The United States urged Americans to reconsider all travel to the Middle East on Monday, warning that Iran and its proxies could target US interests worldwide as the conflict with Tehran continued to intensify. The State Department also cautioned travelers to expect flight disruptions and rapidly changing security conditions.

The warning came as US Central Command (CENTCOM) launched a tenth consecutive night of strikes on Iran, targeting military command centers, missile and drone launch sites, maritime capabilities, and air defenses. President Donald Trump warned Tehran that “every time Iran kills an American soldier they will pay many times over,” after the Pentagon confirmed that nearly 100 US service members have been injured since July 7, though most have already returned to duty.

Meanwhile, Iran claimed it fired missiles at a US base in Kuwait, struck US military systems in Bahrain, and reported two oil tankers caught fire in the Strait of Hormuz, while Kuwait activated its air defenses against incoming missiles and drones. The Iranian claims have not been independently verified.

As attacks spread across the Gulf, the conflict is increasingly spilling beyond Iran’s borders, fueling fears of a wider regional war and further disruption to one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

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The State Department urged travelers to heed its travel advisories and review the latest security alerts before making travel plans.

By JNS

The U.S. State Department on Saturday called on Americans worldwide, particularly those in the Middle East, to exercise increased caution, citing heightened regional tensions “with the potential for unforeseen escalation.”

“We remind Americans in the region of the continued need for caution and encourage them to monitor the news for breaking developments,” the State Department said in the travel advisory.

“Americans abroad should follow the guidance in security alerts issued by the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate,” it added. “Flight cancellations and periodic airspace closures may cause travel disruptions.”

The alert warned that U.S. diplomatic facilities have been targeted, including some outside the Middle East, adding that “groups supportive of Iran” could target American interests abroad, as well as “locations associated with the United States and/or Americans throughout the world.”

The State Department urged travelers to heed its travel advisories and review the latest security alerts before making travel plans.

Earlier on Saturday, the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem issued a warning message, advising citizens in the Middle East to “exercise increased caution” due to high tensions in the region.

“We remind Americans in the region of the continued need for caution and encourage them to monitor the news for breaking developments. Americans traveling in or through the region should also check with their air carriers to make sure their flights are still scheduled,” the embassy said in a statement.

It advised Americans against traveling to Gaza, northern Israel and Israel’s border with Egypt, except for the Taba Crossing point.

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But while politicidal rhetoric is interesting to monitor, what matters most are the power plays and the strategy for building power on the ground used by Ankara and its allies.

By Michael Rubin, Middle East Forum

In the current strategic landscape of the Middle East, one of the most notable and insufficiently understood elements is the rising influence of Turkey, and of an emergent Sunni Islamic alliance of which it is part.

In this emergent bloc, Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan are the core players. Efforts are under way to draw both Saudi Arabia and Egypt toward this axis.

Ankara’s role, and that of the gathering of which it is part, is notable in that it combines close relations with the United States and other Western powers with support for and exploitation of anti-Western Islamist forces on the ground as a key element of its power-building.

This is an alliance openly opposed to Israel. The language now routinely employed by senior Turkish officials with regard to the Jewish state leaves little room for misinterpretation.

Turkish officials call for struggle against Zionism

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a recent speech, said that “the genocidal, occupying, expansionist ideology called Zionism threatens not only me, not only our party, not only our alliance; it threatens everyone…. When we struggle against Zionism, we are not waging this struggle for ourselves or for personal reasons. We are doing it for our own survival and for the survival of our nation.”

Turkish Interior Minister Mustafa Ciftci said in a June 6 speech that “just as we witnessed the liberation of Damascus, Aleppo, and Karabakh, God willing, one day we will also witness the liberation of Jerusalem.”

But while politicidal rhetoric is interesting to monitor, what matters most are the power plays and the strategy for building power on the ground used by Ankara and its allies.

In this regard, the potentially contradictory pillars of active support for Sunni political Islam and jihadi movements, and self-presentation as an ally of the West should be examined in detail.

Regarding the first aspect, Turkey offers active support to a variety of Sunni Islamist and jihadi authorities and organizations in the Levant and further afield.

The Turkish state is the key backer of the emergent Sunni Islamist regime of President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria.

While Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham movement was not a direct proxy of Ankara, the Turkish decision to maintain a Syrian insurgent enclave in northwest Syria against regime and Russian attacks made feasible Sharaa’s eventual march to Damascus and the destruction of the Assad regime.

Turkey, as a result, is the key external player in the new Syria.

In an agreement signed on August 13, 2025, Ankara took on the role of training and shaping the new Syrian army and security forces.

The goal is to build an army of 200,000 soldiers over the next five years.

Turkey linked to US sanctioned individuals

The new structures are dominated by Sunni Islamist commanders, including many directly linked to Turkey and including individuals designated for financial sanctions by the US Treasury Department because of their involvement in grave human rights violations.

These include Abu Hatem Shaqra, whose Turkish-linked Ahrar al-Sharqiya faction carried out sectarian killings in northern Syria during the war, including the brutal murder of a female Kurdish politician, Hevrin Khalaf, in October 2019.

Shaqra is today a division commander in the new armed forces, with Ahrar al-Sharqiya redesignated as Division 86 of the New Syrian Army.

Other commanders of this type include Mohammed al-Jassim (Abu Amsha), a Turkish-aligned commander similarly sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in October 2023 for his involvement in kidnapping, extortion, and the forced displacement of Syrian Kurdish residents.

