(Illustrative)
Despite Saudi Arabia’s refusal to normalize relations with Israel, a discreet exchange of Israeli intelligence for Saudi missile-defense cooperation could transform the fight against the Houthis.
By Jonathan Pollard, World Israel News
The escalating Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia, highlighted by missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure, has exposed a troubling paradox. Despite possessing one of the most technologically advanced and heavily equipped militaries in the Middle East, Riyadh continues to struggle against an adversary armed with relatively inexpensive Iranian-designed drones and increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles.
This predicament raises an important strategic question. Could Israel, with its extensive experience in missile defense, intelligence gathering, and unconventional warfare, help Saudi Arabia overcome a threat that neither its advanced Western weapons nor its enormous defense expenditures have been able to eliminate?
The obvious obstacle is political. Saudi Arabia continues to insist that normalization with Israel must be tied to the creation of a Palestinian state, a condition that makes an overt military alliance virtually impossible under present circumstances. Nor is there any realistic prospect of Israeli combat aircraft operating openly from Saudi bases or Israeli missile-defense batteries being deployed across the kingdom.
Yet the absence of formal diplomatic relations does not necessarily preclude cooperation when vital national security interests converge. Indeed, the most valuable arrangement between Jerusalem and Riyadh might be one that neither government would ever publicly acknowledge.
The answer lies in a discreet strategic exchange: Israel could provide the intelligence, cyber capabilities, and operational expertise needed to weaken the Houthi military apparatus, while Saudi Arabia could use its geographic position and existing air-defense network to help intercept missiles and drones heading toward Israel.
Such an arrangement would not require Saudi Arabia to abandon its public diplomatic demands, nor would it require Israel to make political concessions affecting its sovereignty or security. It would simply recognize that both countries face a common enemy whose growing capabilities threaten their respective national interests.
The most valuable contribution Saudi Arabia could make to Israel’s security would be to serve as an additional layer of defense against Houthi missiles and drones launched from Yemen.
The kingdom possesses an extensive network of American-supplied air-defense systems, including Patriot batteries and the more advanced THAAD system, supported by modern radar installations and Royal Saudi Air Force fighter aircraft. Although these capabilities have not provided Riyadh with complete protection against Houthi attacks, they represent a substantial military asset that could potentially be employed in a broader regional defense arrangement.
Saudi Arabia’s geographic position is particularly important. Depending on their flight paths, Houthi missiles and drones directed toward Israel may pass through or near areas where Saudi surveillance and interception capabilities could provide an additional opportunity to detect and engage them.
A discreet understanding between Jerusalem and Riyadh, potentially facilitated by Washington, could therefore enable Saudi forces to intercept certain threats before they reach Israeli airspace.
Such cooperation would require careful coordination of radar coverage, missile trajectories, communications, and engagement procedures. It would not be a simple matter of ordering Saudi missile batteries to shoot down every projectile traveling northward, nor could the kingdom guarantee the interception of weapons following trajectories beyond the reach of its defenses.
Nevertheless, even a limited arrangement could significantly complicate Houthi attack planning by forcing the movement to contend with an additional layer of regional defenses.
The importance of such cooperation becomes even clearer when considering reports concerning Chinese-origin technology and components reaching the Houthis. Of particular concern are indications that the movement may be seeking to expand its ability to manufacture increasingly sophisticated solid-fueled ballistic missiles, potentially drawing upon technologies associated with Iran’s Kheibar Shekan family.
The Iranian missile is generally credited with a range approaching 1,900 kilometers and incorporates a maneuvering reentry vehicle intended to complicate interception. Although reports of Chinese-sourced components do not establish that the Houthis have successfully manufactured an equivalent weapon, the possibility of further advances in their domestic missile-production capabilities should be treated seriously.
The earlier such threats can be detected and, where feasible, intercepted, the greater the opportunities for protecting Israeli population centers and critical infrastructure.
For Israel, therefore, Saudi Arabia’s most valuable contribution might not be diplomatic recognition or public military cooperation, but the quiet willingness to help prevent Iranian-backed missiles from reaching Israeli territory.
Saudi Arabia’s difficulties in confronting the Houthis cannot be attributed simply to an insufficient supply of modern weapons. The kingdom has spent enormous sums acquiring sophisticated Western military systems, yet its armed forces have repeatedly encountered difficulties adapting to an adversary that relies on mobility, concealment, decentralized operations, and inexpensive precision weapons.
