Iran speeding up nuclear progress, outsourcing attack role to proxies

Iran is unlikely to take risks with its nuclear advancements now that it is so close to realizing its nuclear potential, says Professor Uzi Rabi.

By Yaakov Lappin, JNS

Iranian uranium enrichment activity at the country’s nuclear sites has reached disturbingly advanced levels amid growing regional tensions.

The Islamic Republic now faces critical decisions about its nuclear doctrine and the timing of additional steps, beyond the enrichment of uranium, needed to produce nuclear weapons.

On August 14, Iran International reported that Iran is secretly restructuring its Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and resuming experiments on nuclear weapon triggering mechanisms.

Last month, the National Intelligence director’s office told Congress in an annual threat report that since 2020, Iran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so,” according to a report by Voice of America on August 20.

The report notably omitted a long-standing assertion, previously held by U.S. intelligence and which appeared in past reports, according to which Iran “isn’t currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”

Professor Uzi Rabi, a senior researcher and head of the Program for Regional Cooperation at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, described Iran’s nuclear program as the regime’s “strategic jewel.”

Iran is unlikely to take risks with its nuclear advancements now that it is so close to realizing its nuclear potential, he told JNS.

“All the regional commotion forces Iran to adopt a more cautious and calculated approach. It directs Hezbollah to keep ‘biting’ Israel, while lowering the intensity of its own responses and revenge against Israel,” he said.

At this stage, a full-scale conflict that could jeopardize its nuclear ambitions and see its nuclear sites attacked is not in the Islamic Republic’s interest, he explained.

“Iran has seen its vulnerabilities up close and understands that in terms of air defense and internal security, it is very exposed,” Rabi told JNS. “Therefore, it believes it must accelerate the completion of its nuclear program to be treated differently and prevent such penetrating attacks.”

On April 19, international media reported that an airstrike had targeted an S-300 air defense battery situated at Iran’s Shikari airbase, which protects the Isfahan nuclear site. The strike came five days after Iran launched over 300 missiles and drones at Israel.

Iran has in recent weeks been threatening to retaliate for the July 31 blast that killed Hamas political bureau terror chief Ismael Haniyeh in Tehran.

According to Rabi, Iran is determined to complete its nuclear program quickly to solidify its strategic position, and hopes thus to become immune to future attacks.

Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Washington D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told JNS that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “will likely order a dash for nuclear weapons only once Iran has adequate nuclear fuel for a reasonable-sized nuclear arsenal that it could quickly enrich to weapons-grade or divert to a secret site, as well as the ability to quickly fabricate the fuel into nuclear devices.”

She explained that Tehran was openly progressing in its efforts to amass nuclear fuel and that Western intelligence had observed signs of Iran’s potential to construct nuclear devices, though additional covert activities might be underway.

“A strategy of progressing to the nuclear threshold without authorizing atomic weapons development until the last moment shields Khamenei from an official leaking such a decision or Western intelligence agencies detecting it,” Stricker assessed.

Stricker provided a historical example regarding timelines, citing Taiwan’s nuclear program in the 1970s and ’80s as a case where the leadership aimed to be within three to six months of producing an atomic weapon.

“By 1986, Taiwan was still about three to five years away from achieving that capability. U.S. intelligence found out, and in 1987, Washington forced Taipei to shut down the program. That is the kind of detection a … state would try to avoid, especially Iran, given how penetrated the country is,” she added.

In an Aug. 21 op-ed in the Algemeiner, Stricker outlined the alarming advances Iran has recently made in its nuclear program.

She stated that in June, Tehran installed numerous new centrifuges at its Natanz enrichment plant and underground Fordow site, more than tripling the latter’s capacity to produce uranium enriched to 60%.

“Amassing 60% enriched material puts Iran days from enriching that uranium to 90%, the level needed for atomic weapons,” Stricker warned.

She highlighted that as a result, the Islamic Republic’s so-called “breakout time”—the amount of time needed to produce weapons-grade uranium for multiple nuclear devices—might have dropped significantly.

Stricker noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 35-member Board of Governors is set to meet on Sept. 9 in Vienna to assess Tehran’s nuclear advances and non-compliance with previous Board demands.

She urged the West to pass an IAEA censure resolution against Tehran and trigger the “snapback” of U.N. sanctions to deter further Iranian advances.

Meanwhile, reports from Iran indicate an intensifying internal debate over the country’s nuclear doctrine and posture, particularly in light of recent events, including the elimination of Haniyeh in Tehran and escalating tensions with Israel.

According to the Iran Dossier website, some Iranian officials and lawmakers are calling for a reassessment of the country’s nuclear posture, potentially paving the way for the development of nuclear weapons.

Amid these developments, former Iranian officials have voiced strong opinions in favor of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

Mohammadreza Sabbaghian Bafghi, a former member of the Iranian parliament, argued that Iran should develop a nuclear weapon as a form of retaliation against Israel and “oppressive countries.”

He declared in an Aug. 12 parliamentary session, “In my opinion, the Islamic Republic’s retaliatory action against the killing of Palestinians and the situation in Gaza, especially the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, should be to develop a [nuclear] weapon that Israel and oppressive countries possess.”

Similarly, former Majlis member Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani advocated for the development of nuclear weapons as a means of securing Iran’s strategic interests.

He suggested that a nuclear weapon would create a balance of power against Israel and strengthen Iran’s position in international negotiations.

It seems unlikely that such statements were made without the prior knowledge and approval of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ayatollah Khamenei.

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