Iranian Armed Forces spokesman Gen. Abolfazl Shekarchi vowed that Iran will never make peace or surrender to the United States, warning that Tehran will “fill the mouths of U.S. officials with dirt.”

Iranian Armed Forces Spokesman Gen. Abolfazl Shekarchi: Nowhere in the Region Is Safe for Americans; One Day We Will Fill American Officials' Mouths with Dirt; We Will Never Make Peace with Our Enemies pic.twitter.com/pHemk9UepR

— MEMRI (@MEMRIReports) July 21, 2026

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From its inception, the Guardsmen have understood their confrontation with the United States not as a dispute over particular policies but as an enduring ideological conflict between the “front of truth” and the “front of arrogance.”

By Saeid Golkar, Middle East Forum

For many observers of Iranian politics, the most important question after the 2026 war and ceasefire is whether the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would support the Memorandum of Understanding and whether the Memorandum could lead to a fundamental change in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ identity and strategy.

The Guard’s own messaging suggests the answer is no.

The aftermath of the 2026 war seems to have strengthened the Revolutionary Guard’s political weight within the Islamic Republic’s decision-making structure, especially after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had been the ultimate decision-maker.

At the same time, his son and official successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, has remained absent from public view since the war started, making the official interpreters of the Supreme Leader’s thinking inside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps important for understanding the regime’s public line.

Among all, Hojatoleslam Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is one of the most important voices.

His office functions as the Guard’s ideological and political command center, supervising political and ideological education, shaping the organization’s propaganda and political messaging, overseeing its system of political commissars and propagandists, and ensuring that commanders and rank-and-file personnel remain committed to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, the idea of guardianship of the jurists, on which the Islamic Republic is based.

The Guard’s representative office to the Supreme Leader is important because its cohesion depends on not only military organization but also an ideological and political system.

The office shapes how Guardsmen understand and interpret both domestic and international politics.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps media organizations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Basirat website and its weekly magazine, Sobh-e Sadegh, serve as the organization’s primary propaganda and political platforms, through which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps explains the Guard’s official positions, justifies controversial decisions, and communicates the ideological boundaries within which commanders, Basij members, and the broader revolutionary constituency can operate.

In this context, when Sadeghi delivers public statements immediately after one of the most significant foreign policy developments in recent years, those remarks are not simply religious sermons but carefully crafted institutional messaging.

Sadeghi’s two recent statements—one addressed directly to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and Basij members, and the other delivered during a press conference—provide the clearest explanation of the Guard’s understanding of the new Memorandum of Understanding.

Along with many other speeches and messages by Sadghei and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps political deputy general Yadollah Javani, they reveal that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps does not see the agreement as a strategic reorientation.

It portrays the Memorandum as a tactical adjustment authorized by Mojtaba under exceptional circumstances. The emphasis is that the Guard’s ideology and strategic orientation remain unchanged.

The legitimacy of the agreement derives from the Supreme Leader’s permission, according to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ official interpretation, as Sadeghi insists that whatever the Leader authorizes becomes binding on all revolutionary forces.

Even more revealing is his repeated effort to suppress internal criticism.

While parts of Iran’s hardline camp have accused government officials and members of the Supreme National Security Council of weakness or betrayal in recent weeks, Sadeghi rejects such accusations, but he also rejects the opposite interpretation that the Memorandum completely fulfilled the Leader’s objectives.

Unity does not equal moderation. Sadeghi spends more time reaffirming the Guard’s traditional worldview than discussing the Memorandum itself.

He reminds his audience that the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rested on two permanent principles: absolute loyalty to the Supreme Leader and permanent struggle against global arrogance.

The Guard continues to describe the United States as the principal embodiment of that arrogance.

Sadeghi emphasizes repeatedly that the Guardsmen “never shake hands with the enemy,” in reference to President Donald Trump shaking hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and that negotiation does not mean reconciliation.

This continuity is not surprising to people who are familiar with the Guard’s ideological literature.

From its inception, the Guardsmen have understood their confrontation with the United States not as a dispute over particular policies but as an enduring ideological conflict between the “front of truth” and the “front of arrogance.”

In the Revolutionary Guard’s worldview, resistance is a strategic doctrine, not a tactic. This aligns with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ideological and political training, which portrays the United States as the leader of a global system of domination while casting Iran as the leader of the axis of resistance.

Within this worldview, tactical flexibility does not imply strategic reconciliation or rearrangement.

This also helps to explain why the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps emphasizes military readiness despite discussing a diplomatic agreement.

Its emblem includes a Quranic verse: “And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows.”

In this case, rather than presenting the Memorandum of Understanding as the beginning of de-escalation, he instructs commanders to strengthen both their hard and soft capabilities.

Quoting the Qur’anic injunction to “prepare against them whatever force you can,” he argues that the present moment is a time for increasing power, not reducing it. Even while defending the Memorandum, the Guard continues to frame the external environment as one of continuing confrontation, justifying its efforts to expand the Guard’s power and influence.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these statements is their repeated insistence that the Memorandum will not change the revolutionary and Islamist identity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps itself.

Sadeghi rejects attempts to distinguish today’s commanders from those who died during the Iran-Iraq War, arguing that the current generation of commanders remains just as ideological as their predecessors.

He concludes by declaring that anyone hoping the Guard will one day separate itself from clerical rule “will take that wish to the grave.”

This rhetoric is intended to reassure both the organization’s rank-and-file and its broader revolutionary constituency are not ideological retreats.

While analysts often interpret Iranian diplomatic initiatives as evidence of moderation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ own materials suggest a different reading.

For the Guard, the agreement is justified as an instrument for managing immediate external pressures and protecting the Islamic Republic during a dangerous period, not as the beginning of a post-revolutionary or post-Khamenei foreign policy.

Recent tanker attacks make it clear that they are not using the pause to reduce pressure; instead, they try to shape the pause.

If this reading is correct, then expectations that the Memorandum will lead to the gradual normalization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are mistaken.

Resistance, anti-Americanism, anti-Israeli policy, and absolute loyalty to the Supreme Leader remain the permanent foundations of Iran’s revolutionary and Islamist identity.

The memorandum is, therefore, better understood as tactical adaptation akin to Khamenei’s earlier concept of heroic flexibility. As Sadeghi explains, negotiation is not the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ preferred choice, but resistance remains its principal strategy.

This has important policy implications for the United States and its allies. They should not assume that if Iran follows parts of the Memorandum of Understanding, it will lead to broader moderation.

Iran needs the Memorandum to get through the current crisis, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still depends on maritime insecurity, proxy groups, and ideological mobilization to protect its long-term interests.

Policymakers should be able to distinguish between temporary restraint and genuine strategic change. Real change would require the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to rethink its mission, its relationship with the Supreme Leader, its approach to the United States and Israel, and its use of asymmetric tactics to maintain the regime.

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President Donald Trump called the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the US and Iran a test that Iran did not honor, claiming he had called it from the beginning.

