How to stop Iran’s airlift to Hezbollah

Mahan Air, Iran’s largest airline, long has been an important element in Qods Force logistics.

By Babak Taghvaee, Middle East Forum

After a bomb killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps guest house in northern Tehran on July 31, 2024, Iranian leaders swore revenge upon Israel, whom they blamed for the assassination.

Theirs was not empty rhetoric. Almost immediately, the Islamic Republic began a three-week airlift of weaponry to Hezbollah.

The mechanics of the airlift were simple.

A day after Haniyeh’s death, Mahan Air used an Airbus A340-212 previously owned by the French Air and Space Force to shuttle weapons, including suicide drones, from Tehran-Mehrabad Airport to Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport on August 1, 2024.

The same aircraft logged three more flights between Tehran and Beirut over the next three weeks.

After these arms-delivery flights to Beirut, the Israel Defense Forces detected a sudden surge in Hezbollah’s use of a new variant of the Shahed-101 one-way attack drone.

Wreckage of these drones found in northern Israel indicated the use of German components, including engines recently procured and supplied by Iran.

The transportation of these components to Lebanon by aircraft allowed Hezbollah to quickly assemble and prepare them for attacks on Israel.

A Mahan Air A340-313 also airlifted weapons and operatives to Beirut on August 8, 9, 15, and 16.

Before entering Lebanese airspace, pilots turned off their Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast to hide their location from flight-tracking websites.

Mahan Air, Iran’s largest airline, long has been an important element in Qods Force logistics.

Satellite imagery shows the aircraft parked on the military apron in the south of Mehrabad airport before each flight to Beirut.

The Qods Force loaded cargo pallets originating from an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps storage site next to the apron.

Before 2022, the Qods Force avoided using Mahan Air passenger aircraft to airlift weapons to Lebanon, instead flying weaponry to Damascus and transferring them overland into Lebanon.

The subsequent decision to bypass Syria likely reflects the success of Israeli Air Force precision strikes at Syrian weapons depots and Damascus International Airport itself.

The Biden administration’s refusal to update the sanctions list on Mahan Air’s A340 fleet gives Tehran an opportunity to arm Lebanon directly and easily; today, only eight of Mahan Air’s 15 Airbus A340s are listed in the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s latest Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list.

The loophole not only allows Mahan Air to fuel the fire on Israel’s northern border, but it also undercuts Western leverage on Lebanon to deny landing permits and ground support.

While Biden officials talk the talk about diplomacy and de-escalation, a failure to walk the walk and update America’s own legal framework today undermines efforts for peace.