Oct. 7 naval attack could have caused far greater disaster, investigator says

Solomon said the Israeli Navy later intercepted an unmanned explosive-laden submersible launched toward Israel that afternoon.

By Vered Weiss, World Israel News

Brig. Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon, who led the Gaza Division’s war investigation team, said Hamas’s October 7 assault included a sophisticated naval offensive that received little public attention and could have caused far greater destruction had key attacks succeeded.

Speaking to Arutz Sheva, Solomon said public attention has largely centered on the terrorists who crossed into Israel by land, while a parallel maritime operation targeted strategic infrastructure using naval commandos, fast attack boats and explosive-laden unmanned submersibles.

According to Solomon, Hamas developed one of its most advanced military capabilities at sea, combining amphibious assault units with remotely operated underwater explosives.

“These weren’t just naval commandos,” he said. “These were forces trained in diving, amphibious landings, and carrying out attacks by sea. In addition, Hamas developed unmanned submarines with remote navigation capabilities, carrying substantial explosive charges.”

He said seven fast boats carrying about 45 terrorists departed Gaza at 6:30 a.m. on October 7. Their missions included attacks on an Israeli offshore gas platform, EAPC facilities and other strategic sites. Another boat reached Zikim Beach, where terrorists killed civilians who had taken shelter in a bomb shelter and a public restroom.

“If the boats assigned to the gas platform had succeeded,” Solomon said, “we would have faced an event on an entirely different scale. A successful strike on an active gas platform could have caused an enormous disaster.”

Solomon said the Israeli Navy later intercepted an unmanned explosive-laden submersible launched toward Israel that afternoon.

“This is an incident that has barely been discussed,” he said. “Had that submersable struck the gas platform, half of Ashkelon could have been vaporized. It was a great miracle.”

Beyond the operational details, Solomon sharply criticized the postwar investigations, arguing they omitted critical information and disproportionately blamed field commanders.

He cited Ashdod Naval Base commander Col. Eitan Paz, who, according to Solomon, independently raised the alert level, mobilized reserve forces, deployed naval vessels and reinforced strategic facilities despite standing instructions not to alter routine activity.

Solomon also said intelligence warning signs received before and during the night preceding the attack were either not passed to the Ashdod base commander or were not translated into operational measures. He added that the review committee headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman rejected the Navy’s investigation and several other core reports after determining they did not meet the required professional standard.

“There are incidents the public knows nothing about,” Solomon said. “If we don’t study them thoroughly and present the full picture, they could happen again. We must not cover things up. We have to understand what really happened in order to prevent the next disaster.”