Trump on Iran:

The memorandum of understanding was sort of a test and they didn't honour the test. https://t.co/8aPZ2aEMWh pic.twitter.com/Zx4YmB8Pky

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) July 13, 2026

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President Donald Trump, speaking to reporters at the 2026 NATO Summit, called the Memorandum of Understanding with Iran “over” after the “sick” regime struck several ships in the Strait of Hormuz.

BREAKING: President Trump announces he believes the ceasefire with Iran is "OVER"

"To me, I think it's over. I don't want to deal with them… There's SICK people.. They're vicious, violent people.

"It's just a waste of time dealing with them. They're LIARS."

Obviously,… pic.twitter.com/rbRGwpsRar

— Nick Sortor (@nicksortor) July 8, 2026

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Iranian Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Ghalibaf, one of Iran’s top negotiators, boasts that the newly signed memorandum between Iran and the US is a signal of American defeat.

Iranian Majles Speaker Qalibaf: Khamenei’s Blood Will Be Avenged by Liberating Jerusalem; Iran Will Never Allow IAEA Access to Bombed Nuclear Sites; The MoU Proves America Was Defeated; We Must Build a True Strategic Partnership with China pic.twitter.com/lgBjSKdg8N

— MEMRI (@MEMRIReports) July 2, 2026

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U.S. President Donald Trump said earlier on Wednesday that the technical talks were going “very good.”

By JNS

Iran and the United States held indirect technical talks on implementing their June 17 Memorandum of Understanding, Qatar said on Wednesday night.

Qatari and Pakistani mediators “concluded separate meetings with the U.S. and Iranian negotiators in Doha today, with positive progress made on issues related to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding,” Majed al-Ansari, a spokesman for Doha’s Foreign Ministry, stated.

The talks built on the outcomes of a first round of talks held in Switzerland on June 20, the spokesman said.

“The parties agreed to continue discussions over the coming period, with the next meeting to be scheduled at the earliest possible time following the funeral processions of the former Iranian supreme leader,” he added.

Mass funeral ceremonies for Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are set to begin on Saturday, more than four months after he was eliminated in the opening Israeli Air Force strikes of “Operation Roaring Lion/Epic Fury.”

The processions are expected to conclude with his burial at the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad on July 9.

U.S. President Donald Trump said earlier on Wednesday that the technical talks were going “very good.”

Tehran has “come a long way” in implementing the MoU and was “getting along very well” with the United States, he told reporters at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland.

“We hit them very hard last week,” Trump said when asked about reports he had considered resuming all-out war with Iran. He added, “I think they’re fine.”

“It’s the denuclearization of Iran—it’s very simple. And Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon,” the president said.

Sources familiar with the talks told Reuters they focused on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and unfreezing Iranian funds, adding that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program was not discussed because the meetings were technical in nature.

Senior U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who were in Qatar for what the White House had described as “high-level” talks, did not attend the meetings, according to a source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the regime’s top negotiator, announced on Tuesday that Tehran would not take part in further talks until the conditions outlined in the MoU were met, including an end to the fighting on all war fronts.

He said the current negotiations were aimed at ensuring the United States fulfilled its commitments.

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When Iran’s hardline regime—the same as before, just with new faces—becomes restive again, it will be far more difficult and more costly in blood and treasure to stop.

By Grégoire Canlorbe, Gatestone Institute

“Peace through strength,” when it comes to U.S. President Donald J. Trump, appears to mean “peace through whatever “works”—diplomacy, sometimes seeming to verge on suicidal patience, and economic pressure, with military pressure only as a last resort, and even then, only in a short-run way.

As one might expect from the co-author of The Art of the Deal, the core of his foreign policy so far has been making deals—or trying to.

Trump has not been afraid to use pressure — economic and short-run military — to persuade foreign powers to sign agreements that match U.S. interests or, when U.S. interests are not involved, to make the world, eventually, more peaceful for the free world.

Among Trump’s amazing achievements at the White House are indisputably the Abraham Accords and—in dazzling partnership with Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—freeing the Hamas hostages and effectively demolishing much of Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure, a threat no prior president had the courage to confront.

Unfortunately, when it comes to the Middle East, Trump’s approaches have not been the magic bullets he might have hoped.

With the plan of turning Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East”—both Hamas-free and (in the October 2025 update of the plan) placed under the administration of a committee supervised by a “Board of Peace”—much of which, bizarrely, appears made up of countries engrossed in waging jihad—Trump has so far been less than successful.

Hamas, to this day, has not disarmed and refuses even to entertain the notion. Much of Gaza remains solidly under its control.

In addition, Trump’s January promise to the Iranian people that “HELP IS ON ITS WAY” seems equally on the rocks.

Executions of dissidents have once again been stepped up, and the US is apparently doing nothing about it.

Trump appears first to envision a goal and then the extent to which that goal may be reached through dealmaking or pressure.

If the goal cannot be reached fully in those ways, the goal is then revised downward, if not abandoned. Trump appears to choose dealmaking over war and adjusts his goals accordingly.

When the goals are adjusted downwards from U.S. and Western interests, the results tend to be less than positive.

One issue in which The Art of the Deal might have been better left aside is trying to negotiate with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Trump’s abrupt decision, on April 8, 2026, to end the joint U.S.-Israel offensive (Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion), which had begun February 28 — evidently signaled to adversaries not strength but weakness: that he could not tolerate more than a short-run intervention.

The Arab Gulf states, as Iran’s rulers had most likely planned, presumably informed Trump that they did not appreciate being attacked.

Most of the declared goals of the US offensive—including that “Help is on its way”—have, tragically, been abandoned.

According to the U.S. version of the MOU (Iran released this one) and according to Trump himself, “It’s okay” if Iran’s radical Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has ballistic missiles.

In addition, after 60 days, control of the Strait of Hormuz will be negotiated, as will control of Iran’s enriched uranium, which Iran is apparently planning to “blend down” until it is enriched back up again.

Also apparently up for grabs are control of a sovereign state, Lebanon, in addition to Iran’s other proxies, Hamas and the Houthis, neither of which was even mentioned in the MOU – and control of Iran’s centrifuges to resume enriching uranium “for peaceful purposes only,” of course—and presumably for making nuclear weapons on the side, just as in President Barack Obama’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) “nuclear deal.”

Trump’s stated reason for going to war was that “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon” — it is why the U.S. and Israel in June 2025 bombed three mountains within which Iran stored its enriched uranium.

Now Iran is saying that it has “no choice but to obtain nuclear weapons.”

American voters are watching the IRGC dictate its terms to the US — as if they were the victors. No wonder Iran’s leaders are celebrating.

Souk-bargaining over the end of the MOU, after all the money and benefits have been given up front—including $300 billion, $3 billion of which has already been transferred to them—will easily outlast the Trump Administration to enable Iran’s regime to rebuild, possibly stronger than before.

Trump’s MOU will not bring peace. It is simply a coffee break until he is safely out of office.

Later, when Iran’s hardline regime—the same as before, just with new faces—becomes restive again, it will be far more difficult and more costly in blood and treasure to stop.

A single one of Iran’s ballistic missiles can obliterate an entire city block. Ballistic missiles may not be able to “blow up the planet,” but they can threaten and devastate other countries—and were seemingly the reason Trump called for the April 8 ceasefire.

