Could Israel’s closest ally one day turn against it? – analysis

Political shifts are transforming Israel’s diplomatic relationships worldwide. Could America’s longstanding alliance with the Jewish state be next?

By Jordan Levy, World Israel News

Colombia officially opened its embassy in Jerusalem on October 14, completing a remarkable diplomatic turnaround just two months after the country welcomed a new president.

“Today, we are taking a concrete step towards restoring diplomatic relations between our countries, relations that should never have been broken,” Colombian Foreign Minister Omar Bula Escobar declared at the ceremony.

“Israel is a strategic partner. It always has been, and from now on, it will be an even stronger one.”

Under leftist President Gustavo Petro, Colombia became one of Israel’s fiercest international critics. Petro severed diplomatic relations in 2024 over the war in Gaza, accused Israel of genocide and halted coal exports.

But following the election of conservative President Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office in August, Colombia has moved decisively in the opposite direction.

Diplomatic relations have been restored, economic and security cooperation renewed, and Colombia has recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar summed up the extraordinary turnaround:

“In just two months, we have reversed most of the negative consequences of the Petro administration for Israel-Colombia relations and have even broken new ground.”

Sa’ar recalled that the new Colombian president had promised to relocate the embassy during his election campaign.

“He made a promise, and he kept it,” Sa’ar said.

In a matter of months, Colombia went from one of Israel’s most vocal diplomatic opponents to a country openly embracing closer relations with the Jewish state.

But Colombia’s transformation raises a much larger question: If an election can so dramatically alter one country’s relationship with Israel, could a similar political reversal eventually occur in Washington?

The United States is not Colombia. Its alliance with Israel is far deeper, stronger and more firmly established.

Yet political movements on both the American left and right are increasingly challenging assumptions that have underpinned that relationship for generations.

How Elections are Reshaping Israel’s Alliances

Argentina offers another example of how political leadership can reshape relations with Israel.

Since taking office in December 2023, President Javier Milei has transformed Argentina into one of Israel’s strongest international supporters.

Although Argentina maintained friendly relations with Israel under his predecessor, Milei has elevated the partnership to an unprecedented level.

He chose Israel for his first official overseas state visit, pledged to relocate Argentina’s embassy to Jerusalem, designated Hamas a terrorist organization and expanded security and defense cooperation.

In April 2026, Milei and Netanyahu announced the Isaac Accords, an initiative aimed at strengthening Israel’s ties with Argentina and other Latin American countries.

Brazil could soon experience a similar transformation.

On October 25, leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will face conservative Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro in a closely contested presidential runoff.

Under Lula, relations with Israel deteriorated sharply. He accused Israel of genocide, compared its military operations in Gaza to the Holocaust, and withdrew Brazil’s ambassador from Israel in 2024.

By contrast, former President Jair Bolsonaro cultivated a close relationship with Netanyahu and established a Brazilian trade office in Jerusalem.

His son Flávio has pledged to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem if elected and restore strong diplomatic relations.

A Bolsonaro victory could therefore produce another dramatic reversal in Israel’s diplomatic fortunes.

Europe Moves in the Opposite Direction

Across Europe, several governments that previously enjoyed warmer relations with Jerusalem have adopted increasingly confrontational policies.

Under conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, Spain maintained generally friendly relations with Israel, including cooperation in trade, technology and security.

Under Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Madrid recognized a Palestinian state, imposed restrictions on arms trade and military cooperation, and emerged as one of Israel’s harshest critics within the European Union.

Britain has undergone a similar shift.

In March 2023, under Conservative Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Britain and Israel signed an ambitious agreement to strengthen cooperation in trade, defense, technology and security.

“The bilateral relationship has never been stronger,” the two governments declared.

Under Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Britain recognized a Palestinian state, restricted certain arms exports and imposed sanctions on two Israeli cabinet ministers.

His successor, Prime Minister Andy Burnham, has pursued an even tougher approach toward Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria.

Of course, these developments cannot be attributed entirely to elections. The Gaza war, shifting public attitudes and broader geopolitical developments have also influenced government policies.

Nor do dramatic diplomatic reversals necessarily reflect equally dramatic changes in public opinion.

Most voters are primarily concerned with domestic issues such as the economy, immigration and crime. Yet once elected, political leaders can pursue foreign policies that fundamentally alter relationships their predecessors spent years building.

For Israel, the lesson is clear: Diplomatic relationships can change dramatically when political leadership changes.

And nowhere would such a development carry greater consequences than in the United States.

