The choices Saudi Arabia must now make – opinion

Mohammed bin Salman should realize that the real key to security in Saudi Arabia rests in Riyadh and in the strategies he pursues.

By Michael Rubin, Middle East Forum

The dust has settled in Yemen after the Houthis’ lightning offensive to seize Mokha and nearby Perim Island.

The Houthis remain in place. Subsequent Saudi Arabian bombardment of the Mokha airport was of limited lasting value.

President Donald Trump’s proposal to sell the Saudis F-35 Joint Strike Fighters may symbolically suggest solidarity, but between delivery and training, they will not impact the operational environment until the next decade.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bears responsibility.

Often for better, but sometimes for worse, he has consolidated control over decision-making.

Just as he deserves credit for Saudi Vision 2030 and social changes, so, too, does he bear responsibility for the Kingdom’s diplomatic, foreign policy, and military choices.

Yes, those in finance and risk advisory whose analyses rely more on facts than diplomatic niceties or a desire to ingratiate themselves to decision-makers in Riyadh now consider a Saudi Arabia without bin Salman in a way they did not a month ago.

The Saudi economy can weather the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb, but not both, especially as the Kingdom’s economic transformation already rests upon deficit spending.

What could bin Salman do differently to resolve the Houthi problem and better secure Saudi Arabia’s long-term growth?

First, he must end the self-defeating competition he has with the United Arab Emirates.

There is healthy rivalry and dysfunctional rivalry, and the current dynamic between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is the latter.

Abu Dhabi deserves some blame but the Emiratis are right to resent and resist bin Salman’s tolerance of the Muslim Brotherhood abroad.

There are no angels in the Sudanese civil war, and even the Rapid Support Forces’ allies acknowledge its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” is a problem.

Still, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s tolerance for both the Houthis and the Muslim Brotherhood carries long-term security implications for the Red Sea and for Saudi Arabia’s own security.

The Sudanese civil war is a manifestation of dysfunctional Riyadh-Abu Dhabi ties in other ways, as the Sudanese officers who respectively fought alongside the Saudi and Emirati contingents in Yemen a decade ago now face each other down in Sudan.

In Libya and Somalia, too, bin Salman’s policy risks blowback. Bin Salman may consider Libya too far away to matter, but his support for Abdul Hamid Dbeibah is destructive.

If bin Salman is going to pick a side, he should ensure its leader is competent.

Not only is Dbeibah hopelessly corrupt, but he gives haven to Islamist militias that he cannot control, many of whom look at Mecca and Medina as the ultimate prize.

Indeed, while bin Salman finds common ground with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over joint antipathy toward Israel’s sovereignty and control over Jerusalem, bin Salman should not kid himself: Erdoğan also wants control over Mecca and Medina.

Saudi leaders derive their legitimacy as custodians of the two Holy Mosques, but the leaders of bin Salman seek internationalization under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation of the two cities’ holy sites.

Saudi Arabia plays a poor hand in Somalia as well. Riyadh sides with Mogadishu primarily because it resents Hargeisa’s ties with Abu Dhabi and, more recently, Jerusalem.

This represents double defeatism on Saudi Arabia’s part.

First, bin Salman’s hatred of Emirati President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed leads Saudi Arabia into bed with Qatar and Turkey, both of whom envision a Somalia whose foreign policy and tolerance for militancy will be at odds with Saudi Arabia’s security.

Second, bin Salman’s hostility toward Somaliland represents weakness on his part since it signals that he does not believe he can outcompete with the United Arab Emirates.

If Turkey can maintain an embassy in Mogadishu and a separate consulate in Hargeisa, there should be no reason why Saudi Arabia cannot do the same.

Many Somalilanders remain frustrated with Abu Dhabi’s prevarication; a more forward-thinking Saudi leadership would compete positively and try to sway Somaliland into closer partnership.

Realistically, Riyadh may wish Somaliland away but a region that has operated independently for 35 years is not going to go away, regardless of recognition.