That call was possibly Trump’s greatest disaster. America was winning—then Trump stopped!

Iran’s ballistic missiles can hit Europe as well as Israel and other neighbors in the Middle East.

Future models will be able to reach Boston, Washington, DC and New York. It would have been so much easier to stop Hitler before he crossed the Rhine.

When the ceasefire was announced in April, Iran’s missile and drone capabilities had been severely degraded, its air force and navy mostly annihilated, and its defense-industrial base largely destroyed (but its reconstitution not prevented).

Iran’s energy infrastructure is still in place and, most importantly, there has been no regime change: the IRGC became the sole power structure with the new, incapacitated Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei formally sitting at the top.

There are no moderate IRGC jihadists—no Delcy Rodríguez-like figure with whom to negotiate—just as there were no moderate Nazis in Germany. If there is no real regime change, there will be no peace.

After the April 8 ceasefire, several requests were relayed to Tehran through the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on naval vessels, air-defense systems, radar, surveillance, command-and-control sites, and drone- or missile-related control nodes.

In the meantime, however, demands for Iran to renounce its nuclear weapon ambitions, relinquish its enriched uranium, limit its ballistic missile production and discontinue support for its proxies, would all be reduced to just opening the Strait for shipping, possibly until the IRGC felt like closing it again

No one is expecting Iran’s regime to live up to anything it signs anyway. It never has.

The Trump Administration is reportedly waiting to see a “change in destructive behavior”—which may last only as long as the time it takes to change a “toll” to a “fee” for the “service” of allowing transit of commercial cargo ships through an international waterway, especially when Trump’s term in office is over.

Trump’s current MOU “deal” is a deal to talk about a deal—for eternity.

“Rather than waging the war to the end, Trump chose to suspend it,” wrote Guy Millière, a senior fellow of the Gatestone Institute, on May 26.

“When one wages a war and is winning, one does not stop along the way; otherwise, one gives the enemy a respite and gives it the means to reorganize and rearm. […] The agreement, if it is reached and if it corresponds to what it appears to be […], will lead to the regime parting with its enriched uranium and saying that it renounces its military nuclear program. That said, the renunciation of its military nuclear program will be merely a verbal renunciation. […] If the agreement is reached, whatever its content, it will leave the regime in place, and that regime will still be a fanatical regime […] seeking to destroy Israel and support Islamic terrorism. This regime will regard its survival as a victory.”

Trump, for all his mastery in the “art of the deal,” refuses to see the leadership role of the U.S. through to the end. He “choked,” as he would say.

Trump, after claiming that “help is on its way,” abandoned the Iranian populace.

Then, when Israel was told not to protect itself adequately from the missiles and attack drones launched by Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, Trump abandoned Israel—just as the Iranians had planned.

The most tragic part is that Trump’s original instincts were right. Turn Gaza into a “Riviera in the Middle East”—an American protectorate on the Mediterranean, perhaps with a U.S. military base to keep order.

Trump seems to have let himself fall into a trap of listening to “friends”—who are not friends—then sidelining and excoriating his true friends, such as Israel.

While Trump was boasting that Iran’s new IRGC rulers with whom he is negotiating are “less radical,” the very man who had electronically signed the MOU, Iran’s “New Rational Leader,” Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, immediately went on television declaring the “liberation of Jerusalem.”

If some of the rulers in the Middle East convinced Trump to let them generously “help” with the reconstruction of Gaza, it may well have been to acquire a foothold on Israel’s border from which to keep trying to obliterate Israel.

Despite all the glowing advancements promised by the Abraham Accords, no one new seems to be rushing to join them. Perhaps these countries have a different plan in mind.

America regrettably cannot be “made great again” without restoring its leadership as a bulwark against oppression and barbarism.

Unless the Trump Administration can demonstrate a real win—not a fake one, no matter how often Trump tries to tell us how good his deal is—his party may not even be able to keep the House and Senate in the midterms this November.

No wonder Trump did not want the MOU made public. By now, he probably knows it is a dud. He is probably concerned about America’s 250th birthday party this week and the price of gas at the pump.

Where fulfilling the role of a great world leader is compatible with dealmaking, Trump appears to be willing to assert himself as a great power, but where a choice has to be made between that and the terrible advice he is following to negotiate with terrorists instead of dictating his terms to them, he appears to shrink back to his role as a dealmaker—and from the looks of it, not even one that can best Iran or Hamas.

Perhaps Trump has become infatuated with dreams of glory—even for a fake peace—rather than for America

First or even the future of the West. Many of Trump’s new fake “friends” are, in reality, cold-blooded dictators who loathe the West and, despite what they tell him, have not lost their appetite one day to overthrow it.

Qatar has “invested” more than $400 billion in infiltrating the US – possibly more than a trillion dollars all told—no doubt with Muslim Brotherhood “strings attached.”

China is waging war on America every way it can. It maintains secret biological warfare laboratories in California and Nevada that are developing deadly genetic pathogens.

It sends poisonous agricultural seeds to the U.S.; steals American intellectual property valued at roughly $600 billion a year; sends spy balloons over U.S. military sites, buys up “farmland” next to them, and smuggles in fentanyl to kill around 100,000 Americans each year—the equivalent of one jumbo jet crashing every day.

Trump’s Russian “friend,” President Vladimir Putin, has a record of killing critics too numerous to name, razing Grozny, and invading Georgia and Ukraine.

If one were to ask many countries in the Middle East if they would rather go forward into the 21st century with artificial intelligence and high tech or remain in the 7th century, they would probably ask why they cannot have both: better technology with which to fulfill Allah’s divine mission of a global caliphate.

Trump is poorly placed to warn that the U.S. might have to distance itself from some European countries undergoing Islamization when he himself cozies up to supporters of terrorism such as Qatar—which, according to at least one expert, “funds more terrorism than Iran”—or Turkey, which is reportedly preparing for war, or Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom Trump appears proud of having “essentially put there; he’s doing a phenomenal job,” but under whose leadership attacks on Alawites, Christians, and Druze have “skyrocketed,” despite Western-friendly talk about “inclusivity” and “pluralism.” Meanwhile, Syria is “coming together” more hard-core and Islamized than ever.

Perhaps Trump is hoping to win over these dictators. Perhaps they might even sound won over—until his presidency is over.

As a Western power, you should never prioritize the interests of a non-Western power over those that are Western—even if it looks as if your short-term interests are being served.

It can backfire someday. The issues of civilization, the continuing security of the West, cannot be detached from national interests. 1

The 2025 White House National Security Strategy correctly refers to European countries’ ongoing “loss of national identities” and to the “stark prospect of civilizational erasure.”

The report also raises the question of, by that erasure or by “regulatory suffocation,” “whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.”

Trump has negotiated impressive investments in the US from oil-rich Arab states. Qatar, for instance, committed last year to investing $1.2 trillion in America, as well as a $400 million aircraft, the “flying palace,” among other tributes. What have they asked for from Trump as his end of the deal?

