How big is the IAF’s window of opportunity to hit Iranian missile launchers?

Many missiles require substantial preparation time before firing, further constraining salvo sizes and providing Israel potential opportunities to disrupt launches.

By Hezy Laing

The greatest threat to Israel from Iran remains its arsenal of middle- and long-range ballistic missiles, capable of reaching Israeli territory and inflicting significant damage.

Estimates place Iran’s stockpile of such missiles at around 1,500 following recent conflicts and replenishment efforts, though numbers fluctuate due to expenditures and Israeli strikes.

Iran’s strategy centers on saturating Israeli defenses through large, simultaneous volleys, aiming to overwhelm systems like Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow by launching hundreds of missiles in coordinated barrages.

There is some encouraging news for Israel in this equation: Iran possesses a relatively limited number of missile launchers—recent assessments suggest roughly 100 serviceable mobile launchers remain after prior Israeli operations targeted them extensively.

This bottleneck restricts Iran’s ability to unleash its full missile inventory rapidly.

Many missiles require substantial preparation time before firing, further constraining salvo sizes and providing Israel potential opportunities to disrupt launches.

Iran’s missile force divides into two main categories based on propulsion: liquid-fueled and solid-fueled systems.

Liquid-fueled missiles, comprising about 70% of the longer-range inventory (such as variants of the Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Khorramshahr series), rely on storable propellants loaded shortly before launch.

This process is complex and time-intensive, often taking hours—including fueling, system checks, and positioning—which makes them vulnerable to detection and preemptive strikes. These missiles offer range advantages but sacrifice rapid response.

In contrast, solid-fueled missiles account for about 30% of the arsenal (including systems like Sejjil, Fateh family derivatives, Kheibar Shekan, and Fattah variants).

Solid propellants are pre-mixed and stable, enabling much quicker launch preparation—typically minutes rather than hours.

Once positioned, these can be fired rapidly from mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), reducing exposure time and complicating interception efforts.

This capability allows Iran to execute faster, more unpredictable attacks, heightening the challenge for Israeli defenses.

To counter this, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) prioritizes neutralizing the quick-launch solid-fueled systems first. These represent the most immediate danger due to their short preparation windows and mobility.

The IAF would likely employ a combination of intelligence-driven strikes, using advanced surveillance (drones, satellites) to locate hidden TELs, followed by precision airstrikes with standoff munitions or loitering weapons.

Past operations demonstrated success in “launcher hunts,” where air superiority enabled dynamic targeting of mobile platforms before they could fire.

By focusing early on solid-fueled assets, Israel aims to degrade Iran’s saturation potential, buying time for defenses to handle remaining liquid-fueled threats.

This window of opportunity—while Iran’s launcher numbers stay constrained and solid systems remain detectable—could prove decisive in blunting a large-scale attack.