Part of the problem is structural. Saudi military institutions have historically been shaped by considerations of internal regime security, with authority divided among different defense and security organizations. Such arrangements can complicate coordination, slow decision-making, and inhibit the operational flexibility required to confront rapidly changing threats.
These institutional weaknesses are compounded by the practical difficulties of defending an enormous territory against small drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles launched from concealed positions. Even an efficient military command structure would struggle to provide comprehensive protection against such attacks.
Israel, however, possesses capabilities that could help Riyadh compensate for some of these limitations without requiring a wholesale transformation of the Saudi military establishment.
Israeli intelligence organizations have accumulated extensive experience identifying hostile command structures, tracking senior operatives, monitoring weapons transfers, and integrating information from human sources, electronic surveillance, and other intelligence systems.
In principle, this expertise could enable Saudi Arabia to identify legitimate Houthi military targets more effectively, including command facilities, missile-production infrastructure, weapons depots, and operational networks responsible for attacks against the kingdom.
The objective would be to disrupt the movement’s ability to plan, coordinate, and sustain attacks rather than simply responding to individual missile launches after they occur.
The elimination or capture of senior military commanders could form part of such a campaign where legally justified, but it would be a mistake to assume that removing a handful of leaders would automatically paralyze the entire organization. The Houthis have demonstrated considerable organizational resilience, and any effective campaign would have to address the military infrastructure and networks that enable their continued operations.
For Riyadh, access to more timely and accurate intelligence could prove as valuable as the acquisition of another expensive weapons system.
Another area in which Israel could provide substantial assistance involves cyber warfare and electronic countermeasures.
Houthi missile and drone operations depend on a combination of communications systems, navigation technology, intelligence networks, and logistical support. These systems vary considerably in sophistication and vulnerability, but certain elements may be susceptible to electronic interference, cyber disruption, or other defensive measures.
Israel has developed considerable expertise in this field, including the integration of electronic warfare with conventional military operations.
A carefully structured arrangement could allow Saudi Arabia to benefit from Israeli technical expertise in protecting critical infrastructure, improving early-warning systems, identifying vulnerabilities in hostile communications, and disrupting selected military networks.
Some of these capabilities might be shared through American coordination or other discreet arrangements, although any transfer of sensitive technology would necessarily involve political, legal, and security considerations.
The strategic advantage of such cooperation is that it would address the Houthi threat before every attack becomes a contest between an inexpensive offensive weapon and a vastly more expensive defensive interceptor.
Missile defense will always remain essential. But no country can indefinitely rely upon intercepting every hostile projectile after it has already been launched.
A further possibility involves supporting those Yemeni forces already engaged in resisting Houthi control.
The Houthis do not govern a politically unified country. They face opposition from forces associated with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, southern political and military movements, and various tribal coalitions whose interests frequently conflict with those of the Houthi leadership.
These divisions create opportunities, but they also present considerable dangers.
Israel could potentially assist Saudi Arabia by contributing intelligence and strategic assessments concerning the capabilities and vulnerabilities of anti-Houthi forces. Under carefully defined arrangements, such assistance might support efforts to strengthen legitimate military opposition to Houthi expansion and reduce the movement’s freedom to concentrate resources on attacks beyond Yemen’s borders.
However, the assumption that every enemy of the Houthis is necessarily a reliable partner would be a serious mistake.
The internationally recognized Yemeni government, southern separatists, and independent tribal formations have competing political objectives. Some are concerned primarily with local autonomy, while others seek control over national institutions or territory. Strengthening one faction without considering these rivalries could deepen Yemen’s internal fragmentation and ultimately benefit the Houthis.
Any Israeli contribution would therefore have to be coordinated with a broader Saudi strategy designed to avoid empowering forces whose long-term objectives might prove incompatible with regional stability.
The purpose should not be to draw Israel into Yemen’s internal political struggles, but to help ensure that the Houthis cannot devote their military resources exclusively to threatening Saudi Arabia, Israel, and international shipping.
The Houthi threat extends well beyond missile attacks against Saudi and Israeli territory.
The movement’s ability to threaten commercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has demonstrated how a relatively small military force can disrupt international trade, impose enormous economic costs, and threaten one of the world’s most strategically important maritime passages.