Regarding the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran, Trump lately has been favoring the interests of Muslim countries over those of Israel.

On June 24, 2025, and then on April 8, 2026, Trump prevented escalations that would have endangered Iran’s Muslim neighbors.

However, he then called for a ceasefire that prevented Israel from further weakening Iran.

On April 8, Trump called for another ceasefire just as Israel was successfully degrading Iran’s biggest proxy Hezbollah, which has been bombarding Israel, most likely at the behest of Iran.

Having Hezbollah bombard Israel serves at least two of Iran’s objectives. It drives Israelis out of the northern part of their country—Iran might hope permanently—then, when Israel retaliates, Trump orders it to stop before it can accomplish its goals.

The latest ceasefire also created tension between the U.S. and Israel, which Iran regards as its two biggest targets singled out for demolition.

Trump acted similarly again in March and May, when he asked Netanyahu to abstain from some strikes.

Trump would have done better to learn from Netanyahu rather than to hamper his efforts.

Trump still can tell Iran’s regime that “We won, you lost, and now here is what you are going to do.” Trump can still decide to make Gaza the “Riviera of the Middle East” under joint American and Israeli supervision.

It is what American voters are waiting to hear. Until then, Iran is effectively calling the shots while Trump is backtracking on one red line after another: ballistic missiles, removing Iran’s enriched uranium, “Help is on its way,” ending Iranian support for terrorist proxies, possibly freedom of navigation—and a status quo of once more having Iran enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

Why should Americans vote for that? Many must be justifiably horrified. America is—again! — choosing to lose.

The entire West would do well to get over the illusion that fighting back against those planning to destroy you is endangering you.

If adversaries are planning to destroy you, you are already in danger. Confronting them is the proper reaction, not the wrong one

Israel’s retaliation against Hamas in Gaza did not cause masses of Muslims or Palestine-friendly Westerners to rally against Israel.

Pursuing the operations in Iran would not have resulted in chaos.

Now, Iran is being allowed to continue being a major source of regional and worldwide destabilization and a threat to Israel and America. That is what will result in chaos.

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A restored Iran would intensify pressure on neighbors, rebuild alliances with proxy militias, and pursue vengeance against external opponents.

By Majid Rafizadeh, Gatestone Institute

The Iranian regime’s strategy is clear: survive the pressure of President Donald J. Trump’s second term by any means necessary, secure breathing room through negotiations, and position itself for a far more aggressive posture once his administration is over.

Iran has long mastered the art of playing for time: it sees that American presidential terms are finite, while its own project is not.

With Trump’s decisive military actions having inflicted significant damage on Iranian capabilities and proxies, the regime finds itself economically crippled and militarily weakened, yet determined to drag out talks, extract concessions, and wait.

Last week, the U.S. and Iran signed an initial memorandum of understanding to end active hostilities, ease certain sanctions, facilitate reconstruction funds, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump’s team highlighted commitments on nuclear inspections.

Vice President JD Vance noted progress on access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—to which, of course, Iran’s regime has never granted real, anytime-anywhere access, so essentially the achievement is empty.

Even so, almost immediately, tensions resurfaced. Iran’s leaders threatened to reclose the Strait over alleged breaches, prompting sharp warnings from Trump.

Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—Tehran’s “new rational mind”—who had just electronically signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Vance, immediately went on television and called for the “liberation of Jerusalem (Quds)”:

“We must uphold that honor, remain committed to that vision, and carry out that mission. A hundred Netanyahus are not even worth the shoelace of our martyred Imam.”

He also wrote on X, concerning the very first point of the 14-point memorandum of understanding:

“They can never isolate any part of the pillars of resistance alone. The jihad efforts of Lebanon’s brave warriors and the powerful diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran will guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of dear Lebanon and will disrupt the crazy games and warmongering of the Israeli regime.”

In short, the West can never separate Hezbollah in Lebanon—Iran’s largest proxy and forward base right on Israel’s border—from Iran.

A few days after that—revealing the regime’s confidence in extracting maximum gains at the diplomatic table even amid recent setbacks—Ghalibaf declared:

“Everything we sought to achieve through military action, we obtained several times over through negotiation; it was not even comparable.”

This pattern—hard bargaining mixed with oscillating replies—reflects a regime that publicly projects defiance while privately craving the financial relief that sanctions relief provides.

Iran’s leaders know they cannot match Trump’s strength in the near term.

Unlike previous administrations, Trump, in both of his terms, has featured maximum pressure: economic pressure as well as military strikes that degraded Iran’s missile arsenals, naval assets, and proxy networks.

The regime’s economy is gasping: inflation has soared, foreign currency reserves are depleted, and paying soldiers and maintaining patronage networks grows harder by the day.

As Trump has noted, the mullahs lack the funds to sustain their apparatus without external relief. They are at the table not out of goodwill but for survival.

They drag out negotiations, starting with maximalist demands, testing Western patience, and ultimately aiming for a deal that lifts sanctions without delivering irreversible curbs on their nuclear ambitions.

In 2015, under then-President Barack Obama, Iran secured the JCPOA “nuclear deal”—a 10-year runway to acquire nuclear weapons by 2025.

Iranian officials have already been boasting, as above, that diplomacy delivered more than war could have done.

Trump himself, highlighting the regime’s patient, long-term approach, noted that “Iran never won a war but never lost a negotiation.”

Iran’s officials are not bound by election cycles; their singular mission is regime preservation to bring “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

Assume that a comprehensive deal materializes: robust inspections, enrichment limits, proxy restraints, and sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable compliance.

The regime’s track record suggests that the probability of honoring the terms would be zero. Iran has repeatedly violated past agreements while proclaiming adherence, as it was clandestinely advancing its nuclear weapons program.

Even if Iran’s new rulers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) temporarily say they will comply with everything in the agreement, they would view any restriction as temporary—and then wait for Trump to leave office.

Money has already started to flow again before even a single Iranian concession, especially the fake minute of IAEA inspectors.

Iran, in exchange for receiving billions of dollars, gave up precisely nothing – and the hapless US negotiators evidently agreed to that.

Reconstruction pledges so far amount to more than $300 billion—twice as much as the entire Marshall Plan for Europe, updated in today’s dollars.

The real danger looms after Trump’s term is up. Without his willingness to wield overwhelming force, his successors — whether Republican or Democrat — may well lack the resolve for decisive action. Iran has signaled as much through figures like Ghalibaf, who declared that “Hormuz will never return to pre-war status” and, after US agreement, would take permanent control of the Strait.

Post-Trump, Iran could impose tolls, “fees,” and “protection payments” on ships transiting the Strait, harass shipping, and assert control over this critical chokepoint if no one has the will to stop them—which is what Iran is probably counting on.

Regionally, the regime would continue to expand its influence through reviving its proxies.

The recent conflict revealed vulnerabilities of the Gulf states, which Iran would no doubt continue to attack or threaten to attack.

A restored Iran would intensify pressure on neighbors, rebuild alliances with proxy militias, and pursue vengeance against external opponents.

Domestically, the regime would continue to crush dissent, probably even more brutally.