Abu Amsha’s former Suleiman Shah Brigade is now Division 62 of the new army. And so on.

What is emerging under Turkish tutelage in Syria is a new phenomenon in the Middle East—namely, an Islamist-controlled state army.

Simultaneously, Turkey is the largest trading partner and primary economic anchor of the new Syrian regime.

Turkish exports to Syria are at record levels, with the two countries targeting an annual volume of trade of up to $10 billion.

Elsewhere in the Levant, Turkey maintains an active Hamas office in Istanbul. This office and other Hamas facilities in Turkey play a direct operational role.

That is, they are used to plan and direct attacks and to move funds.

Hamas officials, up to and including the now-deceased former head of the movement’s political bureau Ismail Haniyeh, travel (or traveled, in Haniyeh’s case) the region on Turkish passports.

In Lebanon, Turkey has been engaged in quiet and systematic influence building in recent years, centering on the Sunni northern city of Tripoli, and the Turkmen community in Akkar.

The recent statements by US President Donald Trump regarding a possible role for the Syrian government in Lebanon appear to reflect the influence that Turkish positions have on the highest reaches of the US administration.

This influence goes via Special Envoy and US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, whose positions often echo those of Ankara.

Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, meanwhile, also frequently adopts positions reflecting the views of Qatar, Turkey’s close ally.

Regarding regional alliances, Ankara has over the last decade developed a close strategic partnership with Qatar, encompassing economic, military, and diplomatic elements.

Turkey is a major importer of Qatari natural gas. Turkey maintains a permanent military base in Qatar.

The two countries share the anomalous position of support for movements of political Islam across the region, together with close links and involvement with the US and Western countries.

The third component of this “strategic triad” (as a study at Qatar-supported Al Jazeera referred to it) is Pakistan.

Turkey is Pakistan’s fourth largest source of arms, as Islamabad seeks alternatives to the West for its source of weaponry (the main exporter of arms to Pakistan is now China).

Turkey maintains extensive investments in Pakistan and consistently votes with Islamabad on issues such as Kashmir in the United Nations.

On the deeper level, the two countries share a similar orientation of nationalism with an Islamic coloration, and a trajectory of historic alignment with the West now turning into something else.

While not linked by formal defense pacts, Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan have similar orientations and compatible and mutually beneficial capacities.

Qatar’s vast financial reach, Turkey’s conventional military capacities, and Pakistan’s nuclear capability together form a powerful combination.

This triad is now presenting itself as an appropriate mediator in Mideast conflicts and the right partner for the US in the region for the period ahead (see Pakistan’s role in the US negotiations with Iran, which produced the current deeply problematic Memorandum of Understanding, as an example of the result).

In practice, the combination of support for political Islam and often for violent Islamist and jihadi organizations as a tool of power projection, combined with strong and deep links into Western systems and economies, makes the current government of Turkey and its allies in Doha and Islamabad a major and emergent challenge both for Israel and for those wishing to assemble a coherent Western policy on the Middle East and beyond it.

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The QME must rest less on American political moods and more on Israeli industrial sovereignty, technology leverage, and regional security architecture.

By Jose Lev Alvarez, Middle East Forum

On June 6, 2026, Israeli forces struck Beirut’s Dahieh district after Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks on northern Israel.

Iran had threatened Israel and then launched ten ballistic missiles.

These operations show Israel can act independently when deterrence requires it, yet also reveal how its qualitative military edge (QME) has narrowed.

Last year the United States diluted that edge by extending advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Gulf partners.

Saudi Arabia received F-35 stealth fighters and NATO non-member ally status; the UAE and others gained additional high-end systems.

This decision carries a clear obligation: these states must become far more proactive against Iran. Advanced platforms cannot remain just as prestigious assets.

Riyadh’s Yemen campaign cannot end without severing Iranian supply lines to the Houthis.

If Washington narrows Israel’s advantage, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi must impose measurable pressure on Iranian networks, weapons flows, proxy infrastructure, sanctions-evasion routes, and maritime blackmail.

U.S. law defines QME as the ability to defeat credible threats while sustaining minimal damage and casualties through superior means.

Israel’s 2026 defense budget stands at roughly $45 billion against $3.8 billion in annual U.S. security assistance.

Israel cannot allow its security doctrine to depend indefinitely on a Washington consensus that erodes its freedom of action.

Israel must also make its QME increasingly independent because American politics on both the left and right is moving in a more hostile direction.

Gallup’s 2026 polling found sympathy nearly split—41 percent with Palestinians, 36 percent with Israelis—reversing the 54-to-31 percent lead Israel held three years earlier.

Pew found only 34 percent of Democrats view Israel favorably, while Republican support has weakened to 69 percent, its lowest level in more than two decades.

The generational picture is worse. Yale’s 2026 youth poll found 55 percent of voters aged 18–22 agreed America should end its “slavish surrender” to Israel and 55 percent agreed Israel is “an apartheid state.”

Whether a post-Trump Republican future is Vance-led or a Democratic future follows an Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez/Gavin Newsom coalition, Israel cannot assume Washington will remain structurally pro-Israel.

The QME must rest less on American political moods and more on Israeli industrial sovereignty, technology leverage, and regional security architecture.

