As Tehran turns to preemptive attacks, Iran believes it can win a war of attrition

The tit-for-tat responses to Iran’s attacks on U.S. bases have not been strong enough to deter Tehran.

By Shay Khatiri, Middle East Forum

On August 30, 2026, Iran attacked two U.S. bases in Jordan. According to Iranian military leaders, the attacks reflect a shift of doctrine toward preemption and a more offensive conventional outlook.

Prior to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Iran used proxies to attack enemies such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The only exception was shortly after a U.S. drone killed Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad on January 3, 2020.

On April 13, 2024, after Israel killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, in Syria, Iran launched a barrage against Israel.

A second barrage followed on October 1, 2024. Both times, the Biden administration restrained the Israeli response. After the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, Tehran changed its doctrine.

On August 26, 2026, Iranian army spokesman Mohammad Akrami-Nia declared to Fars News that “We should use preemptive war.”

Ahmad Naderi, a top-ranking parliamentarian, said, “We changed our offensive and some of our defensive weaknesses during these two wars.”

He added, “There is a possibility that Iran will again attack U.S. and Israeli interests in the region.”

He said that Iran now considers direct conventional strikes as valid—not only to preempt U.S. military action, but also as a response against U.S. sanctions.

Defense Ministry Spokesman Reza Talaei-Nik told Defa Press, “Considering the enemy’s depth of threats and type of weapons, defense necessarily cannot be actualized within [Iran’s] territorial borders,” adding, “[Sometimes] it is necessary to employ offensive weapons.”

He continued, “This strategy in the past was employed on occasion and succeeded in controlling the crimes of the American and Zionist enemy.”

Iran has stated that its objective is to force the United States to abandon the region.

Iranian media are widely referring to the current war as a war of attrition, reflecting Tehran’s belief that the Islamic Republic can sustain more pain, due to its totalitarian character and home advantage, than a democracy like the United States fighting a faraway war.

The conditions aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, which Iranian media continue to cover, Chief of Naval Operations Daryl Caudle’s “non-concur” on extending deployment orders, and Iran’s success in damaging U.S. bases in the region lead Iranian officials to believe Iran’s strategy might work.

Most crucially, the tit-for-tat responses to Iran’s attacks on U.S. bases have not been strong enough to deter Tehran.

To the contrary, boasting about them suggests that Iran is comfortable with paying the price.

Habibollah Sayyari, an admiral in the regular navy, called it superior “will,” even if that will means watching his countrymen suffer.

Iran does have a higher threshold for pain.

The late military historian Sir Michael Howard cited adaptation as an important strategic virtue.

Iran has adapted to the conditions the United States has imposed on it. Tehran has good reason to believe that it can win a war of attrition.

To win the war, the United States must adopt a new strategy that defeats rather than plays into Iran’s strategic patience.