Iran considers leaving the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Former Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Araki, and many members of the parliament demand a bill to be put on the agenda to withdraw from the treaty.

By Shay Khatiri, Middle East Forum

Iranian policymakers and journalists have resumed discussion of Iran’s status within the International Atomic Energy Agency and commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On October 18, 2026, Ahmad Naderi, a centrist member of the parliamentary leadership, suggested that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei might revise his late father’s fatwa against nuclear weapons.

Then on October 24, the hardline Paydari Front, led by former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, issued a statement, calling for Iran’s withdrawal from the treaty.

The statement objected to the treaty’s two-tiered system of haves and haves-not, pointing out that recent wars prove that Iran needs nuclear weapons for deterrence.

On October 31, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei, effectively Iran’s chief national security official, told the national television that Iran’s future as a party to the treaty was uncertain.

The context makes it appear as an unconsidered statement, which Rezaei tried to walk back.

During the initial interview, Rezaei bragged about how Iran was immovable during the negotiation with Vice President J.D. Vance.

Rezaei explained Iran’s approach to discussion of the nuclear issue: “We first discuss our rights, rather than imposing restrictions on ourselves.”

He stated that “every country that is party to the NPT has 22 rights. … They might want to start a war again, and it is unclear that we will remain in the NPT after a war—but so long as we are in it, we have 22 rights and will demand them.”

Rezaei added that Iran’s nuclear doctrine so far had not changed.

On November 1, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated, “Iran is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it upholds its commitments under this treaty,” adding that Iran’s relationship with the agency remains uneasy. But the damage was done.

However, a wide range of Iranian officials now advocate for a withdrawal. Former Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Araki, and many members of the parliament demand a bill to be put on the agenda to withdraw from the treaty.

Mottaki, who is in the parliament, even claimed that all 290 members of the parliament would sign on to leaving the treaty if Khamenei agrees with it.

Reformist website Rouydad24 observed, “Demanding to leave the NPT is no longer limited to a few members of the parliament,” adding, “From the Friday prayer tribune and the national television and radio to the [Expediency] Council, they find it useless.”

Rouydad24 likely would have opposed withdrawal in the past but now takes a different tone.

Instead, it cautions against a hasty decision and advises that, “if Iran’s nuclear doctrine is to change,” that decision should be a result of serious considerations.

There are still voices against this course of action. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, who sits on the parliament’s national security committee, warned that this move could suggest that Iran is moving toward nuclear weapons.

As a result, “the international community could maneuver against Iran.”

Ali Jannati, a minister in the Rouhani administration close with all sides and the son of powerful cleric Ahmad Jannati, opined, “Individuals who say that Iran should exit the NPT do not know to what extent this statement is against national interests.”

He cautioned, “Even talking about it is wrong, and it inherently will impose another war on the country.”

Khabar Online, which is close to the security establishment, warns that withdrawing from the treaty will be costly for Iran, though he adds that the costs might be worth the reward.

But crucially, it observes that Iran’s policy has not changed—though the changes in regional politics could result in changing Iran’s policy regarding nuclear weapons.

There are three new variables to consider. First, Khamenei lacks the caution of his father; second, Iran sees itself exposed as a result of the recent two wars but also believes U.S. deterrence to be weaker today after the failure to secure a conclusive victory; third, below the regime elite, opinion is moving toward proliferation.

The old guard who are currently in charge, such as Rezaei and Araghchi, have yet not endorsed the idea, but they might need to do so under the pressure of the rest of the regime.