Iran has already, once again, stepped up executing its dissidents, most likely as a warning not even to think of challenging the rule of the IRGC.

Why does virtually every commentator keep repeating that the Iranian people must change their regime?

If even the mighty United States backs down from the task, why should anyone expect unarmed civilian protesters to do it for them?

The regime mowed down more than 40,000 of its own citizens in January alone. That is precisely why the regime must be changed—the sooner the better.

So long as the current regime remains in place, especially after being thoroughly enriched, there will be no peace in the Middle East.

Above all, the regime, drawing lessons from North Korea, Libya, and Ukraine, would restore and accelerate its nuclear weapons program.

Iranian regime insiders prioritize survival. Western leaders, by contrast, focus on legacy headlines within four- or eight-year windows. Trump stands out as the great exception, prioritizing American strength and long-term global security.

Iran’s patience is nevertheless its greatest asset. The regime has outlasted eight presidents, who used tactics spanning from Bush-era sanctions to Obama-era diplomacy—why not one more?

If Iran’s strategy succeeds, the world after Trump will look markedly different. A regime flush with cash, dominant in the Gulf, unrestrained in its nuclear pursuits, and vengeful towards anyone it perceives as a foe poses incalculable risks.

Proxies will reignite conflicts, nuclear breakout time shrinks back to near zero, and other leaders may not have the same courage as Trump to confront it.

Iran plans for the day when Trump’s term is at an end and American pressure along with it. The stakes extend far beyond the Middle East—to South America and ultimately the “Great Satan,” the United States.

Iran’s regime, to secure the economic lifeline it needs, will probably say it agrees to any terms to outlast Trump.

At the end of Trump’s term, Iran’s regime will be poised to reassert dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, extort regional neighbors, crush opposition at home and abroad, and race once again toward nuclear weapons breakout.

Who then will be willing to take it on?

The post Iran’s ‘deal’: What happens after Trump? appeared first on World Israel News.

In the short term, with US encouragement, a partial Israeli withdrawal from some of the areas of Lebanon captured since Feb. 28 is likely.

By Jonathan Spyer, Middle East Forum

As the 60-day period of negotiations stipulated by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between Iran and the US gets under way in Switzerland, the issue of Lebanon is fast emerging as a central bone of contention between them.

It is also revealing significant differences in the stances of America and Israel.

Israel has sought throughout to detach its battle with the Iranian proxy group Hezbollah in Lebanon from the negotiations and from the larger effort to settle the conflict between the US and Iran.

The logic to this is as follows: Hezbollah intends to continue its war against Israel.

Jerusalem is aware that the US administration very much wants the current negotiations to succeed, so the Israeli government is currently engaged in the difficult task of seeking not to lose ground in an ongoing fight with an Iranian proxy while simultaneously not coming across as a spoiler to a US administration keen to conclude its own conflict with Iran.

Iran, predictably, is keen that Israel should not succeed in this effort. As part of this, Tehran is determined to link the two fronts (i.e., Iran/Hormuz and Lebanon), insisting that failure in one means failure in both.

Iran hopes by so doing to formalize a mechanism by which it can both protect its main Levantine proxy and create and widen divisions between Washington and Jerusalem.

Regarding the former goal, Iran hopes that US commitment to the success of any agreement will lead it to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon or otherwise stay its offensive against Hezbollah so as not to endanger the agreement’s implementation.

Should Israel seek to defy US desires in this regard, this will serve the secondary goal of encouraging differences between Iran’s two enemies.

After initial wrangling between the US and Iranian sides over the issue of Lebanon, they have now reached agreement on the establishment of a ‘deconfliction cell’ intended to ensure the cessation of military operations in the country, as required by the MoU.

The mechanism includes the United States, Iran and the official government of Lebanon, along with the two countries who are mediating the negotiations, Pakistan and Qatar.

Israel is excluded from the deconfliction cell, and it is not at all clear that the mechanism will succeed in its intended purpose.

This is because a direct conflict is still under way between Israel and Hezbollah, the dynamics of which are in direct contradiction to the Geneva negotiations.

Iran considers that it emerged victorious from the war, which recommenced on Feb. 28.

It is now interested in reaching an arrangement with the United States, which it sees as formalizing this achievement—and which it intends will include new arrangements on the Strait of Hormuz and the unfreezing of financial resources currently out of its reach.

At the same time, Tehran has no intention of ending the broader strategic contest with the US. It also has no interest in concluding the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.

Israel, having been attacked twice by Hezbollah in the last three years (on 8 October 2023 and 1 March this year), is, however, determined not to simply accept the status quo ante bellum. As Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz bluntly expressed it this week:

Even if there is an American demand, we will not withdraw from Lebanon. 200,000 residents will not return.

Katz is referring here to residents of Israeli border communities who have quit their homes because of the danger of living close to the border fence with Lebanon thanks to Hezbollah’s liking for repurposing anti-armor missiles to target civilians and their homes.

Israel is also concerned at the practical implications of a deconfliction cell involving Iran and Qatar, which is intended to manage ongoing friction between Hezbollah and Israel.

As an unnamed Israeli intelligence source quoted in the newspaper Haaretz put it:

Transferring intelligence information, coordination plans or warnings ahead of a possible IDF attack to a body that includes Iranian or Qatari representatives is preposterous… These representatives cannot be trusted, and any shred of information that reaches them will immediately leak to Hezbollah and endanger human lives.

Israel has no capacity to destroy Hezbollah in its entirety in Lebanon, short of a ground invasion of the whole country—which is outside of the scope of possible options.

At the same time, the current diplomatic process under way in Washington between the governments of Israel and Lebanon stands little chance of success, given the simple and stark fact that Hezbollah is stronger than any coercive force available to the Lebanese authorities.

The Beirut government therefore simply has no capacity to force Hezbollah (which itself is represented in the government) to do anything it doesn’t want to.

And neither Hezbollah nor its Iranian masters want it to stand down.

This means that further conflict in Lebanon is fairly clearly only a matter of time. At the same time, Israel has, under US pressure, currently ceased advancing in Lebanon and is in a defensive stance.

Where is all this likely to be heading?

In the short term, with US encouragement, a partial Israeli withdrawal from some of the areas of Lebanon captured since 28 February is likely.

A complete withdrawal, by contrast, probably won’t happen. Israel’s strategy since 7 October has been characterized by a desire to place barriers between its own civilian communities and potentially dangerous areas.

This is the upshot of the Gaza war; it has been implemented also in Syria.

In Lebanon, the November 2024 ceasefire left the IDF in five outposts north of the border.

The clear Israeli desire now is for the army to hold a zone around 6 miles from the border across its entire line—placing civilian communities out of range of anti-tank missiles—for as long as Hezbollah remains the de facto ruler of Lebanon.

This is likely to happen but will also be accompanied by partial withdrawals from areas beyond this point.

These will be handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and one way or another will almost certainly then be reoccupied by Hezbollah.

What all this goes to prove is that the three months of war between February and June changed little of the deeper dynamics.

The long war conducted by Iran and its Islamist proxies, intended to result in Israel’s destruction, is still under way.