Iran now faces acute economic pressure. The U.S. naval blockade around the Strait of Hormuz costs Tehran an estimated $450 million per day.

This distress creates leverage. Israel should use its channels with Moscow to maintain deconfliction with Russia and pragmatic communication with China.

In sanctions-relief or frozen-asset discussions, the United States and partners should require portions of those funds to be redirected through verified civilian and stabilization mechanisms in Gulf states affected by Iranian coercion.

Such redirection would raise the costs of Iran’s proxy and naval blackmail model.

Restoring the QME requires three practical steps that reduce dependence while preserving selective U.S. engagement.

First, expand distributed production. Israel should establish factories in partner countries to manufacture Israeli-designed systems for those nations’ forces, keeping the most advanced production inside Israel.

This generates revenue, strengthens alliances, and frees domestic factories for national requirements. Existing models can be scaled to multiply capacity without compromising sovereignty.

Second, convert technological advantage into continued U.S. cooperation. Israel can share select battle-tested innovations—advanced loitering munitions, electronic-warfare techniques proven against drone swarms, and directed-energy systems—through joint programs or targeted sales to U.S. forces.

These exchanges sustain influence and mutual benefit even as grant assistance declines.

Third, the United States should help formalize an Abrahamic NATO-style framework that functions more like Five Eyes than a treaty alliance.

It should not be an Article 5 arrangement with automatic collective-defense obligations.

Rather, it should serve as a standing coordination mechanism to prevent disastrous outcomes before, during, and after conflict.

Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco should turn existing informal habits into a permanent framework focused on intelligence fusion, early warning, sanctions enforcement, maritime surveillance, cyber coordination, and planning against Iranian proxies, turning the Abraham Accords into a working security architecture with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco providing financial, logistical, and geographic depth for intelligence networks against proxies and coercion.

These steps address political reality in Washington. Structural pressures—including post-2028 aid negotiations, congressional scrutiny, fiscal constraints, generational hostility, and competing priorities—make one-way dependence unwise. The QME cannot rest on shifting external priorities.

It must rest on Israeli production sovereignty, selective technology leverage, and institutionalized cooperation with states facing the same threat.

Current operations confirm the requirement. Multi-layered defenses intercept most threats, yet the cost-exchange ratio favors cheap mass attacks.

Domestic munitions expansion and directed-energy scaling can correct this. Offshore production and targeted technology sharing with the United States can maintain influence.

A formal Abrahamic-NATO-like intelligence model can turn shared threat perception into operational habits.

There is also an immediate Israeli political reality. If Benjamin Netanyahu wants to survive the wave before the upcoming elections, he must answer Iran’s aggression decisively while delivering visible steps toward QME independence—expanding domestic production, accelerating directed-energy deployment, institutionalizing regional intelligence coordination, and proving Israel’s security future will not be hostage to Washington’s next turn.

The QME was never meant to be a permanent external gift. Recent American decisions extended advanced platforms to other states while doing too little to dismantle Iranian networks.

Israel has demonstrated battlefield independence. Its policy must now match that reality by building the industrial base, technological capacity, and regional partnerships to preserve its edge on Israeli terms.

This is urgent because Iran’s behavior has changed. Before the war, Tehran threatened shipping but did not openly blackmail the Strait of Hormuz with the leverage it now seeks.

The regime is using Oman, mining the area, setting tolls, and demanding more than $24 billion in frozen assets as a condition for negotiations. That is strategic insanity.

Releasing such funds without structural concessions would help the regime remain in power and let it sell the narrative that its resilience—not coercion and proxy warfare—explains its survival.

The State of Israel must act now. A Qualitative Military Edge that depends on Washington’s mood, Gulf hesitation, or shifting American consensus is not a strategic asset; it is a borrowed blade that can be snatched away when needed most.

Only an Israeli-forged QME, built with its own hands, genius, and unbreakable will, can guarantee that when Tehran chooses blackmail, Jerusalem answers not with paralysis or permission-seeking but with the thunder of sovereign power that no ally can veto and no enemy can survive.

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Commentator Mark Levin argues that Israel’s indigenous Jewish roots make its survival non-negotiable, warning that a growing Marxist-Islamist threat within the US puts both nations in grave danger.

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New footage of America’s largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, reveals what was initially reported as a minor fire had actually engulfed dozens of beds and other critical equipment aboard the vessel.

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During its 10 months in the region, the Ford played a pivotal role in enforcing the American blockade on Iranian oil shipments and providing a visible deterrent against regional escalation.

By Eliana Fleming, JFeed

The USS Gerald R. Ford, the most technologically advanced aircraft carrier in the United States Navy, is scheduled to leave the Middle East in the coming days to return to its home port.

This departure marks the end of a record breaking deployment that saw the massive vessel remain at sea for over 300 days, a feat not seen by an American carrier since World War II.

While the return provides much needed relief for the approximately 4,500 crew members on board, military analysts warn that the move will reduce the immediate strike capabilities of the U.S. forces in the region at a time when tensions with Iran remain high.

During its 10 months in the region, the Ford played a pivotal role in enforcing the American blockade on Iranian oil shipments and providing a visible deterrent against regional escalation.

However, the prolonged stay led to significant mechanical wear and tear, forcing the Navy to delay scheduled maintenance cycles twice.

Internal reports indicated that the ship faced a series of technical issues, including problems with the advanced sewage systems and a laundry room fire that injured several sailors.

