Ceasefire leaves Hezbollah in a strategic trap – opinion

Tehran is demanding an end to strikes on Hezbollah, while Israel has made clear the strikes will continue.

By Shachar Kleiman, JNS

The temporary ceasefire between the Iranian regime, Israel and the United States has placed Hezbollah in a strategic bind.

At the start of the latest conflict with Iran, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem set out the goal of returning to the situation that existed on Oct. 6, 2023, before the Gaza war.

In his speeches, he laid out three central demands: an end to the frequent Israeli Air Force strikes on Lebanon, an Israeli military withdrawal, and the return of his support base to its villages in the country’s south.

If Hezbollah is bound by Iran’s agreement, it will be forced to back away from those conditions. But if it is not, then it will be left to face Israel on its own.

Israel’s attention would then shift squarely onto Hezbollah, with all that implies. At best, Qassem would get a “support front” from the Houthis in Yemen in the form of occasional launches.

At the same time, the agreement could deepen Gulf distrust of the U.S. Once again, the free world has shown that it has no orderly solution to the Iranian threat.

Rather than pursuing the downfall of the ayatollahs’ regime, the Trump administration blinked first.

It began with the strange immunity granted to senior politicians in Tehran. The argument was that “someone had to be kept alive to talk to.”

That approach exposed the fact that the Trump administration never truly intended to topple the terrorist regime.

It continued with hesitation over Kharg Island and Iran’s oil industry, and ended with opening positions for negotiations that do not include the question of Iran’s regional terrorist proxies or its ballistic missile array.

If anyone is wondering why the Gulf monarchies hesitated to join the campaign, that is one reason: the understanding that Washington is currently offering half-baked arrangements and will not be there to rescue them.

The age of Gulf illusions is over

Anwar Gargash, adviser to United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, already addressed the prospect of an arrangement with Tehran in recent days.

Responding to a proposal published by former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, the Emirati official made clear that it ignored the threat posed by thousands of ballistic missiles and drones.

On the morning after the temporary ceasefire began, Gargash summed it up, saying, “The UAE won a war it sought to avoid, and it won in national defense. Today, we are moving to manage a complex regional landscape with more precise knowledge and a stronger capacity to influence and shape the future.”

His remarks hinted that the age of illusions regarding Tehran is over. Efforts to preserve diplomatic ties with the ayatollahs’ regime failed to limit the Iranian response.

There is clear skepticism in the Arab world about the negotiations set to begin this weekend. Tehran has presented 10 points that it is far from certain the U.S. and regional states will be able to accept.

To begin with, the U.S. and Arab states stressed in their statements that the Strait of Hormuz must remain fully open and unrestricted. That stands in contrast to the Iranian regime’s demand for a degree of control and the collection of fees.

Tehran is also demanding an end to strikes on Hezbollah, while Israel has made clear the strikes will continue. Added to that are Iranian demands to keep its uranium stockpile, lift sanctions and withdraw U.S. forces from the Middle East.

That opening position makes it difficult to reach a permanent agreement within two weeks, or even if the ceasefire is extended from time to time.

A verdict on the war’s success will have to wait

And yet, two countries can claim a diplomatic victory in the regional war: Egypt and Pakistan. Their mediation efforts strengthened their standing and importance in the eyes of all the regional players.

These poor states will now expect economic backing from the gas and oil emirates after securing for them a respite from the Iranian attack.

In Cairo and Islamabad, there was embarrassment at the start of the war.

On the one hand, the Gulf states expected them to take a rhetorical and practical stand in their favor after years of direct and indirect aid, alongside a defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

On Hezbollah the other hand, fully lining up against the Iranian regime would have intensified the conflict. The two countries chose declarative support for the Gulf states while continuing to exchange messages with Tehran.

That conduct drew considerable criticism, but it delivered results.

Finally, the question of the Iranian regime’s future still hangs in the air. The next two weeks will be a test of reports about the condition of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

Either way, a verdict in the debate over the campaign’s success or failure will have to wait. No one knew how to predict the collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria after Hezbollah’s defeat in 2024.

The blows dealt to the ayatollahs’ regime’s security, military and economic infrastructure could accelerate its slide into internal chaos.

On the other hand, there is the fear that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will grow stronger militarily in preparation for the next round, rebuild the damaged infrastructure, and suppress any spark of opposition.

In that case, the next war will only be a matter of time.