What has changed, at least for now, is that Israel needs to conduct this fight with the additional complication of not upsetting a US administration that is trying to make its retreat look like a peaceful outcome.

The post Can Israel fend off Hezbollah without alienating America? appeared first on World Israel News.

According to S&P Global, Wednesday saw 78 transits, the most since the war began, but still below the daily prewar average of 130 or more.

By The Associated Press

Several tankers made their way out of the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday using a new route promoted by a U.N. maritime agency.

Iran has threatened vessels using the path, which runs along the coast of Oman.

The opening of an alternative passage through the vital waterway would relieve pressure on the world economy and remove Iran’s main source of leverage in ongoing peace talks with the United States.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, on a visit to the Gulf to reassure American allies, said Washington was committed to the new route.

Traffic through the strait has increased but is still well below prewar levels.

Oil on Thursday briefly dipped below its last prewar price of just under $73 per barrel, a sign that the market believes the situation is improving.

The two sides are still debating terms of an interim peace deal — from getting ships through the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf to the future of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

Under the memorandum of understanding signed last week, the U.S. and Iran have 60 days to iron out the details.

As talks are held behind closed doors, U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian leaders have seemed to negotiate in public, trading threats and claiming concessions the other side denies.

Meanwhile, a flare-up of fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Iranian-backed Hezbollah militants threatened the wider truce. Lebanon says five people have people been killed by Israeli strikes over the past two days.

More ships are passing through the strait, but far fewer than before the war

Oil tankers, led by the Stoic Warrior vessel, sailed along the United Arab Emirates and then Oman early Thursday, passing by Oman’s Musandam Peninsula fairly close to the shore.

The route was laid out by Oman and the International Maritime Organization, a U.N. agency.

North of the route is a corridor in the center of the strait where ships had moved through freely before the war, transporting about a fifth of all the world’s oil and natural gas.

Iran said it mined that passage after the U.S. and Israel attacked it on Feb. 28. At least one mine has been sighted there.

Though some ships had been getting out of the strait, with U.S. military support, the U.N. agency’s effort is the latest to free trapped vessels.

The shipping company Maersk said its container ship, the Maersk Baltimore, and another chartered vessel made it out on Thursday.

Last week, 125 vessels crossed the strait, up from 33 the week before, according to marine data and analysis firm Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

According to S&P Global, Wednesday saw 78 transits, the most since the war began, but still below the daily prewar average of 130 or more.

“Opportunistic operators — and there are many of them — emboldened by the lower transit risk, or at least the perceived lower transit risk, have begun chasing the backlog of trapped cargoes,” said Richard Meade, editor-in-chief at Lloyd’s List.

Iran says the new shipping route is ‘unacceptable’

The naval arm of the Revolutionary Guard, apparently reacting to the new shipping route and increased traffic, issued a warning Thursday, carried by Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency.

It said the new route was established without notice or coordination with Iran, calling it “unacceptable and completely dangerous.”

“The only authorized route for passing through the Strait of Hormuz is the one declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the Iranian force said.

“Vessel traffic outside these routes is extremely dangerous and prohibited.”

“Violators will be dealt with,” it added, without elaborating.

There were no immediate reports of any incidents in the strait. On Wednesday, the Guard threatened one tanker over the radio, with a soldier warning, “You are in range of my missiles and maybe (I) fire on you,” according to the private security firm Ambrey.

Rubio says the US will ensure there are no tolls on ships

Rubio met with foreign ministers from the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council to assure them that their interests would be protected in any agreement with Iran.

Those countries, including major energy producers reliant on the strait for exports, came under attack by Iran after the start of the war.

“There is no part in this deal that’s undertaken that in any way undermines the security, the stability or the prosperity of any of our partners in the Gulf region,” Rubio said at the meeting in Bahrain, home to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet.

He later told journalists the U.S. and Gulf allies would ensure there would be no fees charged on ships moving through the strait.

He said the U.S. wanted to make sure the Oman route continued for ships to transit the strait. “If that stops, then we’re going to have a problem,” Rubio said.

Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani thanked the U.S. for its support, saying that because of the agreement, “today we see a glimmer of hope for our region” but stressed that it was “critically important that Iran adheres to its obligations.”

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Ghalibaf also defended Palestinian terrorism as “an expression of a nation’s legitimate resistance in the face of occupation.”

By JNS

The U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding was “a declaration of America’s defeat,” Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on Wednesday.

Iran’s armed forces imposed “heavy costs on the United States and the so-called Israeli regime” during the 110-day war, Ghalibaf told a meeting of the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Baku, Azerbaijan, Tehran’s IRNA news agency reported.

The Islamic Republic forced Washington to “retreat both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table,” Tehran’s top negotiator claimed.

Ghalibaf told attendees that Iran defined the retreat of American forces from the Middle East as a “strategic objective” and denounced Washington’s presence in the region as a “source of instability.”

The parliament speaker in his remarks extended the regime’s “hand of brotherhood and cooperation to all Islamic countries.”

“For us, a ceasefire in Lebanon is as important as a ceasefire in Iran, and ending the war in Lebanon is as important as ending the war in Iran,” Ghalibaf stated.

He also defended Palestinian terrorism as “an expression of a nation’s legitimate resistance in the face of occupation.”

Ghalibaf said that “the experience of the past eighty years” showed that no lasting security in the region could be achieved without a “just resolution” of the Palestinian issue.

Iran remains ready to pursue security agreements with regional countries, including Gulf states, in addition to economic cooperation, he added.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday night claimed that he had Iran “ready to go down for the fall” and “willing to give us practically anything,” as he slammed the Senate for passing a war powers resolution directing him to remove American military forces from the conflict with Tehran.

The resolution conveyed to “the number one sponser [sic] of terror in the world that the United States doesn’t like what I am doing to them, and I must stop,” according to the president.

Earlier on Tuesday, Trump said he lifted the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports after the regime agreed to open its nuclear facilities to inspections and made other “major concessions.”

“However, all ships are remaining in place should it be necessary to reinstitute the blockade, which seems, at this point, highly unlikely,” he wrote on Truth Social.

Trump’s statement came after Ghalibaf vowed that conditions in the Strait of Hormuz “will never go back to the way they were before the war.”

“Of course, international regulations will be observed, but Iran will administer the Strait of Hormuz,” Ghalibaf told Iranian media as he returned from talks with U.S. representatives in Switzerland.

While the MoU calls for the immediate reopening of the strait to commercial shipping, Tehran reopened the strategic waterway “according to its own terms and timeline,” the negotiator claimed.

“This is the power of the Islamic Republic,” Ghalibaf said. “We forced Trump to amend the tweet he had published. This is the result of combining our hard and soft power.”

The post US-Iran MoU a ‘declaration of America’s defeat,’ says Tehran’s chief negotiator appeared first on World Israel News.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Iranian terror proxies must halt attacks on Israel and American allies in the region for the memorandum of understanding to move forward.

