While Assad could conceivably follow through with some reduction of Iran’s presence in Syria, it is unlikely that he would completely disconnect from Tehran.
By Yaakov Lappin, JNS
As Israel continues to degrade Iranian and Hezbollah capabilities in Lebanon, Syria and Iran itself, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad faces growing pressure to manage Tehran’s presence within his borders.
How will Assad respond to the changing balance of power in the region, which has dramatically reduced the power of the Iranian-led jihadist axis?
An axis that he depended on to rescue him during the Syrian civil war, and which is currently attempting to turn Syria into an additional war front against Israel (an effort that has been significantly hampered by years of Israeli airstrikes, going back to 2011).
Professor Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv University and chair of its contemporary Middle East history department, believes that “Assad will not give up the connection with Iran, which helped him survive the civil war,” but that on the other hand “he does not want the Iranians to drag him into a confrontation with Israel.”
Speaking to JNS on Tuesday, Zisser assessed that Assad might even welcome a limit to Iran’s influence within Syria, since too prominent an Iranian presence could provoke Israeli attacks on his regime.
However, he continued, while Assad could conceivably follow through with some reduction of Iran’s presence in Syria, it is unlikely that he would completely disconnect from Tehran.
On October 12, the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that Syria’s 4th Division, led by Maj.-Gen. Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, had implemented measures designed to avoid Israeli airstrikes.
“The command of the 4th Division has ordered subordinated troops not to move weapons or host Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militia members within the headquarters and bases of the 4th Division,” according to SOHR.
Additionally, these orders restricted forces from targeting U.S. troops in Syria, as well as attacks on the Golan Heights in Israel from 4th Division sites, according to the report.
Hezbollah’s Golan File is a unit designed to create a network of proxy terrorist cells, bases and surveillance posts in southern Syria, while Hezbollah’s Southern Command in Syria works to create Hezbollah infrastructure in the area, including in Syrian military and observation posts.
In recent days, the Israeli Defense Forces notably targeted significant threats posed by Iranian and Hezbollah activities in Syria.
On Monday, the IDF confirmed a strike against what it said were Hezbollah intelligence facilities in Syria.
The operation was directed against the organization’s central intelligence branch, which includes a specialized network under the command of Hezbollah’s head of intelligence, Hassan Ali al-Zaima, who, alongside Hashem Safieddine, the late head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, was killed in Beirut’s Dahiyeh area in September.
Mahmoud Mohammed Shaheen, Hezbollah’s long-serving head of intelligence in Syria, was also eliminated in the strike, representing a major setback for Hezbollah’s operational intelligence capabilities.
The IDF stated that Shaheen’s elimination constituted “a further degradation of Hezbollah’s intelligence capabilities,” and that the strikes on Tuesday severely hindered Hezbollah’s intelligence assets in Syria.
These attacks are part of a broader Israeli strategy aimed at eroding the military capabilities of Iran’s regional allies and Tehran’s entrenchment in Syria.
During a webinar held by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) on Oct. 27, IDF Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Yaacov Ayish, former Israeli military attaché in Washington D.C., stated that Israel’s Oct. 26 airstrike in Iran was significant for other players in the region as well.
Ayish noted the destruction of Iranian S-300 air defense systems in that attack, systems that are considered a “very expensive, scarce commodity nowadays, and not only in Iran … also in Lebanon, Syria, the Ukraine-Russia war and elsewhere.”
Israel’s destruction of these systems in Iran sends a message to others in the region, including the Assad regime, about their vulnerability to Israeli strikes, which could influence their behavior regarding Iranian-Shi’ite terrorist entities on their soil.
Russia, for its part, which depends on Iran for missile and drone deliveries amid its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, continues to operate its Khmeimim airbase on the Syrian coastline, in northwest Syria.
The Alma Center, an Israeli research center specializing in northern threats to the Jewish state, has assessed in recent months the Russian-controlled base, which forms the main Russian military presence in Syria, could be used to help transfer Iranian weapons to Syria as part of Moscow’s quid pro quo arrangement with Iran.
At the same time, during the Oct. 27 JINSA webinar former Israeli national security adviser IDF Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror stated that the Russians would not “interfere actively” with any Israeli strikes, adding that they do not want to be placed in a position that shows that their “systems do not work.”
Ultimately, even a reduction by Assad of the Iranian presence in specific areas would represent a gain for Israel, not only at the tactical threat level but also as an expression of the waning power of the Iranian-led Shi’ite axis in the Middle East.