Standard deployments usually last between six and seven months to ensure the longevity of the ship’s complex systems, but the demands of the current war against Iranian proxies necessitated the Ford’s extended presence.

The departure of the Ford will leave two American aircraft carriers, the USS George H.W. Bush and the USS Abraham Lincoln, to continue monitoring the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.

These vessels are tasked with intercepting vessels carrying sanctioned Iranian oil and providing air support if hostilities break out.

Upon its arrival in the United States, the Ford is expected to enter an extensive overhaul period that could last several months.

Navy leadership emphasized that while the Ford’s departure creates a temporary shift in the regional power balance, the remaining carrier groups are more than capable of maintaining the current blockade and responding to any immediate threats to international shipping or American interests.

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US President Donald Trump expressed surprise at Lebanon’s ban on contact with Israel, calling such laws “crazy” — a stance echoed by critics who say these policies block any real path to peace.

Across parts of the Arab and Muslim world, strict anti-normalization laws criminalize even basic interaction with Israelis, with penalties ranging from prison terms to harsher punishments.

Analysts warn that as long as coexistence is treated as a crime, stability will remain out of reach — reinforcing extremism and making genuine peace efforts far more difficult

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The soldiers could be used to seize Kharg island, Iran’s main oil export hub.

By David Isaac, JNS

A group of roughly 2,200 U.S. Marines are expected to enter the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) region on Friday, The Wall Street Journal reported on Monday.

It will take another few days for them to reach the Strait of Hormuz.

The troops of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, based in Okinawa, Japan, are traveling aboard the USS Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship, and USS New Orleans, an amphibious transport dock. Both ships are designed to transport, land and support Marine Corps forces.

Another group of about 2,200 Marines, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), departed from San Diego aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer on March 18, about three weeks ahead of schedule, according to multiple reports. It will arrive in the CENTCOM region in a few weeks.

The two Marine units will supplement the 50,000 U.S. troops already in the region and bolster U.S. President Donald Trump’s ability to put boots on the ground.

One scenario is to land troops along the shoreline of the Strait of Hormuz to secure that key oil supply chokepoint.

Despite accelerating the Marine deployments, Trump told a reporter last Thursday at the White House, “I’m not putting troops anywhere. If I were, I certainly wouldn’t tell you.”

The Pentagon is deliberating a deployment of a combat brigade of about 3,000 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, which would include elements of the division’s headquarters staff, The New York Times reported on Sunday, citing anonymous senior military sources.

The soldiers could be used to seize Kharg island, Iran’s main oil export hub, the paper said.

Military officials said the preparations were “prudent planning” and did not reflect any orders sent by the Pentagon or U.S. Central Command.

On Monday, in a surprise announcement, the president said that “very good and productive” talks—“in depth, detailed, and constructive” —were taking place with Iran.

To give the negotiations a chance, he placed a five-day pause on military strikes he had earlier threatened against Iranian energy infrastructure.

On Sunday, Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to lift its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. If not, the United States would “hit and obliterate their [Iran’s] various power plants, starting with the biggest one first.”

The energy issue has risen to the fore as the U.S. administration attempts to keep a lid on rising oil prices while Iran promises to send prices past the $200-a-barrel mark to weaken the global economy.

On Monday, Brent crude, the benchmark for most oil outside the U.S., dropped about 11% to $99.94 a barrel after Trump’s remarks that talks were taking place.

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Iran warns it will strike critical infrastructure across the Middle East if its energy assets are attacked.

By World Israel News Staff

Iran threatened on Sunday that if the United States or Israel targets its energy assets, it will retaliate by striking vital infrastructure across the Middle East, including desalination plants critical for providing water in one of the driest regions of the world.

The threat came after President Donald Trump warned that the U.S. could attack Iran’s electricity facilities if Tehran does not reopen the Strait of Hormuz — a crucial maritime route for global oil shipping — by Monday evening. Iran quickly responded with defiance.

“Following previous warnings, if Iran’s fuel and energy infrastructure is attacked by the enemy, all energy, information technology, and desalination infrastructure belonging to the U.S. and the regime in the region will be targeted,” an Iranian army spokesman said in a media statement.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammed Ghalibaf reinforced the warning, stating that any attack on Iran’s power infrastructure would trigger immediate retaliation.

Ghalibaf said Tehran would target “critical infrastructure, energy, and oil across the region,” adding that such assets “will be irreversibly destroyed, and oil prices will rise for a long time.”

Kaveh Madani, a water expert at the United Nations and a former Iranian government official, told Fox News that attacks on desalination plants could have far-reaching consequences beyond the region.

The Middle East “might see a real water war, but the knock-on effects on the world’s economy, including the U.S., will be both immediate and lasting,” Madani said.

“Now, add the possibility of damage to the already fragile water infrastructure, including treatment plants, pumping stations, and distribution networks,” he added. “The consequences would be catastrophic and lasting.”

According to Madani, a recent U.S. airstrike damaged a desalination center in Iran. Tehran responded by striking a desalination plant in Bahrain, signaling it is serious about carrying out its threat to disrupt drinking water resources across the Middle East.

Madani emphasized that Iran is the “least reliant” country in the region on desalination, making such facilities a strategic target in any escalation.

“The Islamic Republic is explicitly including them as legitimate targets for retaliation because this is the biggest vulnerability of the other parties to the war across the Middle East,” he said.

