Air force failed to attack Hamas invaders for hours on Oct. 7

Command headquarters prevented pilots from engaging with the terrorists who stormed the border.

By Batya Jerenberg, World Israel News

Israel’s air force failed to attack Hamas invaders for hours on Oct. 7, 2023, with planes either sitting on the ground or told to hit preplanned targets deep in Gaza instead, Channel 12 reported in a damning review Saturday.

Although 24 minutes into the massive terrorist attack the IAF received concrete information about two mass penetrations of the border fence near Kerem Shalom and Kibbutz Netiv Haasara, Southern Command did not request any planes or helicopters to rush to the sites, and no one in the air force gave the order independently.

Hamas-led fighters ultimately breached the border in more than 60 places, in three waves over the course of the day.

Brig. Gen. Oren Solomon, one of the military investigators probing the IDF’s multiple breakdowns that day, said, “Instead of these planes going up immediately and attacking those terrorists at the fence, at the entry and infiltration routes, what are the planes doing? Planning. For almost three hours they sit on the ground and don’t attack.”

Headquarters was focused on a plan called “Sword of Damocles,” which targeted a terror group within Gaza.

Southern Command insisted on moving forward with it despite Gaza Division Commander Avi Rosenfeld urging the Air Force to “attack the fence,” Solomon said.

Dozens of pilots remained idle until the order was given about 10:30 a.m. to carry out the plan, which did nothing to help civilians or soldiers under attack with automatic weapons, axes and flame-throwers.

Other aircraft were available, but Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy ordered them to hit Hamas rocket depots or protect strategic assets, the report said.

The order to shift focus to the border area was not implemented until noon, but even then, there were failures in engaging with the enemy.

At an internal conference held at Palmachim Air Base in December 2024, pilots and navigators who were in the air on Oct. 7 complained about overly centralized command that prevented them from reacting to what they saw on the ground.

“There was no firing without authorization, there was no initiative and striving for contact,” Pilot R. said. “Whoever took the initiative was reprimanded. We developed concerns about small mistakes, which led us to big mistakes.”

A commander from the IAF’s Shaldag special forces unit said, “Completing a mission is not just about following orders, it requires much more independent decision-making.”

Pilots also said it was often impossible to distinguish friend from foe from the air, and that they were not told crucial information — such as the widespread use of white Toyota trucks by the terrorists — even though such footage was being broadcast on television.

In at least one case, Solomon himself, who defended a large group of civilians on the road leading from the Nova festival, called for helicopter support, gave their exact location, but the pilot said he could not identify the terrorists and left.

Solomon noted that the failures began the night before, when the air force was not alerted to several incidents that indicated Hamas was planning an attack.

A young officer in the “alarm station” unsuccessfully sought information more than four dozen times after receiving such indications at 2:30 a.m.

At 4 a.m., then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy conducted a situation assessment without consulting Air Force commander Tomer Bar, and concluded that Hamas would almost certainly not attack from the air.

As is well known, at 6:29, Hamas launched thousands of rockets and drones at cities across Israel, especially targeting IDF bases near Gaza.

Drones exploded “on our outposts, vessels, and all the observations towers” at the border, Solomon said, “blinding over 80% of our [surveillance] means.”

The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit reacted defensively to the media report, saying, “The Air Force met all the preparedness requirements defined for it, and carried out all the attack orders given to it,” while adding that “none of this detracts from the IDF’s failure to protect the residents of Israel.”

Regarding the conference, the army said that it had been a “very highly classified” meeting where soldiers had been “given the platform to voice internal criticism” prior to the conclusion of the investigation into the air force’s actions.

“We regret that one of the participants decided to commit a serious offense and extract quotes from it,” the statement said.