Israeli reserve soldiers from the Alexandroni Brigade who took part in an operation to recover the body of slain hostage Ran Gvili from the Gaza Strip are seen near the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, southern Israel, January 27, 2026. (Photo by Tsafrir Abayov/Flash90)
Early in the war, concerns were raised that leaders such as Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif might be untouchable if they alone possessed certain knowledge about captives.
By Vered Weiss, World Israel News
The IDF at times chose not to target specific Gazan terrorists because they were believed to hold critical information about the locations of Israeli hostages, a senior Intelligence Corps commander disclosed Thursday.
The officer described the decision as part of an ongoing operational tension between eliminating threats and preserving intelligence value tied to hostage recovery. “There is always a dual dilemma” about whether to “let security forces kill terrorists to remove a threat” or refrain in order to maintain access to information that could aid rescue efforts, he told the Jerusalem Post.
The revelation sheds light on how Israel was able to pursue senior Hamas figures while still preserving channels that could lead to hostage intelligence.
Early in the war, concerns were raised that leaders such as Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif might be untouchable if they alone possessed certain knowledge about captives.
Regarding Ran Gvili, the commander said Hamas did not know his location. “Hamas never knew where he was,” he said. “Islamic Jihad did not even know.”
Intelligence teams explored multiple scenarios, including the possibility that Gvili had been mistakenly buried among Gazans in October 2023.
Identifying specific areas in eastern Gaza City required extensive analysis supported by Shin Bet interrogations.
“I didn’t think we would get all of the hostages back,” the officer said, crediting more than 2,000 personnel at the hostage center for the eventual recovery.
He said new intelligence received about a month before the operation, and additional details days before it, significantly improved the likelihood of success.
He added that the Islamic Jihad figure questioned by Shin Bet was not the person who originally transported Gvili’s body into Gaza but someone who later received it.
The Mossad, he said, focused mainly on negotiations but also contributed to operational efforts.
The commander noted that locating living hostages required different methods than recovering remains, with separate units dedicated to each task.
After fatal incidents in December 2023 and August 2024, the IDF revised training and tightened operational standards, requiring updated intelligence before entering areas where hostages might be present.
Within two weeks of the war’s start, uncertainty about the fate of 3,000 Israelis was narrowed to 200–300 cases, and by December 2024, the status of all missing persons was known, he said.
According to the military, the operation targeted individuals involved in recent exchanges of gunfire between…
Sukkot said one of the messages, which he said was sent by a Hamas supporter…
A U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance plane refuels midair from a KC-135 Stratotanker as part…
Shin Bet data published this week showed that Jewish extremists carried out 660 attacks against…
Lifting sanctions or providing other forms of economic relief would strengthen repression rather than improve…
Through forged identities, disabled trackers, and covert crypto payments, this is how Iran's shadow fleet…