Mojtaba Khamenei’s election to supreme leadership is not the end

Both father and son rely upon the security forces at the expense of the seminaries.

By Shay Khatiri, Middle East Forum

Iran International reports the Assembly of Experts has elected Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as his father’s successor.

The younger Khamenei will have to overcome two challenges: disdain for hereditary succession and insufficient clerical rank.

Reportedly, he owes his elevation to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This poses a third problem: His friends have short lifespans.

The Islamic Republic ascended to power in large part in objection to the hereditary monarchy.

While the supreme leader has as much power as an absolute monarchy, the clerics sought to distinguish their order from the shah’s by criticizing hereditary rule.

Ali Khamenei argued that one of the Islamic Revolution’s greatest achievements “was the destruction of a structure which was based on a cruel and unreasonable hereditary monarchy.”

“This old and derelict structure,” his website explained, “was a wrong and unreasonable tradition that dominated our country for several thousand years.”

Mojtaba Khamenei cannot claim superior religious credentials to overcome this. As of March 3, 2026, the day the Assembly of Experts reportedly elected him, domestic outlets still referred to him as a hojjat ol-Islam.

In religious ranking, this is the equivalent to a bachelor’s degree and typically comes after four years of studying.

Seminarians who conclude studying khawrij become Hujjatul-Islam wal-Muslimin, and those who study the dissertations of the scholars become ayatollahs.

The Islamic Republic’s constitution requires the supreme leader to be a grand ayatollah, the highest clerical rank. A grand ayatollah is an accomplished scholar of Shi’ism who has reached ijtihad, published a dissertation, and is a marja’ at-taqlid, a source of emulation.

He has his own followers to whom he can issue fatwas, or religious decrees in answer to queries, varying from how to pray to demanding the assassination of Salman Rushdie.

Mojtaba Khamenei is three ranks away from this level. The difference between his rank and a grand ayatollah is the difference between a college graduate and a tenured professor.

Mojtaba Khamenei is an exaggerated version of his father. Ali Khamenei was also not a grand ayatollah when he ascended to the throne in 1989.

In the three months between Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death and Khamenei’s election, the regime ghostwrote a dissertation and predated it to 1986.

At the time, there was neither internet nor digital archive to expose his fraudulent rank to the faithful; his son will not get an easy pass.

Both father and son rely upon the security forces at the expense of the seminaries. This fact, and his lack of scholarly credentials, explain why the Assembly of Experts’ clerics agreed to elect Mojtaba only after the guys with guns demanded it.

To keep possible critics in line, Mojtaba Khamenei’s second trick will be to use his wealth, estimated at more than $100 billion, much of it made through shell companies outside of Iran.

Mojtaba’s election is not the end of the story, even if he escapes future attempts on his life, because his backers will not be so lucky.

The United States and Israel are eliminating senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders. With enough of them gone, there could be a clerical mutiny.

The more difficult task will be cutting Mojtaba’s access to his wealth so he cannot bribe dissenting clerics to remain in power.

The security forces’ power has come at the cost of the mosque’s influence; even Alireza Arafi, an Ali Khamenei favorite who serves as the Head of Seminaries, complained about this.

The clergy had hoped to resume the position they had enjoyed under Khomeini (r. 1979–1989) after Khamenei died.

The clergy retains the constitutional power to impeach and remove Mojtaba. If the United States and Israel kill enough commanders, that might happen.