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In an attempt to escalate the conflict, Iran has deliberately targeted several of its Gulf neighbors, launching missiles and drones targeting sites in Kuwait, Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

By Con Coughlin, Gatestone Institute

US President Donald J. Trump’s decision to launch his devastating military campaign against Iran’s ayatollahs means that countries, such as Turkey and Qatar, which have previously been ambivalent about their attitudes towards Tehran, will now need to undertake a serious reappraisal of where their true interests lie.

Prior to Trump launching “Operation Epic Fury,” the military campaign designed to eliminate Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles or support its proxies once and for all, several important regional players sought to remain neutral as the tensions deepened between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program.

Even though they claimed to be allies of the US, they also sought to maintain links with the ayatollahs even when it became abundantly clear that the Trump administration was determined to confront Iran over its clear delaying tactics in the recent round of nuclear negotiations.

Now, following the demise of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as scores of other prominent members of the regime, countries that have previously tried to maintain cordial relations with the ayatollahs face a stark choice: do they want to maintain their ties with known Islamist extremists or forge closer ties with the US and its allies?

How they respond to this dilemma could have vital implications for their future development. By aligning themselves with the West, they will have the opportunity to benefit from having access to the exciting technological revolution taking place in Silicon Valley, involving new technologies such as artificial intelligence.

On the other hand, if they choose to maintain their ties with extreme Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the founders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, they will be left to fend for themselves.

What if, however—Washington and Jerusalem should both carefully note—they choose both? With the Iranian threat gone, what would prevent them from complying with Trump’s demands of the moment and enjoying the benefits of modernity—and then, when he is no longer in office, continue supporting terrorism, religious extremism, and jihad (holy war)?

Just because one is happy to have a roaring economy—as we already see with Qatar—that does not necessarily mean one will be happy with what is already being reported as “concern” about Israel’s increased standing in the region.

The first suggestion that many Arab leaders may be reconsidering their neutral status in the conflict between the US and Iran came over a week ago, when Gulf leaders voiced their condemnation of Iran’s “reckless and indiscriminate attacks” on their territory and infrastructure.

Leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional organization comprising Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, indicated they were giving serious consideration to exercising their right “to respond to Iranian attacks” in order to protect regional security and stability.

In an attempt to escalate the conflict, Iran has deliberately targeted several of its Gulf neighbors, launching missiles and drones targeting sites in Kuwait, Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

The attacks are seen by many as a deliberate ploy by the Iranian regime to pressure pro-Western Gulf states into calling on Trump and the Israelis to end their military campaign against the ayatollahs.

To judge by the response from Gulf leaders, however, the Iranian ploy has had the opposite effect, with Arab leaders now giving serious consideration to abandoning their neutrality and actively giving their backing to the US military campaign.

The only GCC member state opposed to confronting Iran was—predictably—Qatar, a state that has tried to maintain ties with the ayatollahs while becoming one of the main backers of Hamas terrorists in Gaza.

Qatar’s former prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, cautioned that GCC states “must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran,” even though Tehran “violated the sovereignty of the Council’s states and was the aggressor.”

Another sign that attitudes in the Arab world were hardening towards Iran’s mullahs came with a joint statement issued by the leaders of Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, saying that “Iran’s actions represent a dangerous escalation that violates the independence of numerous countries and threatens regional stability.” Targeting civilians and countries not engaged in hostilities is reckless and destabilizing.”

Another important consequence of Iranian aggression is that it has helped to heal the deepening rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, whose relations had been badly affected by rifts caused by their involvement in the conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, where the two monarchies have often found themselves supporting different sides.

In a sign of a rapprochement, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the UAE’s President Mohammed bin Zayed spoke for the first time in months.

The shifting geopolitical landscape in the Middle East certainly makes the position of Turkey, a country that has sought to maintain strong ties with both Washington and Tehran, look even more exposed, especially after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly condemned the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran while saying he is “saddened” by the elimination of Khamenei and offering his “condolences” to the people of Iran.

Erdogan’s reaction is indicative of the close ties he has developed with Iran’s ayatollahs and his opposition to the notion of the emergence of a democratic, Western-aligned government in Tehran.

Prior to the launch of Operation Epic Fury, Turkey had joined several Arab states in trying to negotiate a “diplomatic solution” between Washington and Tehran.

Turkey’s objective in the negotiations was to strike a deal whereby Tehran would be allowed to preserve elements of its nuclear infrastructure, thereby keeping open the option of the mullahs being able to develop nuclear weapons at a future date.

Turkey, which remains a member of the Nato alliance, has done its best to undermine the Trump administration’s military campaign against Iran, denying US forces vital access to its air, land, and maritime space to conduct operations against the ayatollahs.

Pakistan, which sits on Trump’s “Board of Peace,” despite its failure to recognize Israel, has also been clearly pro-Iran, although carefully framing its objections in terms of international law rather than theology.

The Trump administration certainly needs to take note of the long-term hostile conduct of so-called allies such as Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan as the US and Israel attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear program once and for all, and especially in rebuilding Gaza.

At the very least, if Turkey is not prepared to support the US military in times of crisis and no longer acts as an ally—and is indeed acting contrary to US interests—then the White House would do well to conclude that the US and its allies should cease all military cooperation with it.

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Central to this approach is the so-called “mosaic defense” doctrine: a decentralized military structure in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates through multiple regional command centers.

