IDF insider says Gaza plan missing key elements, likely to fail

Hazut argues that the method selected for “Operation Gideon’s Chariots II” runs contrary to operational logic and established recommendations, and that this could preclude a tangible achievement in the campaign.

By Shirit Avitan Cohen, JNS via Israel Hayom

The manner in which the Israel Defense Forces plans to wage the new campaign in Gaza City lacks the essential components for victory, according to IDF Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazut.

In a document distributed to reserve forces, titled, “How armies have defeated guerrilla organizations,” Hazut, who heads the IDF Ground Forces’ operational learning branch, highlights clauses marked in red—key actions the military has not yet performed and does not intend to execute during the conquest of Gaza City.

These include a complete siege of the city, cutting off the guerrilla organization from the civilian populace and interrupting supply lines.

Hazut argues that the method selected for “Operation Gideon’s Chariots II” runs contrary to operational logic and established recommendations, and that this could preclude a tangible achievement in the campaign.

To achieve victory over a guerilla force, “One must act with high intensity using diverse means, encircle an area with a maneuver, and force the enemy into close-quarters combat,” Hazut argues in the document.

“Demonstrate initiative and aggressiveness, do not permit hit-and-run attacks. Dissecting the area into cells and isolating them from each other to deny the enemy freedom of movement.”

The document further calls for “Severing the guerrilla organization from the population, combining military force with initiatives to improve the population’s lives, controlling the territory, preventing safe havens, and cutting off supply routes to the guerrillas.”

In response to the document, senior IDF officials said that “The commander of the Ground Forces conducted a clarification with Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazut, as the presentation’s content and its findings were not authored with authority and did not represent the IDF’s official position as is expected from a document distributed to reserve forces.”

The officials went on to state that, “The IDF encourages critical discourse, and in discussions held in the General Staff forum and among the ranks, different opinions arise concerning the operational patterns of action to be employed in the Gaza Strip. Operation Gideon’s Chariots met its objectives; during the operation, the IDF completely dismantled terrorist infrastructure where it operated.”

Furthermore, “The operation intensified military pressure on Hamas and resulted in IDF control over three-quarters of the Strip’s territory and the elimination of approximately 2,000 terrorists.”

IDF Col. (res.) Hezi Nehemia, a co-founder of the Reservists Commanders Forum, took issue with the IDF’s official response.

“For anyone who doubted whether the ‘conception’ is still with us, the IDF spokesperson’s response arrived and proved the flawed paradigm is here to stay,” he said.

“When Brig. Gen. Guy Hazut commits his conclusions to writing after 20 months leading the IDF’s operational learning branch, the IDF summons him for a clarification. In short, why contend with the message when you can silence the messenger. We regret this, but we will persist in loudly voicing the outcry of tens of thousands of officers and soldiers.”