Hamas documents detail effort to deceive Israel ahead of Oct. 7 massacre

Hamas sought to create the impression that it was focused on diplomacy, economic issues, and limited military activity.

By Vered Weiss, World Israel News

New Hamas documents obtained by IDF intelligence and reviewed by the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute indicate the terror group carried out a deliberate deception campaign during 2022-2023 aimed at lulling Israel into a false sense of security before the Oct. 7 massacre.

The documents, which were passed by IDF intelligence to the Amit Center and later to The Jerusalem Post, provide additional details about how Hamas sought to conceal its preparations while creating the impression that it was focused on diplomacy, economic issues, and limited military activity.

One section called on Hamas “to formulate a multi-disciplinary strategic deception plan (diplomatic-military-economic-public relations) which will include advancing the exchange issue” involving negotiations over two living and two deceased Israeli citizens held by Hamas before 2023. The document specifically referenced then-prime minister Yair Lapid, who served from mid-2022 to December 2022.

The instructions also directed Hamas terrorists to continue “building the military [border] positions at a normal pace and continuing drills in a routine manner until the opening of the pressure campaign, which will provide an appropriate excuse for reducing (open military activities).”

Another section instructed Hamas to repeatedly summon Nukhba Force fighters in different ways to prevent Israel from identifying the timing of an attack.

The documents further recommended varying training exercises and distances from the border while increasing the presence of senior commanders and additional Hamas terrorists near the frontier.

According to the Amit Center’s analysis, senior Hamas officials later acknowledged implementing a systematic deception effort designed to convince Israel that the Gaza-based terror group had been deterred and posed no significant threat.

The intelligence report quoted Hamas officials as saying they “undertook unprecedented intelligence tactics to confuse Israel, including convincing Israelis that Hamas was afraid to go to war and just wanted to improve its economic situation.”

The documents also described using negotiations and humanitarian demands as pressure tools. “The additional pressure on ‘the enemy’ caused it to work more intensely with ‘middleman negotiators’ [such as the Qataris] to calm the situation. ‘The Movement’ [Hamas] presented official updated conditions regarding humanitarian aid.”

Other recommendations called for public messaging focused on issues including al-Aqsa, security prisoners, the Gaza sea blockade, employment, travel, and medical access.

“These must be inculcated with determination into the national Palestinian consciousness,” the document stated.

The papers also recommended keeping all military forces prepared while coordinating efforts with Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, and Kuwait to increase pressure on Israel regarding humanitarian and unemployment issues.