Israeli special forces operating inside Iran

If Israeli commandos were operating on the ground in Iran amid the current conflict, their missions would likely focus on high-value, precision tasks that airpower alone cannot fully achieve.

By Hezy Laing

Recent reports have claimed that Israeli special forces, including operatives from the Mossad intelligence agency, conducted ground operations inside Iran during as part of the broader ongoing conflict known as Operation Roaring Lion.

The story, based on reports from the Saudi-based Al-Arabiya news outlet, was first broadcast on March 2, 2026, but provided no specific details on the nature, location, objectives, or outcomes of the alleged operations.

Meanwhile Sky News Arabia reported that “non-Iranian ground elements” were identified by local sources near IRGC command centers in Kermanshah (Western Iran).

They suggested these teams are working in tandem with the Iranian Kurdish opposition (PDKI), who are reportedly crossing the border from Iraq to exploit the chaos created by the airstrikes.

Israeli officials have downplayed the ground operations report.

An IDF spokesperson described the Al-Arabiya claim as “unlikely,” emphasizing that deploying ground troops to Iran would be “impractical” given the distance and risks involved.

But recently, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir publicly acknowledged that Israeli commando forces operated inside Iran during the 12-day war in June 2025, marking a rare confirmation of commando operations.

If Israeli commandos were operating on the ground in Iran amid the current conflict, their missions would likely focus on high-value, precision tasks that airpower alone cannot fully achieve.

These elite units, potentially from Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, or Mossad’s Kidon division, would prioritize sabotage of remaining air defense radars, missile launchers, or command nodes that have evaded airstrikes.

They might plant explosives or laser-designate targets for incoming fighter jets to ensure accurate hits on hardened underground facilities, such as residual ballistic missile sites or IRGC bunkers near Tehran or western provinces.

Other plausible activities include gathering real-time intelligence on leadership movements, assessing damage to nuclear-related infrastructure like Natanz remnants, or disrupting communications to sow confusion in Iran’s fragmented chain of command following the reported deaths of senior figures.

Small teams could also conduct limited raids to capture equipment, documents, or personnel for analysis or neutralize threats like mobile missile batteries preparing retaliatory launches.

Such operations would rely on stealth insertion—possibly via border regions or pre-positioned assets; extreme caution to avoid detection in hostile territory; and rapid exfiltration to minimize risk in a vast country with active security forces.

These actions align with Israel’s historical emphasis on special operations to complement overwhelming air superiority, as seen in past covert efforts, though no official Israeli confirmation exists for the present claims.