India has been Israel’s largest defense customer for years, accounting for 34% of Israeli arms sales between 2020 and 2024, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

By Yaakov Lappin, JNS

Israel and India are deepening a defense and strategic partnership that former Israeli officials say now extends far beyond arms sales to include water technology, trade corridors, and shared efforts to shape regional strategic trends.

In June, Israeli Defense Ministry Director General Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Baram led an official delegation to India and held high-level meetings with India’s defense minister, defense secretary, chief of defense staff and other senior Ministry of Defense officials to discuss expanding bilateral defense and industrial cooperation.

Meir Ben Shabbat, Israel’s former national security adviser, who now heads the Misgav Institute for National Security, told JNS in recent days, “From Israel’s point of view, deepening relations with India has supreme strategic importance and the potential for significant impact on the state’s security and economic and political resilience.”

Describing India as a stable anchor for Israel in Asia, given its status as the world’s most populous country, Ben Shabbat listed several pillars underpinning the relationship, beginning with India’s role as Israel’s top defense customer.

“India is the largest customer of the Israeli defense industries, which finances research and development essential for the IDF,” he said.

He also pointed to intelligence sharing on Islamist terrorism and border security, as well as the diplomatic value of diversifying beyond the West.

“Strengthening ties in Asia reduces Israel’s exclusive dependence on the support of Western and European countries,” Ben Shabbat said, adding that joint production of weapons systems with India helps secure Israel’s supply of raw materials and components during emergencies.

Ben Shabbat also framed the relationship within a broader geopolitical structure, connecting Israel to a wider network of partners across Asia and the Gulf.

“The partnership between Israel, India, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates creates a powerful economic-strategic corridor connecting Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with the potential to connect additional countries,” he said.

He also described India as an enormous market for Israeli civilian technology.

“India offers immense business potential for Israeli cyber, communications, and civilian technology companies,” Ben Shabbat said, crediting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi personally with advancing the relationship throughout the war.

“The friendship of Prime Minister Modi and his policy toward Israel throughout the entire war period has made a significant contribution to the tightening of relations between the countries and peoples,” he said.

Micky Aharonson, former head of the foreign relations directorate of Israel’s National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s Office and now a partner at 6H Ventures, a national security-focused investment fund, told JNS that framing the Israel-India relationship purely around weapons sales understates its scope.

“To say that we’re talking about just security issues is to dramatically diminish the relationship, and when we talk about the relationship, we need to talk not about security but about national security, which broadly means military and security matters plus what I call the ability to preserve sovereignty,” Aharonson said, defining sovereignty in terms of agriculture, water, and food security.

She noted that India faces severe climate pressures, including water shortages.

“Israel is considered a world leader in desalination, wastewater purification, and irrigation technologies,” Aharonson said, arguing that these capabilities are no less important than the military equipment discussed during the Israeli delegation’s visit in June.

Aharonson pointed to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) as a central strategic project tying the relationship together.

“The idea was to connect India through the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe, in the direction of Greece—and it’s not just about a rail line; it’s also about pipelines, fiber-optic cables, and other infrastructure. It’s a critical project for the State of Israel,” she said.

Aharonson warned, however, of a rival route under discussion running from Iraq through Syria that could undercut Israel’s position, describing the initiative as a substantial strategic threat.

“The chance that it won’t happen is mainly because Syria is a state in ruins, and good luck to them dealing with all the militias, but otherwise the Turks very much want to do this, with the encouragement of American envoy Tom Barrack,” Aharonson said.

Aharonson also cited I2U2—the economic and technology framework linking Israel, India, the United Arab Emirates and the United States—as an underappreciated pillar of the relationship. The grouping was launched in October 2021 during a virtual meeting of the four countries’ foreign ministers.

“It’s not less important than weapons, and it’s even more important—food security, water, renewable and green energy, transportation, and supply chains,” she said, noting that agricultural parks have already been established in India under the framework’s water and irrigation cooperation.

On the threats driving India toward Israel, she identified China as paramount.

“They have military confrontations on the shared border in the Himalayas. India fears what is known as the ‘string of pearls’—China’s ports and bases that are slowly closing in around India, in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Djibouti,” Aharonson said, adding that Pakistan, Islamist radicalization by groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the vulnerability of Indian Ocean shipping lanes are additional concerns.