By i24 News and Algemeiner

After last year’s devastating conflict with the United States and Israel, Iranian leaders have reportedly adopted a major strategic shift aimed at expanding the war across the Middle East to secure the regime’s survival, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Previously, Iran responded to foreign strikes with limited, targeted reprisals.

The new doctrine abandons that approach, aiming instead to escalate the conflict regionally, particularly against Gulf Arab states and critical economic infrastructure.

The goal is to disrupt the global economy and pressure Washington into shortening the war.

This decision followed the twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025, during which Israeli and US strikes eliminated senior Iranian military leaders, destroyed key air defense systems, and severely damaged nuclear facilities.

In response, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—before his elimination early in the current conflict—activated a strategy designed to maintain continuity even if top commanders were neutralized.

Central to this approach is the so-called “mosaic defense” doctrine: a decentralized military structure in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates through multiple regional command centers.

Each center can conduct operations independently, allowing local commanders to continue fighting even if national leadership is incapacitated.

This makes the military apparatus more resilient to targeted strikes.

Following the adoption of this doctrine, Iran quickly expanded hostilities, launching missile and drone attacks on the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and critical energy and port infrastructure.

The strategy also aims to disrupt key trade routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes.

Analysts cited by the Wall Street Journal suggest that Tehran’s calculation is to make the conflict costly enough for all parties to force the US and its allies into a diplomatic resolution.

However, the plan carries enormous risks. By escalating attacks on regional states and international economic interests, Iran could provoke a broader coalition against itself.

Despite prior military losses, Iranian forces retain the capability to launch drone and missile strikes, maintaining their influence over the ongoing conflict.

For Iranian leaders, the immediate priority remains unchanged: the survival of the regime, even if it requires a major regional escalation.

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More than 20 percent of global oil is moved through the Strait of Hormuz.

By Reuters and Algemeiner

Brent crude jumped 10 percent to about $80 a barrel over the counter on Sunday, oil traders said, while analysts predicted that prices could climb as high as $100 after US and Israeli strikes on Iran plunged the Middle East into a new war.

The global oil benchmark has rallied this year and reached $73 a barrel on Friday for its highest since July, buoyed by growing concern over the potential attacks that arrived a day later. Futures trading is closed over the weekend.

“While the military attacks are themselves supportive for oil prices, the key factor here is the closing of the Strait of Hormuz,” said Ajay Parmar, director of energy and refining at ICIS.

Most tanker owners, oil majors and trading houses have suspended crude oil, fuel and liquefied natural gas shipments via the Strait of Hormuz, trade sources said, after Tehran warned ships against moving through the waterway.

More than 20 percent of global oil is moved through the Strait of Hormuz.

“We expect prices to open (after the weekend) much closer to $100 a barrel and perhaps exceed that level if we see a prolonged outage of the Strait,” Parmar said.

Middle East leaders have warned Washington that a war on Iran could lead to oil prices jumping to more than $100 a barrel, said RBC analyst Helima Croft. Rabobank analysts slightly less bullish, seeing prices holding above $90 a barrel in the near term.

The OPEC+ group of oil producers agreed on Sunday to raise output by 206,000 barrels per day (bpd) from April, a modest increase representing less than 0.2% of global demand.

While some alternate infrastructure could be used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, the net impact from its closure would be a loss of 8 million to 10 million bpd of crude oil supply even after diverting some flows through Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and Abu Dhabi’s pipeline, said Rystad energy economist Jorge Leon.

Rystad expects prices to rise by $20 to about $92 a barrel when trade opens.

The Iran crisis also prompted Asian governments and refiners to assess oil stockpiles and alternative shipping routes and supplies. Kpler analysts said in a webinar on Sunday that India might turn to Russian oil to make up for potential Middle East supply loss.

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Iranian protesters are being massacred, and Hamas and Al Qaeda are being propped up – not because it serves our national interests but because it serves Qatar’s Jihadist agenda.

By Daniel Greenfield, Frontpage Magazine

Syria’s Al Qaeda regime is massacring Kurds to free imprisoned ISIS terrorists, state sponsors of Hamas in Turkey and Qatar are being named to boards running Gaza, and thousands of democracy protesters are being massacred in Iran while Al Jazeera defends the regime.

This isn’t American foreign policy, but it is Qatar’s foreign policy.

The White House’s foreign policy in the Muslim world is now virtually identical to Qatar’s foreign policy, apart from Israel.

And as thousands die in Iran after empty promises of support, there is a bigger picture here of institutional capture by a tiny and powerful Islamic terrorist state.

Viewed in isolation, the refusal to intervene in Iran might be mistaken for a determination to concentrate on America and China, but that does not explain why the Trump administration has dedicated time and prestige to propping up the Al Qaeda leader of Syria to the point of helping him out by releasing and importing ISIS terrorists to America.

Nor does it explain a convoluted plan for Gaza in which a top Qatari official supportive of Hamas and notorious for his alleged links to spying operations using ex-CIA agents to the ‘Gaza Executive Board’ and the entire plan to reconstruct Gaza. It’s certainly not helping Israel, which has been vocal in opposing Qatar and fellow Hamas state sponsor Turkey from playing a role.

Nor does it even begin to explain why we’re negotiating with the Taliban to go back into Afghanistan with a U.S. military presence for ‘counterterrorism’ purposes when the terrorists whom we’re negotiating with, much as in Syria, are the ones in charge of the country.

