The majority of the injuries were reported in Ramle, where a missile impact damaged a daycare facility and surrounding structures.

By Vered Weiss, World Israel News

Hezbollah fired missiles toward central Israel on Monday afternoon, injuring civilians and causing damage at multiple sites, according to Israeli emergency services, police, and hospital officials.

Magen David Adom said 16 people were lightly wounded in the attack.

The majority of the injuries were reported in Ramle, where a missile impact damaged a daycare facility and surrounding structures. Paramedics treated 14 people at the scene, all listed in good condition.

Two additional people sustained light injuries in the Mateh Yehuda Regional Council area after another missile struck nearby, Magen David Adom said.

Police said the missile in that area hit what officers described as “an open area in the Mateh Yehuda [Regional Council] area,” adding that “damage was caused to infrastructure.”

Medical centers later reported receiving several of the injured for further treatment. According to updates reported by Walla, 18 people from the Ramle incident were transported to hospitals in light condition.

Kaplan Medical Center said the patients arrived with minor injuries.

Some suffered head wounds after part of a ceiling collapsed during the strike, while others were hurt after falling as they attempted to reach protected spaces. Several individuals were also treated for anxiety.

Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack and said it had targeted a communications facility in the Haela Valley near Beit Shemesh. In a statement, the group said it launched a “barrage of precision missiles” toward what it described as a “satellite communications station.”

The site referenced in the claim is a civilian installation operated by the European company SES rather than an Israeli military facility.

Emergency responders and police continued assessing the damage at the impact sites as medical teams provided treatment to those injured in the missile attack.

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Rather than restraining the United States, Iran’s actions risk pushing Arab governments closer to Washington.

By Dalga Khatinoglu, Middle East Forum

After suffering U.S. and Israeli strikes on its military and senior officials, the Islamic Republic launched a missile and drone assault against Arab states along the Persian Gulf.

Iranian forces launched roughly 1,500 drones and missiles at Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and even Oman as of March 3, 2026.

While anti-air and missile defenses intercepted most of these projectiles, confirmed impacts were reported on gas facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery, Kuwait’s Al-Ahmadi refinery, three oil tankers in waters south of Iran, and several commercial and industrial sites, including the Omani port of Duqm.

The consequences have been immediate. Qatar halted liquefied natural gas production and exports. Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery, with a capacity of 550,000 barrels per day, has suspended operations.

European and Asian gas prices have surged by 45 percent. The attacks have disrupted oil and petroleum product flows through the Strait of Hormuz, normally about 20 million barrels per day, pushing global oil prices up by 9 percent.

On March 1, 2026, Saudi Arabia warned that it would respond if Iranian attacks continue.

President Donald Trump expressed surprise at Tehran’s decision to target regional states, noting that several countries had signaled willingness to align with Washington should the conflict escalate.

Given Iran’s unsuccessful record in several direct rounds of confrontation with Israel since 2024, Tehran appears to be attempting to pressure Arab states hosting U.S. bases.

The apparent calculation is that these governments would press Washington to halt further strikes on Iran.

So far, however, the strategy has backfired. Rather than restraining the United States, Iran’s actions risk pushing Arab governments closer to Washington.

Several European states have also begun signaling military support for their Arab partners.

On March 2, video footage circulated showing an explosion along one of Iran’s main oil pipelines. Iranian authorities did not comment.

The pipeline connects oil fields in Khuzestan province—which account for roughly 70 percent of Iran’s crude production—to the Jask export terminal, Iran’s only oil outlet outside the Strait of Hormuz.

If confirmed, the incident could be interpreted as a warning that bypassing the Strait would not shield Iran’s own exports from retaliation.

Iran itself is highly exposed to escalation in the Persian Gulf. More than 80 percent of Iran’s oil is produced in areas adjacent to the Gulf.

According to estimates by the commodity intelligence firm Kpler, 96 percent of Iran’s oil exports last year were loaded at Kharg Island—a terminal located in the Persian Gulf.

Five major refineries—Persian Gulf Star, Abadan, Shazand, Lavan, and Bandar Abbas—together account for about 65 percent of output from Iran’s ten refineries, and all are situated in Persian Gulf-adjacent provinces.

Approximately 70 percent of Iran’s gas production comes from the South Pars field, shared with Qatar. Around half of the country’s petrochemical capacity is concentrated in the coastal province of Bushehr.

Beyond energy infrastructure, roughly 70 percent of Iran’s non-oil trade passes through Persian Gulf ports.

The most important of these is Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, which alone handles more than half of Iran’s total imports and exports; one of its docks was reportedly targeted on March 1, 2026.

In practical terms, a substantial share of Iran’s energy and commercial infrastructure lies within reach of Gulf Arab states and their Western allies.