From Trump’s Strong Support to an Uncertain Future

The US-Israel relationship rests on decades of military, intelligence, diplomatic and economic cooperation, reinforced by congressional support and extensive institutional ties.

That foundation has survived numerous changes in American administrations, including periods of serious disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem.

Under President Donald Trump, American support for Israel has reached extraordinary heights.

During his first term, Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moved the US Embassy there, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement and helped broker the Abraham Accords.

His second administration has gone even further.

Trump has backed Israel through major military confrontations with Iran, authorized direct American strikes against Iranian targets, continued supplying Israel with advanced weaponry and imposed sweeping sanctions on the International Criminal Court over its pursuit of Israeli leaders.

These are among the most consequential pro-Israel actions taken by any American president.

Yet even as Trump has strengthened the alliance, political movements within both major parties are challenging the traditional American approach to Israel.

For decades, support for the Jewish state was one of the relatively few issues enjoying broad bipartisan agreement in Washington.

That consensus has not disappeared. But increasingly, the question is no longer whether American politicians support Israel in principle, but what that support should actually mean.

Democrats Turn Against Military Aid

On the Democratic side, an increasingly influential progressive movement is challenging the party’s longstanding approach to Israel, with some of its most outspoken figures calling for sweeping restrictions on American military assistance.

Reps. Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Summer Lee have emerged as prominent voices in this movement.

But opposition to military assistance is no longer confined to the party’s progressive wing.

In July, 103 House Democrats voted in favor of an amendment introduced by Republican Rep. Thomas Massie that would have eliminated $3.3 billion in security assistance to Israel.

The amendment failed, with 314 lawmakers voting against it. Nevertheless, nearly half of House Democrats supported the measure.

The Senate has witnessed similar divisions. In April, 40 members of the Democratic caucus voted to block a proposed sale of bulldozers to Israel, while 36 opposed a separate sale of heavy bombs.

Both measures failed, but the votes reflected growing support for efforts led by Sen. Bernie Sanders to restrict weapons transfers to the Jewish state.

The same political shift is playing out on the campaign trail.

In Michigan, progressive Democrat Abdul El-Sayed, who has called for ending all American military assistance to Israel, including defensive aid, is competing against Republican Mike Rogers for a US Senate seat.

If elected, El-Sayed would have a direct vote on military assistance, arms sales and other legislation shaping America’s relationship with Israel.

Not every Democrat supporting restrictions on arms transfers opposes Israel’s existence or its right to defend itself. Some distinguish between defensive assistance and weapons used in offensive operations, while others argue that military aid should be tied to Israeli government policies.

Nevertheless, positions that once attracted relatively limited support within the Democratic Party are now influencing substantial portions of its congressional caucus.

The Republican Right is Changing Too

Perhaps more surprising is the growing challenge to Israel’s traditional support within parts of the Republican Party.

For decades, Republicans have generally been considered Israel’s most dependable supporters in Washington.

That support remains strong, as Trump’s record demonstrates. But an increasingly vocal faction of the conservative movement is questioning America’s longstanding commitments abroad, including its relationship with Israel.

Some argue that American resources should be directed toward domestic priorities rather than foreign military assistance. Others oppose involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts or question whether Washington’s interests always align with those of Jerusalem.

These positions do not necessarily reflect hostility toward Israel, much less antisemitism. Americans can reasonably debate foreign aid and military intervention without harboring prejudice against Jews.

But another development is considerably more troubling.

Far-right commentator Tucker Carlson has repeatedly promoted narratives portraying Israel and its supporters as exercising excessive influence over American foreign policy, while providing platforms to figures associated with antisemitic conspiracy theories.

Most notoriously, Carlson welcomed white nationalist Nick Fuentes onto his podcast for a friendly interview, despite Fuentes’ history of openly antisemitic statements.

The Anti-Defamation League has accused Carlson of amplifying antisemitic conspiracy theories and helping bring extremist rhetoric into mainstream conservative discourse.

Why Vance’s Relationship with Carlson Matters

Carlson’s influence is particularly significant given his relationship with Vice President JD Vance.

Vance has consistently emphasized an America First approach to foreign policy, expressing skepticism toward prolonged overseas commitments and arguing that American interests must come before those of foreign allies.

In September, he made a particularly pointed statement:

“We cannot let our Middle Eastern foreign policy be subservient to the state of Israel.”

Vance has also maintained his friendship with Carlson, repeatedly declining to distance himself from the commentator despite criticism over his rhetoric and associations.

