Israel military’s internal probes of Hamas attack criticized as inadequate

The panel praised the efforts of frontline intelligence personnel and civilian rapid-response teams, who acted professionally and courageously despite the chaos.

By Pesach Benson, TPS

Most of the Israel Defense Forces’ internal investigations into its failures before and during Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack are deeply flawed, a panel of former senior military officers has concluded.

The external review, presented Monday to the IDF’s top brass, found that while some probes were thorough, many were incomplete or unsatisfactory, raising questions about the army’s ability to learn from its own mistakes.

The findings were delivered by a committee headed by retired Maj. Gen. Sami Turgeman, who spent five months reviewing 25 internal probes conducted after the assault that killed roughly 1,200 Israelis and saw about 250 taken hostage.

The panel examined investigations at the General Staff level, including Israel’s intelligence assessments of Hamas, operational planning, command decisions, and the military’s perception of Gaza over the past decade.

It also assessed a tactical probe into the massacre at the Nova music festival.

Of the 25 investigations, the panel rated nine as “green,” meaning professional and actionable; 11 as “orange,” partially adequate but lacking clear conclusions; and five as “red,” judged unfit for learning or implementation.

Among the failures flagged as red were probes into overall IDF operational planning, the Operations Division, the Navy’s response, the decision-making process on the night of October 6–7, and the military’s Gaza strategy.

These were criticized for poor leadership, insufficient expertise, and failure to address key intelligence and operational gaps.

“The surprise of October 7 did not emerge from a vacuum,” the panel wrote.

“Direct intelligence had accumulated which, if professionally analyzed, could and should have led to an alert and a significant operational response.”

The report highlighted six major causes of the disaster: a conceptual failure in understanding Hamas’ intentions, intelligence shortcomings, neglect of long-standing defense plans, flawed organizational culture, persistent gaps between assessed threats and operational readiness, and deficient decision-making during the attack.

The review also identified systemic problems that had persisted for years.

Warnings from senior IDF officials in 2023 suggested that Israel’s perceived internal divisions could embolden enemies, yet the army did not adjust alert levels or force deployments.

Longstanding intelligence reports, known internally as the “Jericho Wall” plan, detailing Hamas’s preparations, were dismissed as unrealistic.

The panel also found gaps in coordination between the IDF, police, Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), and other government agencies.

In response, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir said the findings demonstrated the need for an “external, systemwide, multidisciplinary and integrative” inquiry.

He stressed that while the military bears full responsibility for the failures, a broader investigation is necessary to include interfaces not examined by the panel.

“The expert team’s report presented today is a significant step toward a comprehensive understanding, one required of us as a society and as a system,” Zamir said.

“To ensure that such failures never happen again, a wide and comprehensive systemic investigation is now required.”

Zamir also indicated that he would consider “personal decisions” against senior officers based on the panel’s findings, potentially including dismissals.

The committee itself did not have the mandate to recommend disciplinary action but stressed that the magnitude of the October 7 attack cannot pass without personal accountability.

The panel praised the efforts of frontline intelligence personnel and civilian rapid-response teams, who acted professionally and courageously despite the chaos, noting that much of the army’s regional defense structure had deteriorated and failed to protect civilians.

The massacre at the Nova music festival exemplified this breakdown in coordination.

Zamir accepted all of the panel’s recommendations and appointed his deputy, Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, to oversee a multiyear plan implementing reforms.

These include overhauling Military Intelligence, prioritizing early-warning systems, and embedding the possibility of surprise war into operational readiness and military culture.

The external review will likely fuel further calls for a state commission of inquiry into the government’s handling of the attack.

The army’s investigations did not include decisions made by the political echelon. Netanyahu has resisted calls for a formal state commission of inquiry, calling it “politically biased.”

Critics accuse him of delaying and weakening the probe. Such commissions, led by senior Supreme Court justices, can summon witnesses, collect evidence, and make recommendations, though the government is not required to follow them.

Around 1,200 people were killed and 252 Israelis and foreigners were taken captive by Hamas during the October 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel. The bodies of three Israelis and one Thai national are still held in Gaza.