During the June visit, the Defense Ministry released a statement by Baram saying, “India is a key strategic partner of the State of Israel. A bond rooted in shared values, deep cultural appreciation, and mutual trust that goes well beyond mere interests. That is what makes this partnership unique, and the joint projects we are advancing together all the more meaningful.”

Globes reported on Feb. 15, 2026, citing Forbes India, that Israel and India agreed to arms deals worth $8.6 billion in 2026, including Rafael’s SPICE 1000 precision-guided bombs, Elbit Systems’ Rampage air-to-surface missiles, Israel Aerospace Industries’ Air Lora air-launched ballistic missiles and Rafael’s Ice Breaker missile system.

Globes noted that India has been Israel’s largest defense customer for years, accounting for 34% of Israeli arms sales between 2020 and 2024, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Total sales during that period reached roughly $20.5 billion, according to Israel’s Defense Ministry International Defense Cooperation Directorate (SIBAT).

India has also signed multiple major contracts with Israel Aerospace Industries to purchase the naval and ground-based Barak 8 air-defense systems, with a combined value of more than $3 billion.

Aharonson said India serves as a valuable complement—not a substitute—to Israel’s alliance with Washington.

“I don’t think India is a substitute, but India is a very, very significant reinforcement. It doesn’t need to be a substitute; it needs to be one of the club,” she said, arguing that Israel benefits from a broader coalition of democratic, productive partners so that if ties with one weaken, others can help offset the loss.

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For Iran, the Balkans and Central Europe remain vectors for sanctions evasion, money laundering, and proxy influence.

By Jose Lev Alvarez, Middle East Forum

The June 14, 2026, agreement between Washington and Tehran has rendered one conclusion inescapable: Israel no longer can anchor its security to a patron whose priorities shift with every U.S. administration.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz, restoring financial flows to the regime, and launching new nuclear talks have bolstered Iran’s confidence and given renewed resources that revive Iranian networks across the West.

No serious Israeli government should calculate its survival on guarantees that bend to American domestic politics.

Center-right Prime Minister Janez Janša’s return to power, after four years of left-liberal rule by Robert Golob, opens a path for Israel to establish a forward position within the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, diversify its military dependencies, and build strategic depth on the continent.

Israel and Slovenia established diplomatic relations on April 28, 1992, shortly after Ljubljana broke from Yugoslavia.

As Slovenia built a military from the remnants of the Yugoslav People’s Army, Israel supplied small arms, artillery components, and training that gave Ljubljana an early deterrent.

Political ties deepened when Slovenian President Janez Drnovšek visited Israel in 2006, and Shimon Peres traveled to Ljubljana in 2010.

Legal architecture followed: an investment protection treaty in 1999, a double-taxation agreement in 2007, and the establishment of the Israel-Slovenia Chamber of Commerce in 2011.

Bilateral trade stayed modest but holds potential in dual-use technology and defense under the 1995 European Union-Israel Free Trade Agreement.

The relationship deteriorated under Golob. In 2025, Slovenia imposed an arms embargo on Israel, banned entry to senior Israeli ministers, and called for the suspension of the European Union-Israel Association Agreement.

Ljubljana became a megaphone for Tehran inside European institutions, while its United Nations General Assembly record placed it against Israel in roughly 80 percent of relevant votes.

Janša’s return at the head of a right-leaning coalition lifted arms restrictions almost immediately.

Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar hailed Janša as “a clear and steadfast friend of Israel,” and Jerusalem announced its first resident embassy in Ljubljana.

With Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz ousted in Hungary’s April 2026 elections, the pro-sovereignty bloc within the European Union—and even Israel—lost its most reliable European strategic disruptor. Slovenia might fill that role.

This nation of 2.1 million fields roughly 7,000 active-duty troops and allocates about $900 million to defense, or 1.35 percent of gross domestic product.

Its geography delivers leverage: Alpine passes, the Pannonian plain, and the Adriatic port of Koper, which handled more than 1.2 million Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units, the standard cargo measurement, in 2024.

For Iran, the Balkans and Central Europe remain vectors for sanctions evasion, money laundering, and proxy influence.

For Israel, the same terrain offers observation posts, testing grounds, and a diplomatic beachhead.

Indeed, Jerusalem should move from rhetoric to engineered outcomes. First, it should create a joint Israel-Slovenia Cyber Defense Center in Ljubljana, led by Israel’s National Cyber Directorate.

Slovenia’s cyber strategy stresses international cooperation because, as a small state, it cannot defend critical infrastructure alone.

Israeli systems would harden Slovenian grids, banks, and networks against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah hackers.