For Israel, the consequences have been particularly damaging to commercial activity associated with the port of Eilat. For Saudi Arabia and other regional states, the disruption of Red Sea shipping threatens trade routes, infrastructure investment, and broader economic development.
Israel and Saudi Arabia therefore possess a substantial common interest in restricting the movement of weapons, missile components, and other military supplies reaching Houthi-controlled territory.
Israel’s naval intelligence, maritime surveillance capabilities, and experience tracking Iranian weapons networks could contribute to a wider effort to identify and disrupt illicit arms shipments, consistent with applicable international law.
Such cooperation could complement existing American and multinational maritime-security operations while potentially involving other regional partners with direct interests in Red Sea stability.
The United Arab Emirates and states along the African side of the Red Sea could also have roles to play, depending on their political interests and willingness to participate. But the existence of overlapping interests should not be confused with the existence of an established Israeli-led coalition.
The essential objective would be to make it progressively more difficult and expensive for Iran and its partners to sustain the Houthi missile and drone arsenal.
Stopping weapons before they reach their destination is preferable to confronting them after they have been assembled, deployed, and launched.
Ultimately, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia can afford to treat the Houthi threat as a permanent condition to be managed through increasingly expensive defensive measures.
Missile interception, however technologically impressive, addresses the final stage of an attack rather than the military organization responsible for launching it.
A more effective approach would combine defensive interception with sustained pressure against identifiable Houthi military capabilities, including missile-launch infrastructure, weapons-production facilities, military command centers, and logistical networks that support attacks against civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
Such operations must be directed against lawful military objectives and conducted in accordance with the requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions to protect civilians.
The strategic purpose would be to reduce the Houthis’ capacity to wage war, not to inflict mass casualties for their own sake. Attacks that kill large numbers of civilians could strengthen the movement’s recruitment and propaganda efforts, undermine regional cooperation, and produce consequences entirely contrary to Israel’s and Saudi Arabia’s security interests.
Nor should Israel assume that a sustained campaign of military pressure would necessarily produce the collapse of Houthi rule. The movement has survived years of conflict, and its resilience must be incorporated into any realistic assessment of what military action can accomplish.
Nevertheless, accepting the indefinite expansion of Houthi missile and drone capabilities would carry its own considerable risks.
The challenge is to move beyond a strategy that merely absorbs and intercepts attacks toward one that systematically weakens the military infrastructure enabling them.
The upcoming Israeli elections on October 27 are unlikely, by themselves, to resolve the political obstacles separating Jerusalem and Riyadh. Saudi Arabia’s insistence upon progress toward Palestinian statehood remains a major barrier to normalization, and there is little reason to assume that these demands will simply disappear because both countries face an increasingly dangerous Iranian-backed adversary.
Yet formal diplomatic relations and practical security cooperation are not necessarily the same thing.
Saudi Arabia does not need to embrace Israel publicly to recognize that Israeli intelligence and military expertise could help protect its cities, energy facilities, and strategic infrastructure. Likewise, Israel does not need a Saudi embassy in Jerusalem to recognize the enormous value of a regional air-defense arrangement that could intercept certain Houthi threats before they approach Israeli territory.
The United States, with its longstanding defense relationships with both countries, could provide an important channel for coordinating such an understanding while reducing the political exposure of the participants.
Of course, secrecy would impose limitations of its own. Military coordination requires trust, reliable communications, clearly defined responsibilities, and mechanisms for preventing dangerous misunderstandings. These requirements become considerably more complicated when the participating governments are unwilling to acknowledge the relationship publicly.
But such obstacles should not automatically foreclose consideration of arrangements that could materially improve the security of both countries.
Israel’s contribution would be intelligence, technical expertise, and assistance in weakening the Houthi military apparatus. Saudi Arabia’s contribution would be its geographic position, surveillance capabilities, and willingness to participate discreetly in a wider defensive effort.
Neither side would receive everything it wants politically. Both could nevertheless obtain something of immediate strategic value.
In a Middle East increasingly shaped by Iranian proxy warfare, the distinction between formal alliances and practical security partnerships may become less important than the willingness of threatened states to act upon their common interests.
The most consequential cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia may ultimately be the cooperation that neither government feels compelled to announce.
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