Pollard: Iran’s dirty bomb plans demand a powerful Israeli response

Iran’s reported plans for radiological and chemical attacks must serve as a warning to Israel: The consequences of unconventional warfare must be made unmistakably clear before the first weapon is used.

By Jonathan Pollard, World Israel News

Iranian intelligence has reportedly explored the possibility of using radiological or chemical weapons against senior American officials in Washington, D.C., raising serious questions about the threat of unconventional warfare and its implications for Israel.

According to a November 16 CNN investigation citing seven US officials, American intelligence uncovered Iranian contingency planning involving a radiological dirty bomb or chemical agents, including potential targets and locations.

The reporting does not establish that Iran has decided to carry out such an attack or that an operation is imminent. American officials reportedly remain divided over Tehran’s intentions and ability to execute the plans.

Nevertheless, the intelligence raises a troubling strategic question: If Iran is considering unconventional attacks against American leadership, could it eventually contemplate employing similar weapons against Israel?

For the Jewish state, the issue is not merely whether Tehran possesses the capability to carry out such an attack. It is whether Iran’s leadership fully understands the consequences of crossing that threshold.

Israel cannot afford to discover the answer after the first weapon has been used.

The danger of strategic ambiguity

For decades, Israel has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity concerning certain military capabilities. That approach has served an important purpose, preserving operational flexibility while forcing adversaries to consider the possibility of consequences they cannot fully anticipate.

But there is a critical distinction between concealing the means of retaliation and concealing the determination to retaliate.

The former can strengthen deterrence. The latter can undermine it.

Iran must never mistake Israel’s desire to avoid unnecessary escalation for an unwillingness to respond decisively when its population faces unconventional attack.

Tehran has invested heavily in ballistic missiles, proxy organizations, terrorism and asymmetric warfare precisely because it cannot reliably defeat Israel through conventional military means.

Radiological and chemical weapons could appear attractive to Iranian planners seeking to impose extraordinary psychological, economic and political costs without employing a nuclear weapon.

That calculation must be shattered before it takes hold.

Israel needs a clearly articulated doctrine establishing that any deliberate Iranian use of radiological or chemical weapons against its civilians, population centers or national leadership would represent a fundamental escalation demanding consequences of exceptional gravity.

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The precise form of those consequences need not be publicly disclosed.

But the seriousness of Israel’s response must never be in doubt.

Three pillars of credible deterrence

First, Israel must establish an unmistakable red line.

A radiological dirty bomb is not a nuclear weapon. It uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material rather than producing a nuclear detonation.

Yet such an attack could create widespread fear, contamination, costly evacuations, disruption of essential services and potentially lasting economic damage.

Chemical weapons present a different but equally disturbing danger. Depending on the agent and circumstances, they can cause mass casualties, overwhelm emergency medical services and terrorize civilian populations.

Neither form of attack should be regarded as another step along the familiar ladder of conventional military escalation.

The deliberate employment of these weapons would constitute a qualitatively different act of aggression.

Israel must make that distinction unmistakable.

Second, deterrence must reach the people making the decisions.

Warnings directed vaguely at the Iranian state are insufficient if the individuals authorizing unconventional warfare believe they can escape personal accountability.

The Iranian leadership, military command structures and intelligence organizations must understand that responsibility cannot be concealed behind proxies, covert networks or layers of plausible deniability.

This does not require Israel to publish a list of retaliatory targets or surrender its freedom of action.

It requires a credible message, delivered through diplomatic, intelligence and strategic channels, that those responsible for authorizing or facilitating an unconventional attack will face consequences commensurate with the gravity of their actions.

Israel should also coordinate closely with Washington so that Tehran cannot exploit perceived differences between American and Israeli thresholds for responding to such attacks.

Third, Israel must prepare for the threat before it materializes.

Deterrence without preparedness is little more than rhetoric.

Israel must ensure that its intelligence services, civil defense authorities, emergency medical systems and military command structures are equipped to detect, contain and respond to radiological or chemical attacks.

That preparation must extend beyond conventional military scenarios.

An unconventional attack could be carried out through proxies, covert operatives or criminal networks, potentially far from an identifiable Iranian military installation.

