Are tanks in urban warfare a burden or benefit? – Israel’s experience

Israeli sources emphasize that tanks are not a standalone solution but a core component of combined‑arms warfare.

By Hezy Laing

Few militaries have tested the limits of armored warfare in dense urban terrain as extensively as the Israel Defense Forces.

From the battles of Suez City in 1973 to Beirut in 1982, to Nablus and Jenin in 2002, and the more recent fighting in Gaza in 2014 and 2023, Israel has repeatedly confronted the question of whether tanks are an asset or a liability in cities.

Israeli military historians such as Brig. Gen. (res.) Dov Tamari and Maj. Gen. (res.) Israel Tal, the architect of the Merkava program, consistently argued that tanks remain indispensable when properly integrated with infantry and intelligence.

Their conclusions are echoed in IDF operational research units, which found that armored forces dramatically reduce infantry casualties when used correctly.

The IDF’s experience in Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 demonstrated that tanks provided essential firepower and protection when maneuvering through refugee camps and dense urban blocks.

Merkava tanks absorbed dozens of RPG hits in Jenin and Nablus, allowing infantry to advance with far fewer losses than expected.

After‑action reports from the IDF’s Ground Forces Command noted that armored units reduced infantry fatalities by more than 60% compared with operations where tanks were absent or delayed.

The tank’s ability to deliver precise 120 mm fire, thermal imaging, and heavy armor proved decisive in breaking fortified positions.

However, the 2006 Lebanon War exposed vulnerabilities.

Hezbollah’s use of advanced anti‑tank missiles such as the Kornet‑E inflicted significant damage, prompting the IDF to accelerate the development of the Trophy Active Protection System, which became operational in 2011.

Since its introduction, Trophy has intercepted more than 90% of incoming anti‑tank threats in Gaza and Lebanon, according to Israeli defense manufacturer Rafael. This transformed the tank from a liability back into a survivable, mobile fire base.

In the 2014 Gaza War and the 2023–2024 operations in Gaza, tanks again proved essential.

IDF commanders reported that armored brigades enabled rapid breakthroughs in neighborhoods like Shuja’iyya and Jabalia while providing medical evacuation corridors and suppressive fire.

Israeli sources emphasize that tanks are not a standalone solution but a core component of combined‑arms warfare.

When paired with drones, engineering units, and infantry, they remain one of the IDF’s most effective tools in urban combat, offering protection, precision, and psychological dominance in environments where foot soldiers alone would face far greater risk.

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