How Iran hopes to defeat Israel’s missile‑defense system – analysis

Israel’s counter‑strategy centers on preemptive disruption, regional coordination, and layered interception.

By Hezy Laing

Iran’s long-term strategy for overwhelming Israel’s multilayered missile-defense network—composed of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2, and Arrow-3—relies on mass production, saturation attacks, and diversified launch platforms.

Over the past decade, Iran has dramatically expanded its missile‑manufacturing capacity, with U.S. and Israeli intelligence estimating annual production in the thousands.

Systems such as the Shahab‑3, Emad, Sejjil, Zolfaghar, and Fateh‑110 are now produced in serial quantities, a capability repeatedly emphasized by IRGC Aerospace Force commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

Tehran’s doctrine is built on firing large, mixed volleys of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones from multiple fronts simultaneously, aiming to overwhelm Israel’s interceptors through sheer volume.

The April 2024 attack—when Iran launched more than 300 projectiles, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and Shahed‑136 drones—was widely interpreted as a real-world test of this saturation strategy.

Although Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Jordan intercepted the vast majority, Iranian officials claimed the attack demonstrated their ability to strain Israel’s defenses.

Iran has also invested heavily in underground “missile cities,” mobile launchers, and hardened silos in regions such as Khuzestan, Kermanshah, and Bandar Abbas.

These facilities are designed to protect launch crews and enable rapid sequential firing.

Cruise missiles like the Paveh and Soumar fly at low altitudes to exploit radar blind spots, while drones launched from proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria add additional layers of complexity.

Israel’s counter‑strategy centers on preemptive disruption, regional coordination, and layered interception.

The IDF and Mossad have conducted repeated strikes on Iranian missile‑production sites in Damascus, Masyaf, Isfahan, and Parchin, targeting engineers, storage depots, and precision‑guidance facilities.

Arrow‑3, developed with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, intercepts long‑range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, while David’s Sling and Iron Dome handle medium‑ and short‑range threats.

Israel is also integrating radar and interception networks with CENTCOM partners, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, to detect launches earlier and intercept threats before they reach Israeli airspace.

Yet Iran faces significant structural obstacles.

Despite possessing an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 ballistic missiles, Western intelligence believes it has fewer than 100 operational launchers, severely limiting its ability to fire large salvos simultaneously.

Many of its most powerful missiles rely on liquid fuel, requiring lengthy and vulnerable preparation. Even Iran’s underground complexes cannot fully shield launch crews from satellite tracking, cyber disruption, or precision strikes.

These weaknesses mean that while Iran can produce missiles in large quantities, its ability to launch them in the concentrated waves needed to overwhelm Israel’s defenses remains far more limited than its rhetoric suggests.