Israel cannot leave Gazan areas again for months – opinion

Prolonged absence allows terrorist organizations to regroup, rearm, and refine their tactics, leading to greater risks and higher costs when security must eventually be restored.

By Yaakov Lappin, JNS

The Israeli military’s extensive operations in northern Gaza over the past few months and the terrorist infrastructure that it uncovered make one thing clear:

Leaving areas in Gaza without sustained security operations for extended periods invites Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to move back in, ultimately increasing the cost of restoring order.

The 162nd Division of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which entered Jabalia in mid-October 2024 after an eight-month absence, has faced newly entrenched Hamas and PIJ networks, exposing the consequences of prolonged inactivity in the region.

While the IDF was previously stretched along two fronts, Lebanon and Gaza, should the ceasefire in the north continue to hold, Israel will be able to mobilize sufficient forces southwards to prevent such an outcome again.

New recruits, new human shields

During the eight months leading up to the 162nd Division’s return to Jabalia Hamas and the PIJ took full advantage of the IDF’s absence to reestablish their infrastructure for recruitment, training, and operational planning.

According to military sources, Hamas has recruited untrained individuals, paying them to join its ranks and equipping them with basic weaponry, including AK-47s and RPGs.

These recruits, though minimally skilled and instructed to attack IDF units on sight, are willing to engage in dangerous missions, posing serious threats to Israeli forces.

The operational vacuum also allowed Hamas to strengthen its control over civilian areas and transform critical infrastructure into military assets.

IDF International Spokesperson Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani highlighted the extent of Hamas’s militarization efforts at the Kamal Adwan Hospital.

Despite repeated warnings and operations in 2023 and earlier in 2024, terrorists operated command centers from within the medical facility, stored weapons there, and used patients and staff as human shields.

The area was heavily booby-trapped, with explosives and anti-tank weaponry posing a significant threat to advancing IDF forces.

Over 240 terrorists were apprehended in and around the hospital in the IDF’s latest operation. Many of them attempted to escape disguised as patients or using ambulances, while others were caught with weapons such as grenades and RPGs.

According to IDF data, terrorists who participated in the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel, including senior operatives, were among those neutralized and captured during the current ongoing operations in Jabalia.

They had been consolidating control, hoping to turn the city into a heavily fortified stronghold as part of an unyielding strategy to exploit civilian cover.

Hamas’s hope was to lay the foundations for rebuilding its terror army and once again threaten the people of Sderot and Gaza-envelope communities in Israel’s western Negev region with rockets, mortars and cross-border murder squads.

The high cost of inaction

The IDF’s ongoing campaign to clear Jabalia of terrorist elements has proven both time-consuming and costly.

By mid-November, after significant progress in civilian evacuations to humanitarian zones, primarily Al-Mawasi on the southern Gaza coast, there were still a few thousand terrorists operating in the area.

Currently, the IDF is dealing with the hundreds of terrorists who remain, demonstrating the scale of the challenge posed by a well-entrenched adversary.

The IDF has paid a substantial price during these operations, with several soldiers killed in recent days.

The bravery of the 162nd Division, including combat teams from the 401st Brigade, the Givati Brigade, and the Multi-Dimensional Unit, is a painful reminder of the burden Israel must bear when countering deeply embedded terrorist networks.

The IDF’s current operations in Jabalia reveal a stark reality. Prolonged absence allows terrorist organizations to regroup, rearm and refine their tactics, leading to greater risks and higher costs when security must eventually be restored.

The time and resources required to dismantle the Hamas and PIJ networks in Jabalia are a direct consequence of the operational vacuum left by Israel’s previous withdrawal.

Additionally, the IDF’s experience in Jabalia underscores the need for intelligence and rapid response capabilities. Intelligence-sharing between the IDF, the Shin Bet intelligence agency, and Military Intelligence has played a crucial role in identifying and neutralizing key Hamas operatives, including those involved in the October 7 massacre.

These lessons should inform broader Israeli security policy. The IDF cannot afford to leave areas in Gaza free of security operations for extended periods of time.

Only by continuously responding to intelligence regarding developing threats, as the IDF does on a nightly basis in Judea and Samaria, can Israel ensure that Hamas and PIJ are unable to reestablish their networks and pose a renewed threat.

CeasefireGazaIDFTerrorism