Next steps for the anti-Houthi coalition after Israel decapitated the Houthi political leadership

The United States and others with advanced intelligence capabilities should enhance human and signals intelligence efforts to target the Political and Jihadi Supreme Councils.

By Khaled Alyemany, Middle East Forum

Israel struck Houthi leadership in Sanaa on August 24, 2025, two days after the Houthis struck Israel with a missile carrying a cluster bomb warhead.

The exchange marks the most significant escalation since the Yemen war reignited nearly a decade ago.

Beyond the direct military impact, the strike represents a major strategic shift: moving from tit-for-tat missile exchanges to targeted assassinations of senior political leaders.

The attack exposed serious security breaches within Houthi ranks and underscored Israel’s determination to disrupt the Houthis’ political and military command structures.

For the first time, Israel successfully struck the core of Houthi political governance, killing the de facto prime minister and a majority of cabinet members in an attack as consequential and shocking as the September 17, 2024, “pager operation” executed against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Houthi leadership has vowed retaliation, while Israeli officials have indicated further escalation if attacks continue. This dynamic suggests the conflict is entering a cycle of sustained, increasingly lethal exchanges.

While the United States and other powers interact with the Internationally Recognized Government and its Presidential Leadership Council, the Houthis maintain their own government headquartered in Sanaa.

With the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, no state recognizes this Houthi government as legitimate.

This “Sanaa government” functions primarily as a façade to project an image of national unity. The real centers of Houthi decision-making remain the Political Supreme Council (responsible for political direction and governance) and the Jihadi Supreme Council (responsible for military operations and strategic planning).

Penetrating and mapping the networks surrounding these two bodies requires sophisticated intelligence capabilities, given their compartmentalization and reliance on clandestine external support.

Israeli officials apparently base their calculus on the assessment that the Houthis, known for ideological rigidity and resilience, will not yield under conventional bombing or sanctions.

Instead, the Israeli government seems to have concluded that weakening the Houthis requires targeting leadership figures, whether in formal offices or informal settings such as qat-chewing sessions.

This represents a shift from attritional warfare to leadership decapitation as a tool to erode organizational coherence.

The Houthis have shown no signs of de-escalation. Their strikes against Ben Gurion Airport, Israeli ports, and disruptive naval operations in the Red Sea signal an intent to expand pressure into Israel’s civilian and economic heartlands.

While these actions demonstrate reach, the humanitarian and economic costs in Yemen are far greater than those borne by Israel.

In northern Yemen, the war has devastated infrastructure, destroying ports and factories, paralyzing electricity production, and grounding aviation.

Current estimates place losses near $1 billion, underscoring the disproportionate suffering of the Yemeni population. Yet, the Houthis continue to frame the conflict as an existential struggle, embedding “resistance” into their political identity.

The second and perhaps most critical dimension concerns the persistent failure of international mechanisms to curb the flow of weapons, ammunition, and advanced components to the Houthis.

Despite coalition oversight, areas nominally under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government remain fragmented, plagued by rival warlords and corruption.

This has created fertile ground for Houthi smuggling operations, fueled by cash—the “golden key” behind the success of Iran’s regional proxies.

Components originate from Iran, Russia, North Korea, and China, reaching Houthi positions via maritime routes and corrupt intermediaries. Even the United Nations inspection mechanism has been compromised by collusion and illicit financial incentives.

As the Houthi conflict expands, it is necessary for the anti-Houthi coalition to adjust. The United States and others with advanced intelligence capabilities should enhance human and signals intelligence efforts to target the Political and Jihadi Supreme Councils.

It is also necessary to partner with effective local actors and strengthen cooperation with credible Yemeni partners such as the Southern Transitional Council and National Resistance on Yemen’s West Coast. Both retain operational discipline.

A Horn of Africa presence is also crucial to establish a coordinated security and monitoring presence to interdict Iranian-Houthi smuggling routes and prevent further entrenchment of proxy networks.

Finally, there can be no shortcuts to coalition reform. This will require reassessing the structure of the Saudi-Emirati-backed government in Yemen to mitigate fragmentation and warlordism, which currently enable smuggling networks.

Until such actions are taken, neither side is positioned to decisively alter regional power balances. Instead, the Middle East is likely to face a drawn-out cycle of escalation with growing humanitarian, economic, and geopolitical costs.