SECRETARY RUBIO: "You can't have the end of hostilities and conflicts in the region as long as Iranian proxies are launching missiles and drones from Iraq, and are participating in terrorism like Hamas did and Hezbollah did." pic.twitter.com/bGb4bgRu6N

— Department of State (@StateDept) June 23, 2026

The post WATCH: ‘Hostilities in the region won’t end until Iranian proxies cease attacking,’ confirms Rubio appeared first on World Israel News.

President Trump contrasted US successes with Iranian setbacks from Operation Epic Fury, dismissing a reporter’s claim that Tehran gained leverage from the recently signed memorandum of understanding.

Trump on Iran:

• Trump dismissed the suggestion that Iran has leverage, arguing that Iran's military capabilities have been severely degraded.

• He says Iran's navy, air force, air defenses, radar systems, and much of its missile and drone infrastructure have been destroyed.… pic.twitter.com/FN4BMOU3Qk

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) June 22, 2026

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Much of the 60-day timetable will be spent defining procedures and reciprocal obligations rather than negotiating a final settlement.

By Mardo Soghom, Middle East Forum

While Washington presents the talks in Switzerland as the beginning of a path toward a comprehensive agreement with the Islamic Republic, Iranian government media increasingly frame the process as an opportunity to secure Tehran’s immediate objectives.

Coverage has centered on a ceasefire in Lebanon, access to frozen Iranian assets, and new arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz, while the core issues that triggered the conflict—Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional proxy network—have received little attention.

Nour News, a media outlet aligned with Iran’s security establishment, described the first round of talks in Switzerland as being focused on “a comprehensive ceasefire in Lebanon and Iran’s frozen assets.”

The outlet reported that the session lasted only 80 minutes before breaking for consultations after “new threats” by President Donald Trump, suggesting that even the limited progress achieved so far remains vulnerable to regional developments and political tensions.

Despite claims that the Lucerne process has kicked off a new phase in talks, there is little public evidence that a substantive face-to-face negotiating session between senior American and Iranian officials actually took place.

The joint communiqué issued by the mediators announced the creation of committees, communication channels, and future talks, but provided no details about direct negotiations, political understandings, or agreements reached during the gathering.

No photographs or official accounts of a formal negotiating session have emerged, leaving the impression that the event functioned more as a high-profile diplomatic summit than as a venue for intensive bargaining.

The government’s official Islamic Republic News Agency offered a similarly reserved assessment of the diplomatic track.

While noting that the parties had agreed on a roadmap toward a final agreement within 60 days, the agency stressed that “the next two months will be less about political positions and more a test of implementing commitments.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei went further, arguing that negotiations on a final agreement cannot begin until specific provisions of the memorandum are first implemented and each Iranian step is matched by a corresponding action from the United States.

Taken together, the statements suggest that much of the 60-day period may be consumed by implementation disputes, reciprocal confidence-building measures, and procedural questions before negotiators reach the core issues separating the two sides.

The emphasis on working groups may also signal that the process remains at an early stage.

Such bodies are typically tasked with addressing technical questions, sequencing obligations, drafting procedures, and resolving implementation disputes before political leaders tackle the most contentious issues.

In the case of the Lucerne process, separate groups are expected to address nuclear matters, sanctions, monitoring mechanisms, maritime security, and Lebanon.

While these structures can facilitate progress, they also raise the possibility that much of the 60-day timetable will be spent defining procedures and reciprocal obligations rather than negotiating a final settlement.

Social media users seized on videos from the Lucerne gathering showing Vice President JD Vance receiving little public acknowledgment from either Iranian or Qatari participants.

One widely shared clip appeared to show Vance expecting a handshake from Qatar’s prime minister during a photo opportunity, although U.S. officials later noted that the two had already met privately before the event.

The Iranian delegation’s behavior was striking.

Iranian officials avoided public interaction with Vance, no joint photographs were released, and Iranian media largely ignored his presence—reinforcing the impression that Tehran was unwilling to grant Washington even a symbolic diplomatic victory before domestic and international audiences.

A second commentary in Nour News suggests that Tehran views the diplomatic process from a position of confidence rather than urgency.

The outlet has portrayed delays, procedural disputes, and even Trump’s renewed threats not as signs of failing negotiation but as evidence that Washington is struggling to translate military and economic pressure into political concessions.

Whether that assessment is accurate remains open to debate.

What is clear is that Tehran increasingly presents the talks not as a process in which it must make difficult compromises, but as one in which the United States is being forced to adjust to Iranian demands.

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Washington framed the delay as a logistical issue. Tehran told a different story.

By JFeed

Less than 24 hours after the ink dried on the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, the follow-on talks have already stalled, with both sides citing separate reasons — and Israel’s continued military operations in Lebanon at the center of the crisis.

The White House confirmed Thursday night that Vice President JD Vance would not be departing for Switzerland as planned to lead the first round of technical negotiations with Iran on implementing the newly signed MOU.

Vance had told reporters earlier Thursday that he expected the technical talks to begin “sometime this weekend” and that he would travel to Switzerland for them.

But the White House said Thursday night that he would not be departing, with a spokesperson saying the plans had not been finalized.

“The U.S. delegation has been prepared to depart at the first available opportunity. But the logistics of these negotiations have never been simple or predictable,” the White House statement read.

“As of now the Vice President is not departing tonight. We will let you know as soon as we have a concrete update about next steps.”

Washington framed the delay as a logistical issue. Tehran told a different story.

The White House announcement followed a report from Al-Mayadeen, a pan-Arab satellite network politically allied with Hezbollah, that Iran was delaying sending its own delegation to Switzerland over Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon.

The timing exposed the structural flaw at the heart of the MOU the moment it was signed: the deal requires an end to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon, but Israel is not a party to it and has consistently held that its operations against Hezbollah are a separate matter.

On Thursday night, intense fighting between Israeli forces and Hezbollah erupted in southern Lebanon, occurring in the hours between the Israeli ambassador’s statement on the ceasefire and Vance’s announcement that he would not be traveling.

Earlier Thursday, Trump posted on Truth Social that the U.S. “is committed to PEACE” and called on all parties to allow negotiations to “beautifully unfold,” demanding “a complete ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel.”

Those words did not hold the line.

The Lebanon problem has shadowed this deal from the start.

The MOU’s 14-point framework explicitly requires a halt to all military operations, including on the Israeli-Lebanese front, but Iran’s foreign ministry has already cast doubt on whether a formal signing ceremony in Geneva is even necessary, saying it was redundant after both presidents signed the agreement Wednesday.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s government has maintained throughout that its fight with Hezbollah is outside the scope of any U.S.-Iran understanding.

That position now threatens to unravel the 60-day negotiating window before it begins.

The MOU does not address Iran’s uranium stockpile, leaving the nuclear phase of negotiations entirely dependent on the Switzerland talks that Vance was to lead.

“Words don’t matter, ladies and gentlemen,” Vance said at the briefing. “We’re about verification.” That verification process now has no venue and no date.

The delay also shines a light on the internal dynamics Vance himself described just hours earlier.

In unusually blunt remarks at the same White House briefing, Vance singled out Israeli cabinet ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir by name for criticizing the deal, warning them he would not advise “attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world.”