There is a consistent throughline here and it isn’t America First, it isn’t ‘isolationism,’ it isn’t Israel, and it isn’t MAGA, but it very much is Qatar along with its Islamist allies: Turkey and Iran.

And this throughline has an ominous similarity to Obama’s New Middle East policy and the way that it consistently empowered Islamist takeovers and protected Iran’s Islamist terror regime.

If we’re not intervening in Iran because we’re non-interventionists, why are we intervening then on behalf of Islamists everywhere from Syria to Gaza?

Much as under Obama, who chose to intervene in Libya and Egypt but not in Iran, the consistent pattern here is one of propping up Islamists, whether through intervention or non-intervention, with inconsistent rationalizations.

Iranian protesters are being massacred, and Hamas and Al Qaeda are being propped up, not because it serves our national interests, but because it serves Qatar’s Jihadist agenda.

Qatar’s foreign policy objectives have been consistent and clear. It elevates and props up Islamic Jihadists and then offers its services in ‘negotiating’ with them.

That means bringing an Al Qaeda affiliate to power in Syria, bringing the Taliban to power in Afghanistan through a fake deal during the first Trump administration, helping Hamas maximize its gains from Oct 7, and preserving the Islamic terrorist regime of the Ayatollahs that it is allied with in Tehran.

The MAGA revolution jettisoned much of the ‘foreign policy blob’ that Qatar had spent billions cultivating through investments in institutions like ‘Brookings,’ and what replaced it was a refreshing breath of common sense in some arenas, but by the second term, the National Security Council and elements of the Pentagon had been poisoned by Koch appointees allied with Soros organizations, which were in turn intertwined with Iranian foreign agents.

Qatar may have lost its original foreign policy blob, but it replaced it with a more ramshackle collection of businessmen with special access and special interests who echoed the same old Obama foreign policy of propping up Islamists while pretending they were something new.

The style was different, but the substance has proven to be the same.

President Trump’s foreign policy is good globally when it confronts China, demands more responsibility from NATO, and challenges Latin American Marxist dictatorships, but that is the official State Department foreign policy as implemented by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

When it comes to the Middle East, however, there is a rogue foreign policy that has little in common with America First or Trump but looks a whole lot like Obama’s old policies.

When it came to the Middle East, foreign policy was outsourced to shady operators like Tom Barrack and Steven Witkoff, who were seen as having a better handle on the region because they had done business there. No one ever got around to vetting their actual interests.

Whatever their agendas are, there is little doubt about what they’ve done and who benefits.

What ISIS couldn’t accomplish in Syria with suicide bombings, it managed to pull off by putting Al-Jolani, now Ahmed Al-Sharaa, in a suit, and the world watched while ISIS terrorists were sprung from their jails, much as the Taliban had freed Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists after Qatar masterminded a deal with the Taliban that, much like Hamas, they were never going to keep.

The path to Al Qaeda’s Syria hegemony was paved with ‘Ambassador’ Tom Barrack lecturing on the importance of allowing the Sunni Islamists to consolidate control over Syria.

This was obviously in the interests of Turkey’s Islamist terrorist regime, which was obsessed with crushing the Kurds, and of Qatar’s Jihadist ambitions, but it has never been explained why any of this is in our interest any more than the Islamist takeovers of Egypt, Libya, and other nations in the region had become the objective of our foreign policy under Obama.

There are areas around the world where an America First policy couldn’t be any clearer, but that is not remotely true in the Middle East, where our foreign policy is wildly inconsistent.

Indeed, the best way to understand our foreign policy in the Middle East is that Qatar has gotten its way on everything except Israel, where it only gets 60% of its way and is scrambling to do away with it.

Much of the current hysteria about Jews and Israel among MAGA influencers can be understood as a Qatari campaign to consolidate its control over foreign policy in the region.

Leftists, libertarians, and members of the woke right who shared little except hostility toward America fused together into their own ideological blob in which Tucker Carlson can interview anti-Trump UN officials like Jeffrey Sachs and Muslim dictators, while Robert Malley, Obama’s disgraced Soros Iran negotiator whose scandal involving the mishandling of classified information was covered up by the Biden administration, can stop by to be interviewed by a veteran of a Soros pro-terrorist site at American Conservative, a ‘conservative media’ outlet that had also claimed that creating a ‘Palestinian’ state was in America’s national interest.

This isn’t MAGA; it’s not America First, it’s Obama sneaking back in wearing a red cap. And the same domestic and foreign enemies who were behind that one are behind this one too.

The question of Israel is a distraction from the real subject, the one that we’re not talking about, of why we’re propping up Al Qaeda and Iran, and what it really means about who’s in control of foreign policy.

No amount of fulminating about the vanished ‘neoconservatives,’ a group that only exists in the editorial section of the Washington Post, by the guilty can distract us forever.

The real question is why are we supporting Islamic terrorists, and who’s calling the shots?

Iran and Gaza are a fault line. They mark the fracture between America First and Qatar. Qatar has won and lost battles over the air strikes on Iran and Gaza, but now it’s winning the war on both. And that’s bad news not just for Iranian protesters or Israel; it’s bad news for America.

Al Qaeda’s consolidation of control over Syria will cost us, as will the survival of the Iranian regime. American foreign policy had two points, defeating terrorists and keeping the Persian Gulf clear, and the Qatar First foreign policy is wrecking both of our interests in the region.