The first joint red-team exercise against simulated Iranian attacks could occur within 90 days.

Israel gains a European hub to collect and disrupt Iranian cyber and financial networks in the Balkans, reducing dependence on American technology.

Second, Israel might turn Slovenia’s mountainous terrain and Adriatic coastline into a classified testing ground for Israeli drone swarms, loitering munitions, precision-guided munitions, and border-security systems.

A small Israeli liaison cell would embed with Slovenian special forces for quarterly Alpine field tests, with after-action data to Rafael and Elbit for rapid iteration.

Slovenia receives modernized capabilities for migration and hybrid threats. Israel obtains European validation data and an export model free of American political vetoes.

Every system validated in Slovenia is one less tethered exclusively to American platforms.

Third, Jerusalem might place a small high-caliber Israeli diplomatic-intelligence cell inside the new embassy to coach Slovenian officials on Iranian influence operations in European Union institutions and equip them to build blocking minorities or counter-resolutions.

Slovenia can rally Central and Eastern European states against fallout from the United States-Iran deal and institutional hostility in Brussels and Strasbourg.

The goal would be to shift Slovenia’s voting at the United Nations General Assembly and the European Union from automatic opposition to consistent support or abstention on core Israeli security issues, while making Ljubljana the convener of a realist caucus that treats Iranian entrenchment as the primary threat.

Fourth, Israel should direct targeted investment through existing bilateral treaties into the Port of Koper and associated technology parks to create dual-use infrastructure.

Secure corridors for Israeli technology, pharmaceuticals, and defense components would bypass Chinese-dominated supply chains and potential Iranian interdiction points.

This creates economic interdependence, locking in elite support while giving Israel a European logistics hub independent of larger partners.

Janša will not remain in power forever. Brussels has pressured previous Slovenian governments toward conformity.

Iranian networks retain the demonstrated capacity for subversion across Europe. Israel’s window to convert a tactical opening into a structural advantage is measured in months.

The prior government’s hostility was the predictable result of European appeasement politics, now accelerated by the United States-Iran deal.

In the 1990s, Israel helped a newborn Slovenia stand on its own feet militarily. The debt of history now runs the other way. Janša’s government has signaled its willingness to repay it.

Jerusalem must present a concrete package—cyber cooperation, military testing, diplomatic engineering, and economic linkage—that makes Slovenia’s alignment with Israel indispensable.

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Somaliland is strategically located in the center of the Horn of Africa along the Gulf of Aden, directly across from Yemen.

By Etgar Lefkovits, JNS

Israel and Somaliland have been covertly cooperating for many years, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said Wednesday.

The remarks, made during a meeting with visiting Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, come six months after Israel became the first country in the world to recognize the self-declared Islamic nation as an independent state and amid growing diplomatic ties between Israel and Africa.

“For many years, we cooperated under the radar in a series of operations that will remain classified,“ Katz said, according to remarks published by his office.

“Now we are determined to bring our security cooperation to new heights, for the benefit of both peoples and for the benefit of stability in the region.”

Somaliland is strategically located in the center of the Horn of Africa along the Gulf of Aden and directly across from Yemen, where the Houthis hold territory and subject international commercial shipping and naval vessels in the waterway to missile and drone threats.

Earlier this week, Somaliland opened its embassy in Jerusalem.

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A managed exit converts that leverage into joint capability. An unmanaged one turns it into mutual recrimination during a war.

By Gregg Roman, Middle East Forum

The end of U.S. military aid to Israel is no longer hypothetical.

On December 25, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a 350 billion shekel, roughly $120 billion, investment in Israel’s domestic defense industry over the next decade.

Two weeks later, in his Mar-a-Lago interview with The Economist, he confirmed he intends to taper U.S. military aid to zero.

On April 26, Calcalist reported that Washington and Jerusalem were preparing formal talks on a successor framework that drives Foreign Military Financing to zero by 2038, with teams led by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Israeli Defense Ministry Director General Amir Baram.

The era of unconditional U.S. grant aid to Israel is closing. The only open question is whether the transition is built or improvised.

The risks of drift fall on both sides and grow with every quarter the architecture remains undefined.

Begin with the structural reality. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding already set the conditions for a phaseout.

Off-Shore Procurement, the unique provision that let Israel spend roughly 26.3 percent of FMF on its own industry, phases to zero in fiscal year 2028.