At a Republican Jewish Coalition gathering in September, Vance was questioned about conservative media personalities who had provided platforms to antisemites.

He condemned Fuentes’ antisemitism but avoided directly addressing Carlson, drawing criticism from some Jewish conservatives.

Vance has publicly defended Israel’s security and spoken out against antisemitism. His America First philosophy should not automatically be equated with Carlson’s more controversial rhetoric.

Nevertheless, his reluctance to confront Carlson illustrates a broader political dilemma.

As influential voices on the right become increasingly hostile toward Israel, Republican leaders face a choice between challenging those views and preserving relationships with commentators who command substantial audiences within the party.

A future Republican president would not necessarily need to share Carlson’s views to be influenced by the political movement surrounding him.

If growing numbers of Republican voters become skeptical of Israel, elected officials may become less willing to provide military assistance, defend Israel diplomatically or support American military action on its behalf.

Vance’s position is especially consequential because, as vice president and a potential future presidential contender, he could help determine which elements of the conservative movement shape Republican foreign policy after Trump.

The danger for Israel is not simply that Carlson has gained influence, but that a political movement historically associated with exceptionally strong support for Israel may gradually become less dependable.

And recent polling suggests that this generational change is already underway.

American Public Opinion is Changing — Including Among Republicans

Recent American public opinion surveys suggest that Israel’s political challenges extend far beyond a handful of outspoken politicians.

An April 2026 Pew Research Center survey found that 60% of Americans held an unfavorable view of Israel, compared with 42% in 2022.

Among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, the figure reached 80%, up from 53% four years earlier.

But perhaps the most surprising finding concerned younger Republicans.

According to Pew, 57% of Republicans between the ages of 18 and 49 viewed Israel unfavorably, compared with 50% the previous year.

The generational divide becomes even more striking when Americans are asked about the Israeli people rather than the country or its government.

A separate Pew survey found that only 43% of Republicans under 35 viewed the Israeli people favorably, compared with 79% of Republicans aged 50 and older.

In 2019, 71% of Republicans under 35 held favorable views of the Israeli people.

A February 2026 Gallup survey revealed another significant development.

For the first time in more than two decades of polling, Americans no longer expressed greater sympathy for Israelis than for Palestinians in the Middle East conflict.

Gallup found that 41% sympathized more with Palestinians, compared with 36% who sympathized more with Israelis. The five-point difference was not statistically significant, but the reversal from previous years was notable.

Among Democrats, 65% sympathized more with Palestinians, compared with just 17% with Israelis.

Republicans remained overwhelmingly more sympathetic to Israelis, by 70% to 13%. Nevertheless, Republican sympathy for Israelis had fallen ten percentage points since 2024.

These findings do not mean that most Americans want to sever relations with Israel.

Public attitudes toward the Israeli government, the Israeli people and American military assistance are distinct questions. A voter who disapproves of Netanyahu’s policies may still strongly support Israel’s security.

But the direction of the polling is difficult to ignore.

For decades, Israel benefited from strong public support across much of the American political spectrum, particularly among Republicans and older voters.

Today, that support is increasingly divided along partisan and generational lines.

And unlike the abrupt diplomatic reversals produced by elections in other countries, generational changes in public opinion can gradually reshape political parties from within.

What Does This Mean for Israel?

None of this means that the United States is on the verge of abandoning Israel.

The alliance remains deeply rooted in shared strategic interests, extensive military and intelligence cooperation, and powerful political and institutional relationships.

Even administrations that have clashed sharply with Israeli governments have generally maintained the fundamental security partnership.

But the developments unfolding around the world offer a warning about the dangers of assuming that longstanding alliances are immune to political change.

America’s political system and its relationship with Israel are far more deeply entrenched than those of Colombia or Brazil. A complete diplomatic rupture remains a remote prospect.

The more immediate risk is something less dramatic, but potentially far more realistic: military assistance becoming increasingly conditional, diplomatic backing less automatic, and disagreements between Washington and Jerusalem carrying greater consequences depending on who controls the White House and Congress.

The polling suggests that these changes may not be limited to the political fortunes of individual leaders. As younger Americans become an increasingly influential force in both major parties, the assumptions that have traditionally guided US policy toward Israel could face growing challenges.

For Israel, the greatest diplomatic danger may not be the hostility of its declared enemies, but the assumption that the friendship of its closest allies is permanent.

America’s alliance with Israel remains exceptionally strong. Yet the growing challenges to that relationship from both ends of the political spectrum suggest that future administrations may approach the Jewish state very differently from the current one.

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