Palestinian mourners and gunmen wave the green Hamas flag at the funeral of a Palestinian terrorist who was killed in an Israeli military raid in Nur Shams, October 20, 2023. (Nasser Ishtayeh/Flash90)
Hamas exploited Israel’s focus on Judea and Samaria before October 7 massacre, new investigation reveals.
By World Israel News Staff
Hamas exploited Israel’s growing preoccupation with terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria in the years preceding the October 7, 2023, massacre, allowing the terrorist organization to build up its military capabilities in Gaza while Israeli intelligence and security forces concentrated increasingly on threats elsewhere, according to a new investigation published by Israel Hayom.
The investigation, based on previously undisclosed military findings, intelligence documents and interviews with former senior security officials, reveals that Israel’s Shin Bet security agency repeatedly sought permission to eliminate Hamas commanders directing terrorist attacks from Gaza into Judea and Samaria, but was prevented from doing so by political and military leaders determined to preserve calm along the Gaza border.
It also raises the possibility that Hamas deliberately intensified terrorism in Judea and Samaria as part of a wider deception campaign designed to convince Israeli officials that the organization was more interested in expanding its influence there than launching a major war from Gaza.
However, several former intelligence officials interviewed for the report disputed that interpretation, arguing that Hamas’ efforts to destabilize Judea and Samaria represented a genuine strategic objective rather than necessarily a diversion.
The findings suggest that regardless of Hamas’ intentions, the terrorist organization benefited from an Israeli security policy that prioritized maintaining quiet in Gaza while increasingly committing resources to counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria.
One of the investigation’s central revelations concerns an October 3, 2023, visit by then-IDF Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva to the Yarkon signals intelligence base in southern Israel.
During the visit, just four days before the massacre, Haliva was briefed on a Hamas operational network known as the West Bank Headquarters.
The network consisted largely of terrorists originally from Judea and Samaria who had been released in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange and deported to Gaza.
From Gaza, they maintained contact with operatives in Judea and Samaria, providing funding, instructions and assistance for terrorist attacks.
A former Israeli security official described the network as responsible for much of the terrorism directed from Gaza into Judea and Samaria.
Israel Hayom reported that the Shin Bet was dealing with approximately 270 active channels connecting terrorist organizers outside Judea and Samaria with operatives inside the territory.
At the October 3 briefing, military intelligence officials outlined plans to prepare an operation against senior members of the West Bank Headquarters, potentially involving the Shin Bet and Israeli Air Force.
According to a participant in the briefing, planning was expected to begin after the Jewish holidays.
Four days later, Hamas launched its surprise attack on southern Israel, killing approximately 1,200 people and abducting 251 hostages.
The operation against the West Bank Headquarters was never carried out.
The investigation also details repeated efforts by the Shin Bet to persuade Israel’s political leadership to authorize offensive operations against Hamas commanders in Gaza.
On October 1, 2023, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar reportedly recommended assassinating Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and military chief Mohammed Deif during a security assessment attended by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The recommendation reportedly drew on an operational plan developed as early as 2011 to simultaneously eliminate Hamas’ senior leadership and a substantial number of its brigade commanders.
By 2023, the principal targets were Sinwar, Deif and Marwan Issa.
According to former Shin Bet officials, the agency possessed substantial intelligence about the movements and locations of the senior Hamas leaders, although an operation would still have required additional preparations.
Israel Hayom reported that Netanyahu and then-IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi were prepared to approve lower-profile operations against Hamas operatives directing terrorism in Judea and Samaria, but opposed conspicuous targeted assassinations that could trigger renewed fighting in Gaza.
The Shin Bet considered some of the covert alternatives operationally difficult and time-consuming.
Former officials interviewed by the newspaper argued that the restrictions prevented Israel from disrupting the infrastructure supporting Hamas terrorism in Judea and Samaria.
One former Shin Bet official said the security services could not rely exclusively on defensive measures, warning that an increasing number of attempted attacks placed mounting pressure on intelligence personnel and made it more likely that an operation would eventually evade detection.
The dispute reflected a fundamental disagreement over Israeli policy toward Hamas.
While the political leadership sought to preserve stability in Gaza, the Shin Bet increasingly viewed Hamas’ continued direction of attacks in Judea and Samaria as evidence that the terrorist organization had not been deterred.
According to the investigation, the policy of maintaining calm in Gaza became increasingly entrenched following Israel’s decision in 2018 to facilitate the transfer of Qatari funds into the territory.
The financial arrangements helped stabilize Hamas’ administration in Gaza, while the organization continued expanding its military capabilities and directing terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria.
An internal Military Intelligence investigation cited by Israel Hayom found that Israeli officials believed Hamas was prioritizing stability in Gaza while seeking to strengthen its position in Judea and Samaria.
The Shin Bet reached a similar assessment but viewed the situation with greater concern.
Former Shin Bet chief Nadav Argaman reportedly characterized the situation as a deceptive calm, warning that the absence of major fighting along the Gaza border did not mean Hamas had abandoned its terrorist objectives.
Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence failed to penetrate some of Hamas’ most sensitive operational planning.
The new report reveals that Military Intelligence investigators later described Israeli cyber access to Gaza as limited and found that information recovered from Hamas computers during the war had not been available to intelligence agencies before October 7.
Those findings are consistent with the IDF’s February 2025 investigation, which concluded that the military had seriously underestimated Hamas’ capabilities and failed to recognize the threat posed by its attack plans.
The military investigation also found that Israeli officials had repeatedly interpreted Hamas’ behavior through the assumption that the organization was primarily interested in preserving its rule and improving economic conditions in Gaza.
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