Whether Arab governments join a military coalition against Iran remains uncertain.

However, if attacks on their territory continue, the United States itself could target Iran’s energy and trade infrastructure in the Persian Gulf without requiring formal Arab participation.

The diplomatic fallout may prove even more enduring than the military escalation. The United Arab Emirates—Iran’s second-largest trading partner after China—has closed its embassy in Tehran.

On March 1, 2026, foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned what they described as Iran’s “unjustifiable aggression” and declared they would take all necessary measures to safeguard their security and stability.

According to the statement, Persian Gulf states are actively reviewing potential responses to Tehran’s actions.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, without addressing the launch of roughly 1,500 drones and missiles toward regional states during the first three days of the war with Israel and the United States, insisted that “Iran continues to value good neighborly relations,” an attempt to project normalcy amid rapidly deteriorating ties.

Oman and Qatar, which for two decades have sought to mediate between Tehran and Washington—often engaging in quiet diplomacy favorable to Iran—may now reassess their assumptions.

The message Iranian actions have transmitted is that in moments of confrontation, the Islamic Republic is prepared to subordinate even long-standing regional partnerships to its immediate military calculations.

In strategic terms, Tehran’s decision to widen the battlefield may ultimately weaken its own deterrence more than it constrains its adversaries.

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The missile’s danger lies not only in its range and payload but in its maneuverable re‑entry vehicle, which allows it to alter its trajectory during descent, complicating interception.

By Hezy Laing

Iran’s unveiling of the Khorramshahr‑4 ballistic missile, also known as the Kheibar, has dramatically escalated regional security concerns and accelerated Israel’s push to field its next‑generation Arrow‑4 interceptor.

The Khorramshahr‑4, presented publicly on June 4, 2023, by Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, represents the most advanced iteration of Iran’s Khorramshahr missile family and stands among the most formidable weapons in the Islamic Republic’s arsenal.

The missile is classified as a medium‑range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a declared range of 2,000 kilometers, though some defense analysts believe its true potential may extend closer to 3,000–4,000 kilometers depending on payload configuration.

What makes the Khorramshahr‑4 particularly alarming is its enormous 1,500–1,800 kilogram warhead, one of the heaviest deployed on any regional missile system.

Its liquid‑fuel engine, derived from North Korean Hwasong technology, allows rapid boost‑phase acceleration, while its reported 10–30 meter circular error probable (CEP) gives it a level of precision far beyond earlier Iranian designs.

The missile’s name, “Kheibar,” referencing the historic Battle of Khaybar, underscores Tehran’s intended messaging toward Israel.

The missile’s danger lies not only in its range and payload but in its maneuverable re‑entry vehicle, which allows it to alter its trajectory during descent, complicating interception.

Its heavy warhead is capable of delivering high‑explosive, submunition, or potentially future unconventional payloads.

Combined with Iran’s expanding arsenal of solid‑fuel missiles, the Khorramshahr‑4 represents a leap toward a survivable, accurate, and strategically destabilizing strike capability that can threaten Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and U.S. bases across the Middle East.

The Khorramshahr‑4 is exceptionally difficult to intercept because its maneuverable re‑entry vehicle can shift its trajectory during descent, defeating traditional prediction‑based interception models.

Its high terminal velocity, heavy warhead mass, and reduced radar cross‑section compress the defender’s reaction time, forcing systems like Arrow‑3 and Arrow‑4 to engage under extreme time pressure and complex tracking conditions.

Because the Khorramshahr‑4 reaches terminal speeds exceeding Mach 12, its flight time from Iran to Israel is extremely short.

A launch from central Iran toward Tel Aviv would take approximately 7–10 minutes, leaving Israeli early‑warning systems only seconds to detect, track, classify, and cue interceptors before the warhead begins its maneuvering descent.

In response to this evolving threat, Israel is accelerating deployment of the Arrow‑4, the newest interceptor in its multilayered missile defense network.

According to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) CEO Boaz Levy, speaking at a defense conference in Tel Aviv on February 17, 2026, the Arrow‑4 is expected to enter operational service “within months,” following rapid development progress.

Levy emphasized that the Arrow‑4 is engineered specifically to counter “the threats of tomorrow,” a clear reference to advanced Iranian ballistic systems such as the Khorramshahr‑4.

The interceptor will replace the aging Arrow‑2 and is designed to defeat maneuvering re‑entry vehicles, heavier warheads, and faster boost‑phase acceleration profiles.

As Iran continues to expand its long‑range missile capabilities, Israel’s Arrow‑4 stands as a critical technological counterweight, ensuring that even Tehran’s most advanced ballistic missiles face a robust and evolving defensive shield.

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