Without it, the legacy aid model converts almost dollar-for-dollar into U.S. industrial subsidy. The marginal Israeli industrial benefit from staying inside the system shrinks every fiscal year.

Israel does not need this aid to remain a tier-one defense power. Defense exports hit $14.79 billion in 2024, the fourth consecutive record year.

The combined order backlog at IAI, Elbit, and Rafael exceeded $65 billion at year-end. Germany bought Arrow 3 for €4 billion.

Rafael and Raytheon opened a Tamir interceptor plant in Camden, Arkansas, on a $1.25 billion direct commercial sales contract that will also supply the U.S. Marine Corps.

Elbit’s Iron Fist active protection system now ships on the U.S. Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle. This is not 1979, not 1985. Asking Israel to fund its own defense is not abandonment; it is the recognition of strength.

The American case is parallel. The U.S. defense industrial base operates near full capacity. Record order backlogs have already reduced American manufacturers’ reliance on Israeli procurement.

Senator Lindsey Graham, the staunchest Israel ally in the Senate, has pledged to accelerate the phaseout and recommend the savings be plowed back into the U.S. military.

The Heritage Foundation has a 19-year plan. J Street’s Jeremy Ben-Ami argued on April 14 that ending the subsidy preserves the alliance rather than ends it.

The Heritage Foundation, Lindsey Graham, and Jeremy Ben-Ami do not agree on much. They agree on this.

The risks of drift are concrete. Operation Epic Fury and Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion against Iran are still active. Industrial planning cycles require two-year visibility.

If the successor framework is not signed by the end of fiscal year 2027, U.S. primes including Lockheed on F-35, Boeing on F-15IA and KC-46, and RTX across missile defense face an investment cliff.

So do their Israeli counterparts. The Biden administration’s May 2024 hold on heavy munitions during the Gaza campaign proved that aid creates leverage.

A managed exit converts that leverage into joint capability. An unmanaged one turns it into mutual recrimination during a war.

Four things must happen now.

First, Washington and Jerusalem must sign the successor framework in a narrow timeline: open talks immediately, sign by the end of FY2027.

The architecture is already visible: a managed glide path of FMF from 2028 to 2038, expanded missile defense co-development, a new joint envelope on directed energy, AI, autonomy, and counter-hypersonic capability, and partial conversion of residual FMF to loans on the Polish model.

Each element has bipartisan support. Each replaces grant subsidy with capability investment.

Second, Congress must double the missile defense allocation from $500 million to $1 billion per year. That funding sits outside FMF, runs through the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, and produces capability; Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 4, and Iron Beam that the U.S. military increasingly fields itself.

It is the easiest defensible expansion of the relationship in a Congress allergic to new commitments.

Third, the State Department must reform International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for tier-one allies.

The United Kingdom and Australia secured expedited review under AUKUS. Israel deserves equivalent treatment. ITAR friction now impedes the alliances ITAR was designed to protect.

A 30-day review commitment, paired with reciprocal arrangements at Israel’s Defense Export Control Agency, would unlock joint development the current system slow-walks.

Fourth, Israel must build the institutional infrastructure for the post-aid era. A Defense Industrial Transition Authority inside the Prime Minister’s Office, accountable for the 350 billion shekel implementation.

A Defense Bond Law to ring-fence the funding from general debt issuance. An Israel Defense Export Credit Agency, modeled on the Export-Import Bank of Korea, to finance buyer-nation procurement of Israeli systems.

South Korea graduated from $250 million in annual U.S. aid to a $14 billion defense export complex over fifty years using exactly these instruments.

Israel proposes to compress the same transition into a decade. That requires institutional clarity Israel does not yet have.

The alternative is drift.

Drift means the FY2028 cliff arrives without architecture. Drift means U.S. primes cancel investment in Israel-relevant capability because the order pipeline is uncertain.

Drift means Israeli industry over-rotates toward European customers and atrophies its U.S. footprint precisely when the U.S. Army is buying more Israeli technology than at any point in the alliance.

Drift means political coalitions on both sides, accelerationists in the Senate, sovereignty advocates in the Knesset, capture an issue that should be resolved by professionals.

The post-aid U.S.-Israel relationship will be stronger than the patron-client model it replaces.

Joint development at the program level. Co-production at the industrial level. Preferential access on dual-use innovation.

Operational integration through CENTCOM that has already proven itself against Iranian and Houthi missiles.

None of this requires a $3.3 billion check. All of it requires a framework that does not yet exist.

The work begins soon. It must finish before the cliff.

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