Why disarming militias constantly fails – analysis

States must vet three main aspects: the fighter, his network, and the command structure.

By Mohammad Taha Ali, Middle East Forum

After every armed transition, the same question looms: Who gets to wear the state uniform and to whom do they still answer?

Syria shows why the question matters. Since the downfall of President Bashar al-Assad, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government has sought to transform his former faction-ridden rebel groups into a national army.

If the rebel groups disintegrate, there will be armed individuals who operate outside the framework of the state.

However, if they are absorbed by the state, they become part of the security machinery of the state, with loyalties and command structures that lie elsewhere.

A soldier can change uniforms but still report to the same commander. And thus, it is not merely who joins the state but what he brings with him.

What matters for integration is not the soldier but the chain of command. Integration remains partial until the state controls the chain of command.

The dangers of weak vetting are evident already in Syria.

On December 13, 2025, a member of Syria’s security forces attacked a joint patrol of U.S. and Syrian forces in the area of Palmyra, killing two American soldiers and a civilian interpreter.

Syria’s security forces later reported that this individual had been marked during evaluation as having extremist views and would have been dismissed the next day.

At the moment when the state recognizes the threat coming from a certain individual, it has already vested him with a uniform, access, and command.

But the message is much broader. Not only should the individual be screened, but also the chain of command that links him to his organization.

The transitional army must incorporate soldiers from various groups while creating one command system for the army.

Screening is important, but so is the dismantling of earlier command systems.

If incomplete, the government will have created a national army that includes other armies under one uniform.

This can be termed “command capture,” which involves an armed group entering the state while retaining command of its members.

The same dilemma appears in Gaza, where Hamas has embedded itself within institutions and built networks that complicate any attempt to replace its personnel and authority.

Dismiss the personnel associated with Hamas, and the newly formed body might not have enough people to provide even basic services.

Keep the personnel without any vetting, and the new body might still depend on the organization that it is meant to supplant.

Vetting will become an issue not of security, but of who controls the state.

Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces represent such danger.

Iraq accepted the militias within its security agencies, but many of them kept political affiliations, leaders, and connections abroad.

Thus, while there was legal integration with the state, there was no command integration.

Libya represents yet another case study. Various attempts to integrate the militias into state institutions involved negotiations with their leaders.

The deal might bring about temporary stability but also might make the leaders of armed groups receive salaries, titles, and political power.

The question diplomats and military advisors must ask is whether the state will have control over any individual when his old network reaches out to him.

This demands recruitment criteria, abuse review, financial screenings, command-level vetting, probation, monitoring, and the ability to fire personnel without having to negotiate with the former commanders.

States must vet three main aspects: the fighter, his network, and the command structure. If the state vets fighters without dismantling their networks, the militia eventually will capture the institution from within.

International partners should condition their security support on command integration, rather than mere fighter integration.

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