While the Pentagon chases phantom ISIS encampments, Jihadists in suits are once again taking power as they did under Obama’s Middle East, and it won’t be long before we pay the price once again as we did back then and after Qatar negotiated a deal with the Taliban.

The Trump administration is not the first administration to be torn apart by malicious factions, and the best evidence of that is how different Trump’s great foreign policy in Asia, Europe, and Latin America is from his policy in the Middle East.

The president is being badly served by infiltrators acting on behalf of special interests, and it’s time to clean Qatar out of MAGA.

Before the Islamic terrorists being unleashed by our Qatari foreign policy don’t just kill 3 Americans in Syria, as they recently did, but once again kill 3,000 Americans in the United States.

Qatar harbored Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.

Rather than learning our lesson from 9/11, we let Qatar control our policy. And the only question is how many have to die this time before we take back our foreign policy from the terrorists?

The post Why are we following Qatar’s foreign policy on Iran? appeared first on World Israel News.

The return of Iran’s former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and a possible restoration of the monarchy in Iran would add another element to the impact of regime change.

By Michael Rubin, Middle East Forum

The Middle East is seldom tranquil but only certain events unleash waves that reverberate across the region.

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1952 overthrow of Egypt’s monarchy unleashed Arab nationalist violence and revolutions across the region. In 1979, it was Ayatollah Khomeini’s turn. Then came the Arab Spring.

In hindsight, the Arab Spring quickly transformed more into a spring break with burkas instead of bikinis.

Still, what began with the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor protesting a police shake-down spread like wildfire and led to the ouster not only of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled his country with an iron fist for nearly a quarter-century, but also of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled for 30 years.

The violence was contagious and soon consumed Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Civil wars in each country ended their ruling regimes but left chaos in their wake.

The fall of the Islamic Republic would be as momentous. A central pillar of both the Islamic Republic’s constitution and the founding statutes of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was the export of revolution.

While apologists for the Islamic Republic repeat the claim that Iran has not started a war in its modern history, this is palpably false.

Put aside wars in the Caucasus, the seizure of Emirati islands, or efforts to subvert Bahrain: the Islamic Republic’s sponsorship of Lebanese Hezbollah and its co-option the Houthis represent aggression and military investment on par with any invasion.

While Iranian diplomats may whine about Israeli airstrikes and assassinations, the Islamic Republic itself started the war with its megalomaniacal desire to wipe Israel from the map.

The collapse of the Islamic Republic would immediately mean an end to assistance and weaponry to groups like Hamas in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, at least unless Turkey and Qatar fill the gap.

A successful movement by Iranians to oust a hated dictator could reverberate in other ways.

Like Khamenei, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan imprisons opponents and seeks to impose a conservative religious agenda on a country traditionally more moderate.

That Iranians rose up as their currency crashed and inflation spun out of control will also resonate among Turks who have seen Erdoğan’s mismanagement of the economy decimate their savings.

When Erdoğan’s brownshirts arrested Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş and Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu, few Turks came out into the streets.

Turks are proud, though. If Iranians can put their lives on the line for their country to fight back against corruption and dictatorship, Turks may, too.

Erdoğan very easily could find himself following Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and perhaps Khamenei, too, in a Russian exile.

Azerbaijan, too, suffers under an ossified dictatorship. While Azerbaijan extracts billions of dollars in gas and oil from its Caspian oil fields, President Ilham Aliyev’s embezzlement and corruption have impoverished his nation to the extent that per capita income in landlocked Armenia, which lacks oil and is under a dual blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, is higher.

While Azerbaijani irredentists in Baku and the think tank scholars they cultivate in Washington promote ethnic separatism in Iran and dream of cleaving off “South Azerbaijan” to form a greater Azerbaijan, they ignore the intellectual weight of Iranian Azerbaijan.

The traditionally Iranian Azeri city of Tabriz was the epicenter of the 1905-1909 Constitutional Revolution. Azeris edited the first Iranian newspapers. Civil society runs far deeper in Iranian Azerbaijan than across the border in the former Soviet republic.

Should the Islamic Republic fall, the idea that Iranian Azeris would win freedom from one dictatorship and flock to subordinate themselves to another is preposterous.

It would be far more likely that Iranian Azeris would form the core of or host civil society to agitate for Aliyev’s fall.

The return of Iran’s former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and a possible restoration of the monarchy in Iran would add another element to the impact of regime change.

Nasser’s overthrew of Egypt’s monarchy created a domino effect that swept away monarchies in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and ultimately Iran.

For Iran to restore its monarchy would inspire similar calls in Arab countries in which the public juxtaposes their current situation with a romanticized view of the past.

Even if Khamenei falls tomorrow, transition in Iran will be neither quick nor smooth. Still, the ramifications of the end of the Islamic Republic will be as seminal for the region as Nasser’s rise, Khomeini’s revolution, and the Arab Spring. What happens in Iran will not stay in Iran.

The post Could a successful revolution in Iran spread? – analysis appeared first on World Israel News.

Israeli Arab activist Yoseph Haddad blasted anti-Israel demonstrators in Germany, noting that many are Arabs who fled chaos in the Middle East and cannot safely return—while he, as an Israeli, can.

The post WATCH: Yoseph Hadadd leaves anti-Israel protesters in Germany floored with one question appeared first on World Israel News.