Lebanon can negotiate with Israel – but it cannot control Hezbollah

A state that has lost exclusive control over the means of coercion is no longer sovereign, in any meaningful sense.

By Jonathan Spyer, Middle East Forum

Israeli forces struck Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on Wednesday and Thursday, after the killing of two IDF reserve soldiers in the area of Majdal Zun on Wednesday.

The two, Major Harel Birenstock from Gush Etzion and Master Sergeant Tamir Vaknin of Eilat, died when a Hezbollah explosive device detonated in an abandoned house they were searching. Four other soldiers were severely wounded.

This incident took place even as US-brokered talks between Israeli and Lebanese representatives continued in Rome. The negotiations convened on Thursday for a third and final day of this round.

The juxtaposition of the talks in Rome with the deadly incident in Majdal Zun exposes the contradiction at the heart of western policy toward Lebanon.

The forces in the country that are willing to negotiate with Israel don’t have the power to influence those who are at war with it.

The Iran-backed forces responsible for the violence, meanwhile, openly reject the talks and make clear that they will not consider themselves obligated by any agreements reached.

The Iran-backed forces responsible for the violence, meanwhile, openly reject the talks and make clear that they will not consider themselves obligated by any agreements reached.

This contradiction shows no signs of being resolved any time soon.

In previous rounds of talks, Israel and the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun agreed to a framework that would include the disarming of Hezbollah, the phased withdrawal of Israel from areas conquered over the last three years of war, and the deployment of the western-supported Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF—the official security forces of the Lebanese state) to the areas evacuated by Israel.

This process is beginning with the establishment of so-called “pilot zones” where the IDF presence is replaced by the LAF, which will then be responsible for disarming Hezbollah in the designated area.

So far, three “pilot zones” have been established in the areas of Faroun, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiya. Neither Faroun nor Srifa was actually occupied by the IDF.

An Israeli presence in Zawtar al-Gharbiya has redeployed. There is little optimism on the Israeli side that the LAF’s performance this time will differ from past experience.

Two UN Security Council resolutions, 1559 from 2004 and 1701, which ended the war of 2006, already call for the disarmament of all non-state military groups in Lebanon.

Past Lebanese governments accepted these resolutions.

Iran’s proxy Hezbollah nevertheless continued and continues to prosecute its long war against the Jewish state from Lebanese soil, without suffering serious hindrance from the forces of the state.

The current government uses sharper tones than previous ones in its criticisms of Hezbollah and both President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam have called openly for the Shia Islamists to give up their weapons.

Aoun on July 31 encouraged all parties to “seize this historic opportunity … and push for the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the army and security forces.”

The problem is that when a state is faced with an armed force on its soil that doesn’t want to disarm, the usual recourse available to the state is coercion.

For this, the state needs both the will and the capacity to force the non-state element to obey. The simple fact of the matter is that in the Lebanese case, neither of these elements is present.

There are no indications of a willingness on the part of the Beirut government to use force against Hezbollah, which retains its presence in the government itself.

But even if Salam and Aoun did wish to do so, the LAF is generally reckoned to consist of about 50 percent Shia Lebanese among its rank and file and around 30 percent in its officer corps.

Such a force would split along sectarian lines were it to be deployed against Hezbollah. And in any case, Hezbollah’s military capacities and abilities outstrip those of the LAF.

The incident at Majdal Zun indicates that, “ceasefire” or not, Hezbollah will, in the months ahead, seek to recommence its long struggle against Jerusalem on behalf of Teheran.

So the US-brokered Israel-Lebanon diplomatic process rests on a series of fictions. Israel is aware of these fictions but must play ball with them at least to a degree because of US preferences.

Most fundamentally, Washington, along with the Europeans, continues to pay lip service to the illusion of Lebanese sovereignty.

But a state that has lost exclusive control over the means of coercion is no longer sovereign, in any meaningful sense.

The government of Israel, which has responsibility for the residents of Israel’s border communities, is not in a position to endlessly indulge this illusion.

The alternative is fairly clear. A large-scale Israeli withdrawal from the 10-kilometer zone of control along the borderline in the near future is unlikely.

As an officer of the IDF’s 36th Division told me during a recent visit to Beaufort Castle in the Israeli zone, “Until we see real signs of the LAF organizing to disarm Hezbollah, we’ll keep the knife to Hezbollah’s neck.”

The incident at Majdal Zun indicates that, “ceasefire” or not, Hezbollah will, in the months ahead, seek to recommence its long struggle against Jerusalem on behalf of Teheran.

What will decide the issue, illusions and fictions notwithstanding, will be the relative capacities, abilities, and will of the combatant sides.