Yemen, however, is the big source of Saudi failure. After the shock of Mokha, bin Salman must free himself from yes-men and sycophants who shield him from the reality of Yemen.

Rather than see Emirati influence in the country as part of a zero-sum game, bin Salman should understand and ask his generals why the Emiratis seemingly have performed better both militarily and politically.

There are two reasons: First are the drawbacks of a zero-defects policy. If Saudi officers are afraid to report what is wrong for fear they will be blamed, then problems compound rather than resolve.

Bin Salman must change the culture of his military to reward identification of problems rather than their concealment.

Second, bin Salman should understand tribal engagement is key to Abu Dhabi’s success. In southern Yemen at least, Riyadh bungles tribal engagement in much the same way that Washington fumbled tribal relations in Iraq.

Riyadh’s dictation backfires. Ironically, given Saudi Arabia’s own tribal governance, Riyadh must remember that there is no substitute for relationships built slowly over tea-drinking, coffee, or qat, and constant consultations and coddling.

As in Libya and Sudan, bin Salman also must be consistent with the Muslim Brotherhood.

If he considers it a terrorist group inside Saudi Arabia, he should also do so outside. To cynically appease jihadists by offering them the ability to pursue their agenda outside Saudi Arabia’s borders not only ignores the history of those like Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, who once made the same bargain but also makes him a terror sponsor.

Islah—Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood affiliate—can never be a trusted partner for Saudi Arabia.

Muslim Brotherhood leaders will accept Saudi largesse, but they will not hesitate to turn on the Kingdom or strike separate deals with its enemies.

The case of Islah member Amjad Khalid personifies such deceit, as he aided both the Houthis and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Salman also should reconsider his blanket opposition to supposed secessionism, especially with Somaliland and South Yemen.

First, it might be the wrong term when both countries have far longer histories of independence and self-rule.

When Egypt and Syria’s merger into the United Arab Republic failed, their re-emergence did not represent separatism.

Nor does Saudi Arabia consider Qatar’s separation from Bahrain to be separatism—even though, compared with both Somaliland and South Yemen, it is a more extreme example.

Just as with Somaliland, an autonomous or independent South Yemen need not be anti-Saudi; its tilt against Riyadh is simply a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Saudi Arabia’s choice now is an expansionist Houthi emirate or an alliance with South Yemen and Somaliland to help Riyadh contain, roll back, and perhaps even eliminate the Houthis.

Finally, if Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman wants to survive the crisis, he must recognize that his diplomatic strategy in Washington, DC, is lousy.

Gone are the days when Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud could simply manage the relationship with presidents from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush on speed dial, while he ignored others across Washington.

His daughter Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, although familiar with Washington, does not have the same relationships, nor can she operate in the same way, yet she and Saudi diplomats can go years between engagements with those whom they cannot buy.

Instead, bin Salman and Princess Reema defer to the older strategy of paying consultants and online trolls to punish critics, rather than to convince them.

Policies evolve and shift—Qatar is now more partner than adversary—but bridges once burned are difficult to restore.

When Saudi trolls accuse any critic of being on foreign payrolls, they make fools of the Saudi government because their ad hominem attacks suggest they cannot argue on the merits, and their projection exposes Saudi Arabia’s own default tactics of outreach based on cash rather than principle.

Today, Saudi Arabia is aligning with Turkey and Pakistan to bolster its own security.

It is also hedging its bets by balancing the United States with China. Fair enough.

But bin Salman should realize that the real key to security in Saudi Arabia rests in Riyadh and in the strategies he pursues.

The Houthi conquest of Mokha and Perim was an avoidable disaster.

Bin Salman should ask what he did wrong that led to this crisis. If he refuses, he will compound his error, perhaps beyond the point of no return.

That would be a tragedy not only for a new generation of Saudis who have come to rely on bin Salman’s reforms but also for the United States.

Mohammed bin SalmanpolicySaudi Arabia