The message was aimed at silencing Israeli criticism. Within hours, Israeli operations in Lebanon had given Iran the pretext to pull its delegation.

The postponement came after the U.S. said it had lifted its naval blockade of Iranian ports, allowing oil tankers to begin moving freely through the Strait of Hormuz after months of disruption, a major concession that was delivered before any technical talks had even begun.

Whether the Swiss talks can be rescheduled quickly will depend in large part on what happens on the ground in southern Lebanon in the coming days.

The MOU gave both parties 60 days to finalize a permanent agreement. Reports describe Thursday’s development as a postponement, not a collapse, though next steps remain uncertain.

For Jerusalem, the sequence of events carries its own message: Israel’s military posture in Lebanon is now the single variable most capable of derailing a diplomatic process it was never invited to join.

The post Vance’s Switzerland trip called off as Lebanon fighting stalls Iran deal appeared first on World Israel News.

With the many billions of dollars Iran expects to receive just in the early stages of this agreement, the opportunity to escalate its “resistance” must look too tempting to pass up.

By Khaled Abu Toameh, Gatestone Institute

A first reaction to US President Donald J. Trump’s “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) has already come from Tehran’s terrorist proxy, Hamas.

The Iranian-backed group responsible for the October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel is openly calling to escalate attacks against Israel and signaling its intention to shift the center of its jihad (holy war) from the Gaza Strip to Judea and Samaria.

The timing is not a coincidence.

To Hamas and the rest of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” the prospect of a “deal” between Washington and Tehran is not being interpreted as a sign of American strength.

It is being viewed as a sign of America’s weakness and a victory for the Iranian regime—which the US defeated—and proof that the US is eager to end conflicts at virtually any price.

The world had been expecting to hear the US announce that unless Iran accepted all of America’s terms unconditionally, the ceasefire was over. Instead, the US has agreed in principle to Iran’s terms. America has deliberately chosen to lose a war—again.

Hamas officials and spokesmen have therefore been intensifying their calls for Palestinians to increase what they call “all forms of resistance” and confront Israelis throughout Judea and Samaria.

Hamas also praised recent shooting and car-ramming attacks against Israelis and have been describing the perpetrators as “heroic resistance fighters.”

After a shooting attack near the Israeli town of Kochav Yair, Hamas military spokesman Abu Obeida hailed the operation and called on Palestinians in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, and inside Israel to intensify attacks and join what Hamas calls the battle of “Al-Aqsa Flood”—the name Hamas uses for the October 7 massacre.

Likewise, after another shooting attack near the city of Hebron, Hamas praised what it called the “pure hands that fight the occupier” and urged Palestinians to carry out more attacks.

Hamas-affiliated organizations have begun publishing detailed statistics highlighting terror-related activities in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem.

According to figures released by Palestinian media outlets affiliated with Hamas, 243 acts of “resistance” were recorded during May alone, including shootings, car-ramming attacks, armed clashes, demonstrations, and confrontations with Israeli security forces.

Other reports proudly documented dozens of incidents over just a few days.

The message is clear: Hamas wants Palestinians to believe that the next phase of the war against Israel, with the help of the Iranian regime, should be fought soon and from within.

This should deeply concern not only Israel but also the US.

Unlike the Gaza Strip, the mountainous terrain of Judea and Samaria is high ground. It overlooks the low broad plain along the Mediterranean coast that is home to Israel’s most densely populated areas.

Major Israeli cities, Ben-Gurion International Airport, and critical infrastructure are within easy range of terrorists operating from the hills: one can comfortably look down over all of central Israel.

Unlike in the Gaza Strip, there are hundreds of thousands of Israelis who live in Judea and Samaria—easy targets for the terrorists.

October 7 demonstrated what happens when a terrorist army is allowed to establish itself along a border. Hamas now appears more determined than ever to create similar conditions to Gaza in Judea and Samaria.

All this appears to have been inspired by the Trump Administration’s preparations to implement a deal with a regime in Iran that funds, arms, trains, and directs Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorists.

With the many billions of dollars Iran expects to receive just in the early stages of this agreement, the opportunity to escalate its “resistance” must look too tempting to pass up.

One of the most astonishing aspects of the reported MOU is that it does not address Iran’s terrorist proxies: Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shiite militias across the Middle East.

This is not a minor detail. It is fundamental—seen by these groups as a green light to step up their terrorism ever since Trump tried to stop Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from dismantling them.

The terrorists see the “daylight” that Iran’s regime maneuvered Trump into creating between the US and Israel as a most welcome gift.

To Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, public friction between Washington and Jerusalem signals that at last, the US may be distancing itself from its closest ally in the Middle East.

Such perceptions greatly encourage radicals, undermine American and Israeli deterrence, and strengthen the belief among jihadist groups that time is on their side and no one will stop them.

Iran’s regional strategy does not rely solely on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Its greatest weapon is its network of proxies, which Tehran uses to continue waging war while claiming plausible deniability.

Ignoring Iran’s proxies while negotiating with their terror master is tantamount to treating the symptoms while ignoring the disease.

Hamas, of course, is not the only jihadist group drawing conclusions from Washington’s current approach.

Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen are watching developments closely.

While Hamas feels emboldened today, Hezbollah and the Houthis are sure to escalate their own attacks tomorrow.

The Iranian regime and its proxies are experts at waiting—what the West calls “strategic patience.”

Unlike many Western policymakers who seek immediate solutions and quick diplomatic victories, Iran’s regime and its allies think in terms of decades.

They have no problem signing agreements, waiting for political circumstances to change, then resuming their campaigns against their enemies.

Israel reached several ceasefire agreements with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas repeatedly violated them.

Israel reached understandings with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah violated them.

The US reached ceasefires with Iran. Iran violated them.

International agreements and diplomatic arrangements do not persuade terrorist organizations in the Middle East to abandon their jihadist ideology or their objective of destroying Israel.

Does anyone seriously believe that Iran and its proxies will behave differently now? Or that Iran will use the $300 billion it is promised in the MOU – or the other many billions from unfrozen assets or its neighbors—to build shelters for abused women?

Trump promised a new reality for the Gaza Strip—a “Riviera of the Middle East.” More than six months after his much-publicized “Board of Peace” initiative and ceasefire plan, however, Hamas remains in power there, more brutal than ever.

It still controls large parts of the territory, continues to recruit and train terrorists, retains substantial military capabilities, and openly rejects disarmament.

If the US has so far been unable to compel Hamas to lay down its weapons, how can it guarantee that the Iranian regime will fully honor any new agreement?

So long as this Iranian regime and its proxies remain intact, there will be no genuine peace or stability in the Middle East.

Far from making the region safer, a deal that ignores Iran’s proxy armies will only embolden them.

Hamas’s latest calls for more attacks against Israel are just an early warning of what will likely come next.

Those celebrating an agreement with Iran, instead of dictating terms as a victor, should pay close attention to what Hamas is saying. Iran and the terrorists—thanks to what appears to be Trump’s capitulations—clearly believe they are winning.

That alone should set off alarm bells in Washington.

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