Mossad said Hamas did not want conflict two weeks before Oct. 7 attack

“Hamas’ calculated policy,” the paper said, “is to increase the benefits to civilians.”

By Batya Jerenberg, World Israel News

Two weeks before the Hamas invasion and massacre on Oct. 7, 2023, the Mossad circulated a position paper stating that the terror organization was not interested in fighting Israel, Channel 12 News reported Saturday.

“It is clear that the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip is not interested in a military confrontation with Israel at this time, but it is also not deterred from one if it is forced upon it,” the document stated.

“Hamas’ calculated policy,” the paper said, “is to increase the benefits to civilians.”

This included Jerusalem offering to raise the number of workers being allowed into Israel from Gaza in order to help gain quiet on the border – a move that was promoted four months before the invasion by Mossad head David Barnea, among others.

“Thus, on the one hand, its military leadership is careful not to come out with accusations against Israel that would force it to react and is showing great caution in using its forces in response to Israeli steps,” the Mossad document explained, while being “at high alert” to react militarily to possible Israeli actions to thwart Hamas in the Strip.

The bottom line, according to Israel’s equivalent of the American CIA, was that “the broad interest of the Hamas leadership in Gaza is to avoid escalation at this time.”

When asked for its response to the report, the Mossad stated, “The division of responsibilities among intelligence agencies, as defined by the political echelon since 2005, established … that the Mossad is not responsible for strategic warnings regarding the Palestinian arena and therefore also did not operate in the Gaza Strip. Consequently, the weight of the aforementioned document in decision-making processes was minimal to negligible.”

Israel’s equivalent to the FBI, the Shabak (General Security Services), is officially in charge of the sector along with the IDF, including gathering intelligence using human agents and electronic means and running special operations in Palestinian areas.

Reporter Omri Maniv called the reaction “pretty astonishing,” asking rhetorically, “

If you lack responsibility for the Gaza Strip and are ignorant of events there, why publish a thorough and detailed report claiming a confrontation with Hamas is unexpected, and that Hamas has no interest in conflict now?”

The Mossad’s position paper reflected the mistaken mindset of the entire top security echelon regarding Hamas intentions that was prevalent for months before Oct. 7.

This led the IDF to ignore intelligence reports, warning signs such as Gazan terrorists openly practicing the takeover of a Jewish settlement, as reported by army observers on the border, and even moves made by Hamas in the hours preceding its invasion that indicated a major operation was about to occur.

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