Such possibilities demand coordinated intelligence collection, effective detection capabilities, emergency response exercises and close cooperation with American and other relevant security agencies.

Israel must also establish in advance how responsibility for an attack would be assessed, particularly when Tehran attempts to hide behind intermediaries.

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A credible doctrine must combine the ability to identify the perpetrator, protect the population and impose meaningful consequences.

The objective is not to provoke a confrontation.

It is to deny Iran any expectation that unconventional warfare could succeed.

The historical warning Israel cannot ignore

There is another dimension to this threat that cannot be separated from the Jewish people’s history.

Nazi Germany systematically murdered millions of Jews in extermination camps, including through the use of poison gas.

For the Jewish people, the deliberate use of chemical agents as instruments of mass murder is not an abstract historical possibility. It is part of the most devastating chapter in our national experience.

That history imposes a particular responsibility upon the sovereign Jewish state.

Israel was established, in part, to ensure that Jews would never again be dependent upon the goodwill of others for their physical survival.

Its military strength, intelligence capabilities and willingness to defend its population are expressions of that responsibility.

No responsible Israeli leader should invoke the Holocaust casually, and historical suffering must never become an excuse for indiscriminate retaliation.

But neither should Israel ignore the moral significance of an enemy contemplating methods of warfare that evoke the systematic murder of defenseless Jewish civilians.

The Jewish state cannot permit weapons of mass terror to become an acceptable instrument of aggression against its people.

The promise of “Never Again” must be more than a declaration of remembrance.

It must be reflected in the practical decisions required to prevent another catastrophe.

Washington cannot afford to underestimate the threat

The latest intelligence reporting also carries an unmistakable warning for the United States.

If Iranian planners are developing options for radiological or chemical attacks against senior American officials, the threat extends far beyond Israel or the conventional boundaries of Middle Eastern conflict.

It raises the possibility that Tehran regards unconventional terrorism as a means of reaching directly into the American homeland.

That possibility demands serious attention even if the intelligence does not establish an imminent operation.

The United States and Israel share a fundamental interest in preventing Iran from concluding that unconventional attacks can compensate for its conventional military disadvantages.

Washington should therefore work with Jerusalem to establish coordinated deterrent principles, strengthen intelligence sharing and prepare for attacks involving Iranian proxies or covert networks.

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The two countries need not adopt identical military doctrines. But Tehran should encounter no confusion about their determination to prevent radiological or chemical warfare from becoming an acceptable tool of state policy.

Nor should Iranian leaders believe that an attack carried out through an intermediary would automatically shield those who ordered it.

The credibility of deterrence depends upon the adversary’s understanding that responsibility and consequences cannot simply be negotiated away.

The price of waiting

Israel’s security doctrine has long recognized that certain threats become far more difficult to confront once an adversary has acquired the capability and opportunity to execute them.

That lesson applies with particular force to unconventional warfare.

The purpose of establishing red lines is not to invite war. It is to prevent an adversary from making a catastrophic miscalculation.

Clear thresholds, credible capabilities and unmistakable political resolve can influence an enemy’s decisions before an attack takes place.

But a warning delivered only after civilians have been poisoned or radioactive material has been dispersed comes too late to serve its most important purpose.

Iran must understand now that unconventional warfare would not provide a shortcut around Israel’s military superiority.

It would not allow Tehran to terrorize the Jewish population while preserving immunity for the leadership responsible.

And it would not be treated as simply another exchange in an ongoing regional confrontation.

Israel must retain the freedom to determine the appropriate response to any specific attack, taking account of its severity, attribution and broader strategic circumstances.

But that flexibility must never be confused with hesitation over the fundamental principle.

The Iranian regime must know that deliberately crossing the threshold into radiological or chemical warfare would fundamentally change the nature of the confrontation.

The lesson of Jewish history is not that every threat must be answered with immediate force. It is that the Jewish people cannot afford to dismiss threats whose consequences could be catastrophic.

A responsible government prepares for the worst precisely because it hopes to prevent it.

Israel must not wait for the first radiological contamination incident, the first chemical attack or the first mass-casualty event to discover whether its deterrence doctrine was sufficiently clear.

By then, the strategic failure will already have occurred.

Israel’s red lines must be drawn before they are crossed.

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