Hamas used double agents, fake peace talks to fool Israel before Oct. 7 – study

Hamas used a comprehensive strategy of deception, involving double agents and fake peace talks to fool Israel’s security establishment before the 2023 invasion, study reveals.

By World Israel News Staff

Hamas deliberately fed false intelligence to Israel’s Shin Bet security agency through double agents while simultaneously pursuing secret negotiations designed to convince Israeli officials that the terrorist organization wanted peace and economic stability, according to a new study examining the deception campaign that preceded the October 7, 2023, massacre.

The research, published Wednesday by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, reveals how Hamas combined manipulated intelligence reports, misleading diplomatic messages and carefully concealed military preparations to lull Israel into a false sense of security until the eve of the invasion.

Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, who conducted the study, found that Hamas began implementing its deception strategy in early 2022, seeking to convince Israeli intelligence that its policy of economic incentives and military deterrence was successfully restraining the terrorist organization.

According to testimony from a senior Hamas military official, the organization had identified a major Israeli espionage network in Gaza as early as 2017 and subsequently recruited some of its members to work as double agents.

These operatives allegedly provided the Shin Bet with deliberately misleading information about Hamas’s activities, including reports portraying the situation in Gaza as routine immediately before the massacre.

The claims are consistent with elements of the Shin Bet’s own investigation into the October 7 intelligence failure, which acknowledged that human intelligence sources had reported normal Hamas activity despite mounting indications of an imminent attack. However, the allegation that those sources were deliberately manipulated by Hamas has not been independently established.

Hamas officials have also publicly acknowledged conducting an elaborate deception campaign.

In an interview conducted after the massacre, senior Hamas leader Khaled Mashal described how the organization deliberately refrained from responding to Israeli military operations and confrontations in Jerusalem, encouraging Israel to conclude that Hamas was preoccupied with governing Gaza.

“The enemy began to analyze and thought that Gaza was occupied with itself,” Mashal said, explaining that Hamas had deliberately encouraged that interpretation.

He revealed that the organization transmitted additional deceptive messages during the Jewish holiday period immediately preceding the October 7 attack.

“The movement’s leadership wisely sent deception messages to the enemy once again. We know some of them,” he stated.

Mashal explicitly compared the operation to Egypt’s deception campaign ahead of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which Egyptian military preparations were disguised to prevent Israel from anticipating the offensive.

“A message, in order to fulfill its purpose, must be an indirect message,” Mashal explained. “The enemy also uses deception against others, and the resistance succeeded in deceiving the enemy, and it picked up false messages.”

The new study also examines a previously reported secret negotiating channel between Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Israeli security officials, suggesting that Sinwar may have exploited the talks as another instrument of deception.

Beginning in March 2022, Hamas used Sufian Abu Zaida, a former Palestinian Authority minister, as an intermediary to explore a possible agreement exchanging Palestinian prisoners for Israelis held captive in Gaza.

The negotiations subsequently expanded to discussions about economic concessions and infrastructure development, reinforcing the impression that Hamas was interested in maintaining stability rather than initiating another war.

Abu Zaida reportedly met Sinwar in Gaza in July 2022, and the contacts eventually reached senior Israeli intelligence officials, including then-Shin Bet director Ronen Bar.

According to Abu Zaida, Bar indicated that Israel was prepared to offer substantial economic concessions if an agreement could be reached, telling him that “the sky is the limit.”

The negotiations progressed to discussions about the identities of prisoners who could be released, with both sides exchanging draft proposals.

On September 14, 2023, just over three weeks before the massacre, Abu Zaida again met Sinwar in Gaza.

During the meeting, Sinwar instructed the intermediary to deliver a message to Israeli intelligence.

“By the end of September we will put cards on the table that will cause an earthquake regarding the negotiations, and they should prepare to empty the prisons,” Sinwar reportedly declared.

The two men subsequently scheduled another meeting for October 8, 2023 — one day after Hamas would launch its devastating invasion of southern Israel.

Dahoah-Halevi argues that the scheduled meeting may have been a deliberate attempt to convince Israeli intelligence that Sinwar remained committed to negotiations and had no intention of launching a major military offensive.

He suggests that knowledge of the planned October 8 meeting could have influenced Shin Bet assessments during the critical hours before the massacre, contributing to the decision to discount warning signs of an impending attack.

The study emphasizes that there is no evidence Abu Zaida knowingly participated in Hamas’s deception or was aware of its plans. Instead, the former PA official may himself have been manipulated by Sinwar.

The research also points to the impact of Israel’s internal political turmoil in 2023, particularly the protests against judicial reform and the refusal of some military reservists to volunteer for duty.

Hamas intelligence officials reportedly interpreted those developments as evidence of weakening Israeli military readiness and national cohesion, identifying them as factors that could improve the prospects of a successful surprise attack.

In July 2023, Hamas military intelligence reportedly even recommended delaying an offensive to allow Israel’s internal divisions to deepen.

The findings add to earlier evidence that Hamas’s preparations were far more extensive than Israeli intelligence assessments recognized.

Documents recovered by Israeli forces during the Gaza war have revealed that Hamas commanders developed detailed plans for attacking Israeli communities and military installations while simultaneously encouraging Israel to believe the organization had been deterred.

Israeli military investigations have acknowledged that intelligence officers detected unusual activity on the night of October 6, including the activation of Israeli SIM cards by Hamas operatives, but interpreted the signs as potentially indicating a limited infiltration or military exercise rather than a full-scale invasion.

The Shin Bet’s investigation similarly acknowledged serious failures in understanding Hamas’s intentions and evaluating information from intelligence sources.

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