US tried to block Israel’s establishment in 1948, recording reveals

Newly released audio recording of an Israeli intelligence chief reveals that on the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel the US State Department pressured David Ben-Gurion not to declare independence.

By World Israel News Staff

A newly released recording of former Israeli intelligence chief Isser Harel offers a firsthand account of the intense political and military uncertainty surrounding David Ben-Gurion’s decision to declare Israeli independence in May 1948, including American pressure on pre-state leaders not to declare independence.

The recording was released this week by Ben-Gurion House in Tel Aviv.

Harel, who became the first head of the Shin Bet and later the second director of the Mossad, was speaking to students during a gathering at Ben-Gurion’s former home sometime after the founding prime minister’s death in 1973.

Harel recalled Ben-Gurion consulting senior Haganah commanders as the British Mandate neared its end and neighboring Arab states prepared to send their armies into the country.

Ben-Gurion questioned the commanders about the Jewish community’s weapons, its military plans, the strength of the opposing forces and the likely course of the coming war, Harel said.

The situation was so precarious that one commander emerged from a meeting with Ben-Gurion and indicated to those waiting outside that the Zionist leader “was having delusions,” according to Harel.

Ben-Gurion nevertheless remained determined to establish a sovereign state before the opportunity disappeared.

Harel said that determination prompted a forceful American warning, which he attributed to then-US secretary of state George Marshall.

According to Harel’s recollection, Washington warned that the Arab states would attack immediately and that the Jewish forces would be unable to withstand them without outside assistance.

“We will not lift a finger, and we will not stand by your side. Do not declare the state,” Harel quoted the warning as saying.

Contemporary US records confirm that Marshall delivered a grave warning to Moshe Sharett, then known as Moshe Shertok, during meetings in Washington shortly before independence. Sharett returned to the country and relayed the message to Ben-Gurion and other members of the Jewish leadership.

Marshall’s own account, recorded in a May 12 White House memorandum, said he had warned Sharett that the Jewish leadership was taking a dangerous gamble based on recent military successes that might prove temporary.

Should the military situation turn against the Jewish forces, Marshall said, “there was no warrant to expect help from the United States.”

The American document, however, also adds an important qualification to Harel’s later account. Marshall wrote that he had sent no personal message directly to Ben-Gurion and that Sharett had not explicitly told him that a Jewish state would be proclaimed within days.

The warning was nevertheless understood by the Zionist leadership as a clear indication that the United States would not intervene militarily to rescue the emerging state if the anticipated Arab invasion succeeded.

The Truman administration was sharply divided over Palestine at the time. Marshall and much of the State Department feared that establishing and immediately recognizing a Jewish state would deepen regional warfare, damage US relations with Arab countries and potentially require American military involvement.

White House adviser Clark Clifford took the opposing position, urging President Harry Truman to recognize the state as soon as it was established. The dispute culminated in a bitter White House meeting on May 12, two days before Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence.

Israeli leaders were simultaneously receiving warnings from the Arab side.

Harel recalled Golda Meir’s secret meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah, whose Arab Legion was widely regarded as the most effective Arab military force in the region. The Legion was well armed, trained by Britain and commanded in the field by British officers.

According to Harel, Abdullah told Meir that he would have no alternative but to join the war if the Jewish leadership declared a state.

The warnings intensified the debate within the People’s Administration, the provisional body that would become Israel’s first government. Several members favored accepting an American-backed truce or postponing independence rather than risking destruction and a confrontation with Washington.

Ben-Gurion argued that postponement could cause the opportunity for statehood to disappear permanently. The United Nations had approved the partition of Palestine in November 1947, but the United States had subsequently supported placing the territory under a temporary UN trusteeship as violence escalated.

Harel endorsed Ben-Gurion’s assessment in the recording, arguing that a decision not to declare independence in May 1948 might never have been reversed.

Ben-Gurion ultimately proceeded with the declaration on May 14. In an entry written that day, he summarized the enormity of the decision: “Today we founded a state. Its fate is in the hands of the defense forces.”

Despite the State Department’s opposition, Truman recognized Israel’s provisional government just 11 minutes after the state formally came into existence.

David Ben GurionIsrael IndependenceUS State Department