Hamas’ legitimacy rests on its ability to govern and deliver aid, and when Hamas can’t do that, it begins to lose legitimacy.
By Yaakov Lappin, JNS
The Israel Defense Forces conducted extensive air and artillery strikes across northern, central and southern Gaza overnight on Thursday, killing Abd al-Latif Qanoua, a senior Hamas spokesman, slain in Jabalia in a strike on his tent.
The attacks are part of a broader campaign to systematically eliminate key figures in both Hamas’s military-terrorist wing, and its “political” leadership.
This, combined with Israel preventing aid trucks from entering Gaza—supplies that were stolen by Hamas and used to bolster its regime—signals an Israeli strategic pivot from strictly targeting “military” wing operatives to dismantling the governing infrastructure sustaining Hamas’s rule.
In recent days, Israel has killed several senior officials of Hamas’s Political Bureau. These included Ismail Barhoum, who managed the organization’s finances and directed funds toward terror planning and weapons procurement.
He was killed in a joint IDF and Shin Bet operation at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis. Just before his death, Barhoum had succeeded Issam Da’alis, Hamas’s “prime minister” in Gaza, who was killed in mid-March.
Salah Bardawil, head of Hamas’s Planning and Development Office in southern Gaza, was also targeted and killed by Israel.
The goals of the war
Meir Ben-Shabbat, head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, who is former Israeli national security adviser and ex-head of the National Security Council, told JNS on Wednesday that “one of the goals of the war, as determined by the political echelon, is the destruction of Hamas’s governing capabilities. This goal cannot be achieved without targeting the functionaries who run Hamas’s administration in Gaza. This is a necessary step.”
He added, “The achievements in recent days are impressive, but the pace must be increased and the blow to Hamas intensified.”
Ben-Shabbat emphasized the importance of Israel controlling the flow of aid “after we have seen that this aid is being used by Hamas both to rearm for continued war and to bolster its governance over the population.”
According to Ben-Shabbat, “To understand why, one must revisit the footage and images from October 7, the monstrous atrocities, and the participation of elderly and youths in these acts. The celebrations in Gaza over the abduction of elderly people, women and children. The horrific stories of what our hostages endured—59 of whom are still held in Gaza.”
In the first part of the war, Israel’s approach to Hamas’s “political” infrastructure was different.
Ben-Shabbat argued that Israel at that time “acted under different conditions—under constraints imposed by the Biden administration and operational limitations that forced it to prioritize its overall tasks. Today, those constraints no longer exist and the operational space is far broader.”
The eyes of the population
Lt. Col. (res.) Amit Yagur, former deputy head of the Palestinian arena at the IDF Planning Branch and a former naval intelligence officer, told JNS on Wednesday that Hamas’s true strategic center of gravity lies not in its rockets or gunmen but in its civilian governance and perceived legitimacy among Gazan civilians.
“Hamas know that in a military confrontation with Israel, their ammunition depots and all their military capabilities will be damaged—that’s something they expect. What they aim to preserve is their organizational survival and legitimacy in the eyes of the population,” Yagur said.
“The military capacity is relatively easy to rebuild. You get hit, you start to restore the military capability. You start restoring workshops using aid coming in, you manufacture more rockets again, you arm the youths. But the civilian governing capacity is much harder to rebuild for Hamas once it’s been damaged.”
Yagur explained that Hamas’s legitimacy rests on its ability to govern and deliver aid. “The population says to Hamas, ‘you stayed as the ruler, okay, rebuild. Bring back our homes and our lives.’”
When Hamas can’t do that, it begins to lose legitimacy, argued Yagur, which is why Hamas is desperate for caravans and aid infrastructure—so it can demonstrate that it’s rebuilding.
Yagur criticized Israel’s past focus on purely military targets, stating that eighty to 90% of everything the IDF had attacked in Gaza was focused on military targets like terror operatives, rockets, weapons.
“That’s what I call speaking in the military language only. It’s a mistake,” he said, since Hamas’s “main goal is to stay in power.”
The previous military echelon was highly opposed to any activity by Israel in Gaza’s civilian sphere, he noted. “There were a few attempts to cement civilian clans that would take control from Hamas in the middle of 2024. These efforts failed,” he recalled.
“Today, everyone understands how important it is to seize control of the distribution of humanitarian aid.”
According to Yagur, the recent focus on Hamas’s political wing marked a necessary correction. “For the first time, we’re seeing the large-scale targeting of the people who run the civilian system in the Gaza Strip. These are Hamas figures. This damages their ability to recover, to govern and interface with the population.”
Protests against Hamas
The shift in approach was quickly followed in Gaza by mounting and unprecedented civilian Palestinian protests against Hamas.
Between March 25 and 27, protests erupted in at least seven locations across Gaza, including Beit Lahia, Jabalia Camp, Shejaiya in Gaza City, Zeitoun, Nuseirat, Khan Yunis and Deir al-Balah.
These followed a major demonstration on March 25 in Beit Lahia, where hundreds of civilians waved white flags and called for an end to the war.
That protest, reportedly organized in part by Fatah affiliates and the “Bidna Na’ish” (“We want to live”) initiative, marked the first large-scale civilian protest since Israel closed Gaza’s border crossings.
Protesters chanted, “Hamas out, Hamas out,” and called out journalists, including from Al Jazeera, demanding media coverage of the events.
Videos circulated showing notable elders from Beit Lahia speaking openly and uncovered against Hamas, indicating bread down of a previous fear barrier.
“These are respected community figures coming out with uncovered faces. That’s not children or women saying, ‘save me’—these are known figures going directly against Hamas. It shows the fear barrier might be cracking a little,” said Yagur.
Human shields
Meanwhile, Col. Avichay Adraee, the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesperson, issued fresh evacuation warnings on Thursday to Gaza residents in Zeitoun, Tel al-Hawa, the Old City of Gaza, Sheikh Ajlin and other neighborhoods, advising them to evacuate ahead of intensified Israeli strikes on Hamas, which continues to systematically use civilians as human shields.
Foreign Minister Israel Katz directly addressed Gaza’s population on Wednesday, warning that more areas will be evacuated, and called on civilians to rise against Hamas and pressure for the release of Israeli hostages. “This is the only way to stop the war,” he said.
Ben-Shabbat outlined what he believed should be Israel’s long-term goal for Gaza: “In my view, President Trump’s vision outlines the scenario that Israel should strive for regarding Gaza: voluntary emigration, enabling first of all the departure of those who wish to live elsewhere. This is an opportunity for historic, fundamental change.”
“Israel must obtain all of the goals it set for this war: return of the hostages, destruction of Hamas, removal of the threat from Gaza. The minimal security goal that it must achieve is demilitarization.
“In the end state of the war in Gaza, Israel will have full security control in this area, and there will be no other fighting force, means, or capabilities that will threaten Israel and its people. Hamas will not only not rule, it will not be a significant force in this area and lose its military, governing, and organizational infrastructure.”
Yagur added that Hamas must be stripped of its interface with the population. “We need to take away its connection to the population—and that means controlling humanitarian aid distribution.”
He argued this could be done through American security contractors under IDF protection, or directly by IDF units in designated humanitarian zones.
Such civilian control efforts are more damaging to Hamas than bombs alone, he said. “These are the things that disrupt them most.”