Hamas believed Israel was on verge of civil war on eve of Oct, 7 – report

According to internal documents, Hamas saw calls for reservists not to show up for duty in protest of judicial reform as a sign the time was ripe for invasion.

By World Israel News Staff

Political turmoil inside Israel over the government’s judicial reform plan and calls by the plan’s critics to refuse to serve in the IDF played a major role in Hamas’ decision to launch its invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, according to a report citing internal documents from the group.

The report, penned by Jonathan D. Halevi, a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, analyzed documents seized by IDF forces in Gaza from Hamas’ leadership since October 7.

Hamas began planning the invasion in 2014, Halevi wrote, and by September 2016 the group’s senior leadership in Qatar had given its approval for the attack plan, with the goal of “liberating all Palestinian territories by the year 2022.”

However, the implementation of the plan was delayed repeatedly, amid concerns that Israel’s security establishment had been alerted to the possibility of an attack.

From April 2022, Hamas came close on several occasions to launching its planned invasion, with massive incursions aborted in September 2022 and April 2023.

Notably, despite the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate and the Shin Bet security agency both possessing details on Hamas’ invasion plans, no warnings were issued prior to any of the aborted attacks in 2022 or early 2023.

Deliberations within Hamas’ top echelons regarding the timing of what was dubbed “Operation Al Aqsa Flood” continued into 2023.

As opposition inside of Israel to the government’s plan to reform the judiciary strengthened, Hamas leaders, including Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar, carefully followed developments in Israel.

On July 25, 2023, the intelligence branch of the Al Qassem Brigades – Hamas’ military wing – recommended to Sinwar that the invasion be delayed further, under the belief that Israel’s national resilience would continue to deteriorate.

On August 14, a study conducted by a pair of activists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and published by a research center aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood claimed that the political crisis in Israel was so severe that it would likely lead to the “collapse” of the state.

Hamas became increasingly convinced that the protest movement was on the verge of launching a civil war, while calls for mass refusal to show up for reserve duty led Hamas leaders to believe that the IDF was no longer capable of carrying out a sustained ground campaign in the Gaza Strip.

According to the report, it was these determinations by Hamas intelligence that led the group’s leadership to finally settle on October 7 as the date of the invasion.

Immediately after the invasion began, Hamas and other Gaza terror groups maintained their assumption that Israel’s response would be limited, and that the IDF was incapable of waging a lengthy, large-scale group operation.

As late as October 15, 2023, Hamas remained optimistic that Israel’s operational capabilities would restrict its ability to retaliate.

Khaled al-Najjar, a Hamas operative from Khan Younis, wrote on October 15 in an article published by Al-Risala that the IDF’s response would likely be a “limited ground operation on the outskirts of the Strip.”